CHECK SIX: The F-4 Phantom's F3H Demon Roots

With yesterday being the 58th anniversary of the F-4 Phantom II's maiden flight, here's some interesting trivia. There is actually a continuous line of evolution from the McDonnell F3H Demon to the F-4 Phantom (which was designated F4H when it first flew). This photo is of the full scale mock up of the main missing link that connects the F3H Demon to the F4H Phantom. In 1953, the McDonnell team headed by Herman Barkey was looking at ways of extending the Demon's viability and expanding its versatility. McDonnell had the in house designation F3H-X for the design as it was considered an evolution of the Demon. 

F3H-C "Super Demon": This design was first, it was powered by a single J67 engine. The J67 was to be have been a license-built version of the Rolls Royce Olympus. No J67s were ever built in the US and the Navy wasn't keen on an unproven engine. 

F3H-E: This was different enough from the Demon that it was given the Model 98A designator. It was also powered by the J67 but had a bigger wing than the Demon and had a level stance on the ground instead of the nose-high stance of the Demon.

Full scale mock up of the F3H-G design
(Wikipedia)

F3H-G (Model 98B): This one had twin J65 engines, a license built British Sapphire engine like that used on the Hawker Hunter. It had lateral intakes that looked more like the Phantoms and exhausts that looked also more like the eventual Phantom design. The Navy was attracted to twin engines for safety. The wing was also further enlarged from the F3H-E. It had four 20mm cannon and had an impressive external stores capability. 

F3H-H: This was was the F3H-G but with two of the then-new and promising GE J79 engines. 

Model 98C: Delta winged version of the F3H-G/98B with J65 engines. 

Model 98D: Delta winged version of the F3H-G/98B with J79 engines. 

F3H-J (Model 98E): Similar to the 98C/D, but with an even larger delta wing. 

Model 98F: Recon version of the 98C. 

Tail section of the F3H-G mockup showing the two different engine sizes-
The J79 was on the right side, the J65 was on the left side.
(Wikipedia)

Barkey's team decided the F3H-G/98B was the most promising of the designs and built a full scale mockup, but one side was sized for the J65 engine and the other side sized for the J79 engine. On 19 September 1953 McDonnell submitted the design as an unsolicited proposal to the Navy. Though impressed with the design, the Navy had already ordered the Grumman F11F Tiger and Vought F8U Crusader for its supersonic fighter needs. The Navy, however, encouraged Herman Barkley's team to refine the design to meet an all-weather attack requirement. This design was submitted to the Navy in 1954 and two prototypes were ordered as the AH-1 which had four 20mm cannon and eleven weapons stations. 

F4H full scale mock up showing the originally
planned trapeze launchers for the Sparrow missiles.
(Wikipedia)

The following year the all-weather attack program was canceled and McDonnell was asked to redesign the AH-1 into a two-seat interceptor with a single centerline station for a 600-gallon fuel tank and AIM-7 Sparrow capability. The J65 engine was dropped from contention when the Chief of Naval Operations selected the J79 engine for the new aircraft which would be designated F4H Phantom II. 

And the rest is history! 

Further reading: 

The Ad Hoc Solutions to Get Air-to-Ground Capability in the Navy's Phantoms in Vietnam

Rivet Haste: Rebirth of the USAF at the End of Vietnam

The Mach 3 Phantom

The Flamboyant Markings of VF-51's Phantoms in Vietnam

The Ault Report: Improving USN Fighter Effectiveness

The First Successful Combat Drops of Laser Guided Bombs

VFP-62 "Eyes of the Fleet" and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

Over the course of the Second World War, photoreconnaissance in the US Navy progressed from rudimentary handheld photography from whatever aircraft was available to reconnaissance variants of carrier fighters equipped with cameras in fuselage bays. The reconnaissance mission was carried out usually by the fighter squadrons in the carrier air wing (which were still called carrier air groups back then) and in the years after the war, small groups of combat-seasoned photo recon pilots were usually attached to carrier air groups but no standard training, syllabus or even squadron existed for the reconnaissance mission. That all began to change in 1948 when Fleet Air Service Squadron THEE formed a photographic detachment at NAS Norfolk, Virginia. On 8 January 1949, 13 officers and 88 enlisted personnel gathered to form Composite Squadron SIXTY-TWO (VC-62) at Norfolk, with a sister squadron, VC-61, formed on the West Coast at NAS Miramar, California, to serve the Pacific Fleet. The squadrons were tasked to train and perform the photo reconnaissance mission. The first aircraft of the units were photo variants of the Bearcat and Corsair- the Grumman F8F-2P (the P suffix designating a recon variant) and the Vought F4U-4P and -5P. Though specialized for the recon mission, that's a loosely used term since the aircraft carried a single camera in a fuselage bay and the pilots were still considered fighter pilots and VC-61 and VC-62's training regimen still required proficiency in gunnery, rocketry and bombing missions with extra emphasis on navigation. 

