The Ryan FR-1 Fireball and F2R Dark Shark: An Evolutionary Dead-End

When the US Navy initiated the development of its first jet fighter, the McDonnell FD-1/FH-1 Phantom, in 1942, not only did it hedge its bets on McDonnell's design by carrier testing the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, but