A VFP-62 F2H-2P Banshee aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Wikipedia)

Of the two squadrons, VC-62 would soon become famous. The unit was transferred from Norfolk to NAS Jacksonville and converted to the McDonnell F2H-2P Banshee which was a quantum leap in performance over the Bearcats and Corsairs as not only was the Banshee jet powered, but its extended nose bay housed multiple cameras that could photograph targets from over 40,000 feet. In 1953, VC-62 added the swept wing Grumman F9F-6P Cougar to its existing fleet of Banshees. Camera technology also progressed in this time to allow sharper and better quality photos from aircraft moving at much higher speeds than piston-engined aircraft. The arrival of the jets also meant that the pilots no longer had guns to shoot back- the recon variants of the jets were unarmed, requiring the use of speed, maneuverability and sharp mission planning to get home with the photos. On 2 July 1956, VC-62 was redesigned VFP-62 and VC-61 became VFP-63. Two years later, VFP-62 got one of the finest naval photo reconnaissance aircraft in the form of the Vought F8U-1P Crusader. 

A VFP-62 F9F-6P Cougar overflies the USS Essex
(Wikipedia)

The Crusader wasn't just fast, it also had the latest in state of the art camera technology in the -1P recon variant. At the speed of the Crusader, especially at low levels, the images would have been blurred, but the four cameras of the -1P Crusader had what was called IMC (Image Motion Compensation). A set of avionics boxes with controls in the cockpit coordinated the aircraft's speed and altitude with the camera equipment. During a photo run, a vacuum sucked the film frame against a moving shuttle- when the shutter opened, the shuttle would move the film frame in the opposite direction of flight at a speed that canceled out the forward speed of the Crusader for that brief moment. When the shutter closed, the vacuum released the film frame and the next frame entered the shuttle. This process took place with each of the Crusader's four cameras multiple times in a second depending upon the target, the aircraft's speed and altitude, and ambient lighting conditions. The IMC electronics also made sure the frames overlapped the ground to insure a required level of coverage of of the target. 

In 1958, the same year as the conversion to the F8U-1P Crusader, VFP-62 moved to NAS Cecil Field outside of Jacksonville as it had outgrown its Jacksonville base. It was an unusually large squadron compared to most Crusader fighter squadrons on account that it sent detachments of carrier air wings- a typical photo detachment might be three aircraft with 35 officers and enlisted men. The squadron could have multiple detachments deployed worldwide at any given moment. 

A VFP-62 F8U-1P Crusader tanks from an A4D-2 Skyhawk
(Wikipedia)

On 1 January 1959, the revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro defeated Fulgencio Batista's regime in Cuba, putting the island nation square in the communist sphere of influence. Needless to say, having a Soviet client state just 90 miles from American shores would greatly influence the foreign and defense policy of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. John F. Kennedy won the 1960 presidential elections against Richard Nixon on a strong anti-Castro platform, campaigning that Nixon, as Eisenhower's vice-president, was weak on Cuba. Unfortunately for Kennedy, this put him in a position after entering office of accepting the plan for the invasion of Cuba by US-trained Cuban exiles at a location called the Bay of Pigs. On 18 April 1961, a force of 1,400 Cuban exiles landed ashore at the Bay of Pigs as the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF) with plans to start a counter-revolution against Castro. Kennedy was keen to limit the appearance and extent of American involvement and the CIA-trained CEF force had its fleet of Douglas B-26 Invader aircraft cut in half as part of that effort. The young president wanted the CEF to look like a home grown force than a US-backed force to prevent a superpower confrontation. The operation was doomed from the start and when it became clear that the CEF was in over its head against Castro's forces the following day, Kennedy ordered a secret photo assessment of the situation on the ground at the Bay of Pigs. 

VFP-62 had three F8U-1Ps as part of Detachment 41 assigned to the USS Independence which was in the area for contingency operations should US air support be needed (which it was but was never authorized). Det 41's commander was ordered to paint over any military markings and even the maintenance stencils were overpainted in gray. Roman numerals I, II, and III, were painted inside the wheel wells to tell the aircraft apart as they were completely sanitized of any exterior markings. The Crusaders were identified as "Gray Ghost" and then "One", "Two", or "Three" during flight operations. They conducted a series of flights over the Bay of Pigs which confirmed that the CEF was about to be overrun by Castro's forces. It was hoped that the low level overflights of the area might give Castro's forces pause that the CEF might be defended by US airstrikes and give the beleaguered exiles time to regroup, but this wasn't to be the case and the CEF was roundly defeated with those not killed taken prisoner. 

A VFP-62 F8U-1P Crusader prepares to launch from the USS Independence
(Wikipedia)

The USS Independence and its carrier air wing were awarded the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for its clandestine operation, but even after the disaster at the Bay of Pigs had passed, VFP-62 was requested to remain in the area to keep an eye on Cuba. Up until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the squadron would make periodic flights to Cuba, mostly staging out of NAS Cecil Field. Flights of two aircraft would then "pretend" to making practice approaches to NAS Key West and dash to Cuba at low level. Other missions had two Crusaders appear as a flight transiting to Guantanamo Bay and then dash down at low level before recovering at Homestead AFB in Florida. 

VFP-62's missions would soon take on added urgency as October 1962 approached. But that's a subject for a future article here at Tails Through Time! 

Further reading: 

Vought's Not-So-Fearsome F6U Pirate

The First American Covert Overflights of the Soviet Union

The U-2's Antecedent: The Martin RB-57D Canberra

Taiwan's Secret Recon Voodoos

Project Palladium: Testing Soviet Radars

Source: Blue Moon Over Cuba: Aerial Reconnaissance during the Cuban Missile Crisis by Capt. William B. Ecker USN and Kenneth V. Jack. Osprey Publishing, 2012, pp 33-50.

How the Lockheed P-80 Saved McDonnell Aircraft

In 1942 James McDonnell was summoned to Washington to meet with officials from the US Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer). At the time McDonnell Aircraft only built parts for other aircraft manufacturers at its St. Louis facilities and only had one aircraft program going, the XP-67 Moonbat fighter. To McDonnell's surprise, BuAer asked McDonnell and his small team to design a carrier-based jet fighter. Not having had any prior experience worked in McDonnell's favor- the Navy felt that he was free of any bias or prejudices and was therefore most likely to come up with an innovative design. McDonnell's design would be come the FD-1/FH-1 Phantom, the first purpose-built carrier-borne jet fighter. But BuAer's decision was not without its controversy in the Navy and to satisfy the critics, it was agreed to evaluate an existing jet fighter that by that point was only a year from its first flight- the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, which first flew in June 1944. With a more powerful engine, the P-80 was faster than the FD-1 Phantom. In early 1945, the Navy purchased two P-80 Shooting Stars for evaluation, one of which would be suitably modified for evaluation as a carrier-borne fighter. 

The first Navy P-80 was flown from Lockheed's California facility to the Navy's flight test center at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, incidentally becoming the first transcontinental jet flight on 29 June 1945 (though it wasn't a nonstop jet flight). The pilot was a young 1st Lt. Najeeb Halaby, at the time a US Navy test pilot who later on would become the FAA Administrator under JFK and later become CEO of Pan Am. The plan was to conduct shore-based trials first before going through with ship-board trials. Through 1946 the P-80 was flown in mock combat against the Navy's main fighter of the day, the Grumman F8F Bearcat. Though not as maneuverable as the Bearcat, the P-80 had the luxury of speed to engage and disengage in combat much to the Bearcat pilots' frustration. The second P-80 arrived at NAS Patuxent River in December 1945 after being modified by Lockheed with a tailhook, catapult hooks (for use with a catapult bridle) and a catapult shuttle holdback. Shore-based tests to simulate carrier operations were used to determine the operating parameters for the P-80 on the carrier deck. Catapult shots were easily accomplished on land-based gear, but it was found that the P-80 was exceptionally clean aerodynamically on approach and had to be "flown" onto the deck, but the nose gear design was too weak for a firm carrier-style three-point landing. But if the P-80 landed to hard on its mains, it would rock forward and the hook would miss the arresting wires. 

After more testing, the project pilot, the legendary Marine Corps ace Lt. Col. Marion Carl and his LSO managed to determine the proper approach speed (just 5 mph above the stall speed of the P-80) and flare to minimize the forward rocking motion on landing. Though the margin was considered too close to the stall speed, Carl found that the P-80 had good stall warnings well in advance of the actual stall. On 1 November 1946 Carl took the P-80 to sea aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt. Catapult launches and arrested landings were made safely, but it was found that the P-80 needed 900 feet of deck with 35 knots of wind over the deck to take off without the catapult, over twice the distance the McDonnell FD-1 required. To put that into perspective, the length of the FDR's flight deck was just shy of 961 feet! It was also found that the J33 engine of the P-80 took as long as 2 minutes to spool up to full power after starting, which would greatly lengthen the deck launching cycle. From catapult takeoff, one circuit in the carrier landing pattern, and then an arrested landing, the P-80 used 37 gallons of fuel. By comparison, the Vought F4U Corsair only used 6 gallons. 

The next phase of carrier testing then involved flying the P-80 at operational loads which also included use of the tip tanks that were a fixture on USAF aircraft during the Korean War. It was quickly found that in this more realistic configuration the catapults of the day even with a strong wind over the deck were unable to launch the P-80. In addition, the wing structure where the tanks were attached was too weak and a stronger catapult would have just launched the P-80, leaving its tip tanks behind!

Before the carrier tests were performed, some in the Navy unhappy with BuAer's decision to go with McDonnell wanted to purchase the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star instead. Lockheed even did some design work on what they called a P-80B for the Navy which would have had the Navy designation FO-1 (Lockheed's designator become V in the 1950s, so it would have been then known as FV-1). The deck trials quickly ended this proposal and McDonnell would go on to develop a whole line of fighters for the Navy from FD-1 Phantom, the F2H Banshee, the F3H Demon, the superlative F-4 Phantom II and today's F/A-18 Hornet. The Navy, did however, buy 50 P-80s to be used as shore-based trainers to allow naval aviators to gain jet experience. VF-6A (later renumbered VF-52) at NAS North Island and Marine squadron VMF-311 at MCAS El Toro operated the P-80s. Lockheed did, however, develop the TV-2 SeaStar based on the Lockheed T-33 in the 1950s. The T-33 required an extensive amount of modification to be suitable for carrier operation. In 1962 the TV-2 was redesignated the T-1 and was ultimately replaced by the North American T-2 Buckeye.

Source: U.S. Naval Air Superiority- Developement of Shipborne Jet Fighters 1943-1962 by Tommy H. Thompson. Specialty Press, 2008, p23-33.

Taiwan's Secret Recon Voodoos

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in 1958 when artillery units of the People's Republic of China bombarded the Nationalist islands of Quemoy and Matsu in a bid to retake them from Taiwan. In a bombardment that began in August of that year, nearly 450,000 shells were fired at the two Taiwanese islands in a standoff that also saw the first use of the AIM-9 Sidewinder when Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) F-86 Sabres engaged PLAAF MiGs over the Taiwan Strait. During the crisis, US naval units were in the area to protect sea lines of communication from Taiwan to the two island outposts. As the crisis ended after 44 days in a stalemate, the US government decided that it needed more information on the disposition of Chinese forces on the PRC side of the strait. Some information came from RB-69 flights by Taiwanese crews and later clandestine P-3 Orion overflights also took place. But the RoCAF's reconnaissance F-86 Sabres and the RB-69s were increasingly vulnerable to improving Chinese defenses on the mainland. In November 1959, the USAF started Operation Boom-Town, a secret effort to utilize the much faster McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo in high speed, low level overflights of the mainland. 

Chiang Kai-Shek authorized the formation of the 4th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (CRS) at Taipei AB in Taiwan. Initially operating Republic RF-84F Thunderflash jets, the pilots selected for the 4th CRS were the veritable "cream of the crop" of the RoCAF. The USAF's 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) based at Kadena AB in Okinawa was selected to provide material support and training for the 4th CRS to convert to the RF-101 Voodoo. The first group of RoCAF pilots trained at Okinawa under conditions of great secrecy. In 1964 the 4th CRS completed its transition to the RF-101 Voodoo and aircraft were flown directly from the 15th TRS' flightline to Taiwan, whereupon they were immediately hangared and repainted in RoCAF markings. Officially the 4th CRS was an all-Taiwanese operation, but the USAF maintained an advisory presence at the RoCAF base, being officially designated as "Detachment 1, 13th Air Force, Shaw AFB, South Carolina, Taipei" (Shaw AFB being the homebase of all USAF reconnaissance Voodoo operations). Pilots and maintenance crew from the 15th TRS at Kadena were rotated secretly back and forth to work with the 4th CRS to keep the Voodoos there flying on missions over mainland China.

Officially the Taiwanese government stated that the Voodoos were purchased to maintain surveillance capability around the waters of Taiwan, but the RoCAF Voodoo pilots frequently trained in air-refueling with USAF KB-50s deployed to the area. The RF-101 already had an impressive internal fuel capacity that gave it an impressive range for a Century-series jet. Air-refueling simply gave the RoCAF pilots the range to reach targets deep inside the mainland.

The RoCAF Voodoo overflight program ended in 1970 with the possible shootdown of one RF-101 over the mainland, quite an impressive record given the speed at which the Taiwanese pilots converted to the Voodoo and the number of reported overflights conducted. Most of the Voodoos were returned to the United States, but one remains on static display in Taiwan.

Source: Voodoo Warriors: The Story of the McDonnell Voodoo Fast Jets by Nigel Walpole. Pen and Sword, 2007, p105-106.

Robin Olds and the Nuclear Voodoos

When SAC lost interest in the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo as a bomber escort, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) saw potential in the big fighter as a tactical nuclear bomber given its large fuel capacity and solid low-level stability. With the support of the commander of the US Air Forces Europe, General Frank Everest, and the USAF Vice-Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, the single-seat F-101A and F-101C Voodoos were assigned to the 81st Tactical Fighter Wing in the UK at the twin bases in Suffolk at RAF Bentwaters and Woodbridge. There the Voodoos replaced the nuclear-capable Republic F-84Fs previously based there that were assigned targets in the East Germany, Poland, and the Baltic republics. Because of the nuclear delivery role of the 81st TFW, the wing tended to have more senior officers as pilots than other USAFE fighter wings of the time. Voodoos on "Victor Alert" were fueled and armed with a single tactical nuclear bomb on the centerline station between the two external fuel tanks. The 81st TFW began its nuclear alert duties with the F-101A/C at the end of 1958. 

Because of the nuclear role of the 81st TFW, many of the pilots assigned would later become generals within the USAF in their careers. In August of 1963, two famous USAF pilots came to the 81st TFW to assume command. Colonel Robin Olds, already an ace from the Second World War and Korea became the wing commander and Lt. Colonel Daniel "Chappie" James would be his Director of Operations. Men of the 81st TFW fondly remembered them as "Blackman and Robin". 

The choice of Olds to lead the wing was surprising to many given Olds' extensive background in air combat. Some even thought him unsuitable to command a tactical nuclear bomber wing. But his enthusiasm, skill, and reputation endeared him to the men of the wing and Olds surprised even his harshest detractors. Olds selected an F-101 with a serial number ending in "001" because, as he put it, "The boss should have Balls 1 as his personal mount." The morale of the unit was the utmost importance to the command staff at USAFE, which may have been the reason Robin Olds was selected to command the unit. The reason was simple- during a time of war, the Voodoos of the 81st TFW would have to fly in low and fast across the Iron Curtain to drop nuclear bombs on tactical targets in the rear flank areas of the Warsaw Pact's immense armored forces in East Germany. The defenses along the way were already dense and the Voodoos had no onboard ECM systems like SAC's bombers did. They would rely on speed and penetration altitudes as low as 50 feet to reach their targets in even the worst weather using the radars that had been upgraded to provide ground mapping functions. Many of the targets were beyond the combat radius of the Voodoo and the men were told they'd refuel from KB-50 tankers over the North Sea, but in a war, many knew that the missions would be one way with little chance of safe return to the UK. 

Knowing their assigned mission was one-way at best, having Olds as their commander was key to morale. Not only did Olds relish in the challenge of commanding the 81st TFW which was nothing like he had done before, he was eager to show the pilots the strengths of the F-101 Voodoo at low-level. Olds worked his man hard and had the Voodoos modified with one of the 20mm cannon being removed to make room for TACAN equipment to help with training missions. Olds set up an intensive series of training missions for his pilots and it wasn't unusual for a pilot sitting Victor Alert to be scrambled in an evaluation of his performance. Olds' rigorous training regimen no doubt would have made even Curtis LeMay proud. 

In 1964 the 81st TFW was notified that they would be soon transitioning to the McDonnell F-4C Phantom and would have start training for close air support missions. Though the Voodoo was far from ideal in CAS roles, Olds nonetheless trained them in CAS to prepare them for the transition to the Phantom which did have a CAS role for the USAFE and NATO. In order to keep the morale of the wing up, Olds set up an aerobatic unit to showcase the F-101's capabilities with four formation aircraft and one solo aircraft. Olds believed even the big Voodoo could be maneuverable if handled properly and the team trained in addition to their regular training duties. Olds, however, in his often maverick style, set up the team on his own accord without consulting his superior officers and his impending promotion to General along with a planned citation for his work in leading the 81st TFW were immediately scuppered. Olds was reassigned to a non-flying staff position as punishment for starting an aerobatic team. 

Only nine months elapsed before Colonel Olds was flying again, this time he was in Arizona converting to the F-4 Phantom. Olds would fly as much as three times a day to understand the quirks and advantages of the Phantom and found himself being called upon again to raise morale for another Air Force unit, this time the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing "Wolfpack" at RTAFB Ubon in Thailand which was suffering losses at the hands of North Vietnamese MiGs. During his tenure with the Wolfpack at Ubon, Olds ordered that no Voodoo reconnaissance pilot should have to buy his own drink at the officers' club at the base!

Source: Voodoo Warriors: The Story of the McDonnell Voodoo Fast Jets by Nigel Walpole. Pen and Sword, 2007, p119-131.

The Ault Report: Improving USN Fighter Effectiveness

After the dismal performance of the naval fighter pilots during the Rolling Thunder campaign in Vietnam between 1964 to 1968, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Thomas Moorer, ordered a wide-ranging and critical review of US Navy air-to-air missile performance during the first half of the war. He put in charge of the study Captain Frank Ault, who served as captain of the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea in 1966-67. During Ault's command of the Coral Sea, his air wing suffered fifty combat losses, three of them to North Vietnamese MiG fighters and only a single air-to-air victory by the entire air wing. He had made suggestions on improving the performance in particular of the semi-active radar homing AIM-7 Sparrow and in 1968 he was commissioned by the CNO to review the Navy's air-to-air weapons, training and tactics in what is now known as the Ault Report.

The most visible result of Ault's investigation and recommendations was the creation of the Navy's Fighter Weapons School better known as TOPGUN. But Ault's purview also included a review of missile performance as the Navy's F-4 Phantoms had no guns and had rely on missiles for air-to-air kills. In the Ault Report's review of missile performance, the maintenance of the missiles themselves came under scrutiny.

During the conflict in Vietnam, there were numerous occasions where the AIM-7 Sparrow had been fired correctly, but the solid rocket motor failed to ignite and propel the missile to the target or the electronics failed altogether, creating "one expensive unguided rocket". Rather than load "fresh" Sparrow missiles to the underfuselage recesses on the Phantom before each mission, the hard-pressed carrier deck crews often left the delicate missiles on the aircraft for the next mission and it wasn't unusual for a Sparrow missile to sit in its recess on the Phantom for months at a time, flying mission after mission (it was common for an unfired Sparrow missile to fly over 50 missions before it was demounted for maintenance work) and the delicate electronics getting jarred repeatedly by multiple catapult shots and arrested landings. In addition, the tropical moisture and salt air as well as the changes in temperature from the heat of the carrier deck to the freezing cold of the Phantom's cruising altitudes took their toll on the Sparrow missiles.

During the same time period the USAF's standard was to at least demount the missile and bench check the electronics and systems after every ten missions flown. Simple maintenace procedures were found to vastly improve the reliability of the Sparrow missiles. For example, there was a disposable "wafer" switch that allowed an electrical connection between the Sparrow's rocket motor and the Phantom. This switch was designed as a one-time use item to be removed at the end of a mission and replaced with a new switch, but in the interests of saving time and money, Navy Phantom squadrons never changed out the component which caused it to corrode and fail, causing a significant number of the Sparrow missile malfunctions.

While TOPGUN is the most visible result of the Ault Report, his recommendations would wide-ranging implications that not only increased the combat effectiveness of the US Navy's fighter squadrons in Vietnam, but also influenced contractor and logistical support of all of the Navy's aviation assets in years to come.

Source: Gray Ghosts: US Navy and Marine Corps F-4 Phantoms by Peter E. Davies. Schiffer Publishing, 2000, p139-140.

Unlike the Navy's F-4 Phantoms which operated from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Phantoms of the US Marine Corps operated from two land bases in support of Marine troops- Da Nang and Chu Lai. Da Nang housed both USAF and USMC units and in the summer of 1966, Chu Lai was built to relieve the congestion at Da Nang- the first Marine Phantom and Skyhawk units at Chu Lai, though, had to use SATS- short airfield for tactical support- which was pretty much the elements of a carrier deck from the catapults and arresting gear used on a land based. The SATS equipment was used until the main runway at Chu Lai was completed in the following year.

Marine Phantoms sat "hot pad alert" at both Chu Lai and Da Nang. The Phantoms were usually loaded with a combination of Mk.82 Snakeye bombs and napalm. At each end of the runways were revetments for the alert Phantoms that allowed them to start up and head out immediately on the runway.

Marine crews rotated eight hour shifts on hot pad alert. There were at least two crews sitting in a ready room adjacent to the hot pad fully suited up and waiting for the urgent call for air support by a Marine unit in the field. The F-4s were full preflighted at the start of each eight hour period and the same ground crews worked the same eight hour shifts to keep the planes "cocked and ready". Once the alert bell went off, the crews made the short run to their aircraft where the plane captains got them strapped in while the RIO got the information on the target, the forward air controller to contact and the necessary frequencies while the pilot got the big fighter started up. Once cleared by the tower and the chocks were pulled, the two alert Phantoms rolled out and onto the runway for an afterburner takeoff. With practice, the flight and ground crews could get the alert Phantoms airborne within five minutes of the alert bell going off.

Should the alert crews be launched, there were two back up flight crews, one on 15-minute alert and one on one-hour alert. As soon as the alert Phantoms were launched, a new pair of aircraft were rolled onto the hot pad already armed and fueled and preflighted by the ground crews. The flight crew on 15-minute alert then became the new alert crew and the one-hour alert crew moved up to the 15-minute spot. If things in the field were hectic (like it was during the siege of the Marine Corps firebase at Khe Sanh, there would a crew on 30-minute alert as well.

Over the course of a week, both the A-4 Skyhawk and F-4 Phantom USMC squadrons in residence at Chu Lai and Da Nang rotated hot pad alert and at Da Nang, the F-4s of the USAF's 366th Tactical Fighter Wing also shared the hot pad alert.

The Marines also had a hot pad for air-to-air alerts for MiG activity, but this was rarely used as the Navy BARCAP (barrier combat air patrol) shouldered most of the patrols for the occasional MiG activity. It got to the point that the Marines just parked a hangar queen Phantom on the air-to-air pad for appearances!

Source: Gray Ghosts: US Navy and Marine Corps F-4 Phantoms by Peter E. Davies. Schiffer Publishing, 2000, p83-101.

The Ad Hoc Solutions to Get Air-to-Ground Capability in the Navy's Phantoms in Vietnam

When the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II was conceived, it was for the role of fleet air defense but McDonnell wisely made it strong enough to carry a sizeable bombload, a hold over from a previous design incarnation of the Phantom that was optimized for strike missions. Once the first F-4Bs headed out to the fleet, the avionics of the new fighter were geared around air defense but it did have a bombing computer- one for nuclear "toss-bombing" and one that many Phantom crews in Southeast Asia found wholly inadequate for the strike mission they were called upon to perform in the mid-1960s as the Vietnam War escalated. Many squadrons lacked any air-to-ground training and some were lucky just to get triple-ejector racks (TERs) or multiple-ejector racks (MERs) to improve their bomb-carrying capacity.

There were, however, some resourceful crews in the Navy Phantom squadrons headed to Southeast Asia. In those days, most of the Phantom pilots came from the F3H Demon and F4D Skyray communities with new RIOs (radar intercept officers) being trained by Marine Skyknight crews. Those pilots were trained in fleet air defense and didn't have any air-to-ground backgrounds but some pilots came from the attack community (A-1 Skyraider and A-4 Skyhawk) and some were proficient in gunnery having come from F-8 squadrons. Throw in a few motivated officers from the air defense group and you had the making of a solution that improved the Phantom's bombing performance in Vietnam.

The first squadron to come up with a fix to the lack of a proper bombing computer on the Phantom was VF-96 on their mid-1960s cruise aboard the USS Ranger. With the carrier stopping at Subic Bay on its way to the Gulf of Tonkin for line operations over Vietnam, the crews came up with a way remove the fixed reflector sight on the cockpit coaming of the Phantom and replace it with the lead-computing sight from the Douglas A-1 Skyraider. The Skyraider's sight allowed lead angles to be entered and based on calculations made the strike-minded pilots in the squadron, they were able to create a reasonably effective bomb sight for dive attacks. Special mounts were cast in the foundry at Subic Bay that allowed the Skyraider sights to be mounted on the Phantoms and some of the pilots tested them out before the Ranger deployed, becoming the first USN Phantom unit so equipped! Their sights even allowed for more effective use of rockets in ground attacks as well, a weapon used in flak suppression missions.

The pilots of VF-114 who were embarked on the Kitty Hawk had more lead time to prepare than VF-96. Before leaving the United States, the strike-minded pilots in the squadron calculated the sight settings to use on the existing Phantom sight to allow for dive bombing attacks at any angle between 10 to 45 degrees from various altitudes, the thought being that having more time, they might be able to make the stock Phantom sight workable. They found that carrier deck landings jarred the sight settings, repeatedly knocking the fine tunings out of whack. A resourceful ordnance officer went to Litchfield Park in Arizona where a number of retired Skyraiders were being stored and he collected enough Skyraider sights (that as I had mentioned could compute lead angles and were also quite robust) for the Phantoms of the squadron. Low profile mounts were devised that improved the visibility particularly during carrier landings and along with extra MERs and TERs that they had managed to get from a Marine attack squadron, VF-114 became the second squadron to improve its air-to-ground capability.

Both squadrons managed to this on their own without any external assistance from the Navy or McDonnell and for the most part, kept their tactics in use all the way through the 1960s!

Source: Gray Ghosts: US Navy and Marine Corps F-4 Phantoms by Peter E. Davies. Schiffer Publishing, 2000, p74-75.

In 1944 the USAAF launched the MX-472 project to examine possible solutions to giving long range intercontinental bombers like the Convair B-36 the necessary fighter escort. As air-to-air refueling wasn't in common use and there were concerns about pilot fatigue on a mission that might last up to 30 hours, the USAAF decided in 1944 that the bomber itself would have to carry its own "parasite" fighter. However, the Army Air Forces found that none of the established manufacturers of the day were interested in the project.

In St. Louis, the USAAF approached Curtiss-Wright but found them less than receptive, in the words of one engineer at Curtiss "they didn't need the aggravation". However, across town, a more obscure company led by James S. McDonnell was willing to take a risk. Having only built Fairchild AT-21 Gunner trainers under license and the failed XP-67 Moonbat fighter, McDonnell had little to lose. However, in negotiating with the Army, James McDonnell would only proceed with the parasite fighter project only if the Army would give him a contract for a conventional jet fighter in exchange. After much discussion, the Army relented and McDonnell began work on the McDonnell Model 27 which would become the XF-85 Goblin in the postwar period.

McDonnell hired away one of Curtiss-Wright's most promising designers, Herman Barkey to work on the Model 27. Having had key roles in the Curtiss Helldiver and C-46 Commando aircraft, Barkey would go on to lead roles in not only the XF-85 but also on the F2H Banshee, F3H Demon, F-4 Phantom II and the aircraft that was given to McDonnell as a quid pro quo for the Goblin project- the XF-88.

While it performed well in testing and evaluation, the nascent US Air Force changed to specifications that led to the XF-88 leading to it not being adopted by the service as previously agreed with James McDonnell. However, Barkey would further develop the XF-88 design to a larger and more capable aircraft as the F-101 Voodoo.

Source: Wings of Fame, Volume 7, Aerospace Publishing 1997. "Beyond the Frontiers: McDonnell XF-85, The Built-In Fighter" by Robert F. Dorr, p26-27.

The first laser designation system used on a fighter aircraft probably goes to the AVQ-9 Pave Light system that was first fielded by the USAF on the McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom in the late 1960s. First tested at Eglin AFB on an F-4C, the "Zot Box" was mounted on the left canopy frame of the WSO's cockpit and the aircraft had to be flown in a left pylon turn (similar to that used on the big gunships in Vietnam) so the WSO could keep the laser manually pointed at the target while other aircraft dropped the laser-guided bombs.

In case of ejection, the WSO would have to demount the "Zot Box" before ejecting, an obvious limitation that eventually led to pod mounted systems, the first of which was the AVQ-10 Pave Knife. The nickname "Zot Box" came about from the anteater character in Johnny Hart's "BC" cartoon strip.

Source: McDonnel F-4 Phantom- Spirit in the Skies, by Jon Lake and David Donald, eds. AIRtime Publishing, 2002, p136.

In the early 1950s as the McDonnell F2H Banshee was being deployed by the US Navy, one of its roles was that of a nuclear weapons delivery platform using a special pylon under the left engine. But the weight and asymmetry of a full fuel load and the nuclear bomb meant the Banshee couldn't be catapulted off the carriers of the day. The solution was for the Banshee to take off from the carrier with a light fuel load and once at higher speeds and altitudes, the safety margin increased for such an asymmetric load.

Air refueling was settled upon as the solution to the problem, with special refueling packages being developed for the North American AJ Savage bomber to carry in the bomb bay- the booster jet engine was removed from the lower aft fuselage and the refueling hose and drogue passed through what was the jetpipe. On the Banshee, a refueling probe replaced one of the 20mm cannons in the nose so the aircraft could top off its tanks from a Savage tanker after takeoff. By the end of 1953 AJ Savage tankers were deployed with Banshee squadrons giving the Navy its first jet nuclear strike capability.

It became immediately obvious to the Navy that air refueling could increase safety margins during carrier operations as before, jets could only land with enough fuel for a few attempts at landing before having to divert to a land airfield, or worse, ditch, due to maximum landing weight restrictions. Having a tanker in the carrier pattern allowed aircraft to make multiple attempts at carrier landings. By 1955 the US Navy ordered all carrier based aircraft to be capable of inflight refueling.

Not long after Douglas developed the buddy store which contained not only additional fuel but the refueling hose and drogue in a self-contained package that could be attached to any compatible aircraft in the carrier air wing from the venerable AD Skyraider to the latest tactical jets. In 1957 the first AD-6 Skyraider tanker became operational with the Navy- with the buddy store in the centerline and two wing tanks, the Skyraider tanker could remain airborne during a complete carrier landing cycle to refuel any aircraft that needed additional fuel to make another carrier landing attempt.

Designer Ed Heinemann of Douglas stated that keeping two Navy jets from ditching during carrier landing cycles "roughly paid for the development costs for the entire buddy store program."

Source: US Naval Air Superiority: Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters 1943-1962 by Tommy H. Thomason. Specialty Press, 2007, 196-199.

During the Vietnam War, the USAF developed a whole series of downward ejecting dispenser pods that were authorized for use by the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-111, and the F-4 Phantom, but in practice only the Phantom used the pods. The pods varied little in external appearance and remained with the aircraft but the submunition payloads were a diverse range of air-dropped area denial mines designed for use against vehicles and enemy troops.

The most interesting of the payloads combined the SUU-41 dispenser pod with what was called the "Gravel" mine. The Gravel mine was a small antipersonnel mine triggered by the pressure of someone stepping on it- though it didn't kill, it certainly caused ruined the foot. The mine was essentially an explosive laden bag of cloth with no type of fusing as the explosive was simply triggered by pressure. To keep the mine inert while in the SUU-41 dispenser, they were packed in liquid Freon and as such, could only be carried and dropped by specially-modified F-4Ds with monitoring equipment to use the Gravel mine.

The WSO in the backseat monitored the temperature of the ten payload bays in each of the SUU-41 pods. Once the Gravel mines warmed to a certain temperature, warning lights came on to alert the flight crew that the mines were "live" in five minutes. Ideally, the mines were dropped while still cold and as the Freon evaporated, the mines would go live. After a period of time, mine's explosives went inert.

Only a handful of Phantoms assigned to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at RTAFB Ubon in Thailand were able to use the Gravel mines.

Source: McDonnel F-4 Phantom- Spirit in the Skies, Jon Lake and David Donald, eds. AIRtime Publishing, 2002, p136.

The McDonnell F2H Banshee introduced several new capabilites for tactical fighters in US Navy despite the presence of the Grumman F9F Cougar/Panther which was in service in larger numbers.

The high altitude performance of the Banshee was put to good use in reconnaissance versions that made high altitude photo runs of Chinese and Russian targets in the Far East during the 1950s, all done with no losses on any of the Banshee missions flown.

The long legs of the Banshee also made it the Navy's first nuclear-capable tactical aircraft- a single Mk7 (1650 lbs in weight) or a single Mk8 (3200 lbs) could be carried under the starboard wing. The aircraft also had an inflight refueling probe as well. In a demonstration of the capability, Navy squadron VX-3 flew three Banshees from the USS Midway which was 100 miles east of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Refueling from AJ Savage tankers, the three Banshees went "feet dry" near St. Augustine, Florida at tree top height on their way to strike practice targets near Lake Erie. Despite all of the USAF Air Defense Command units on the entire Eastern seaboard being alerted ahead of time, the Banshees successfully hit their targets and returned to the USS Midway after a second refueling over the Atlantic from AJ Savage tankers.

The F2H Banshee was also the first Navy fighter to have a space-stabilized radar antenna in the APG-37 intercept radar. This allowed the radar to maintain a lock on target even if the aircraft maneuvered.

Source: Combat Aircraft, August/September 2009. "Screaming Banshees" by LCDR Rick Burgess USN (Ret) p68-72.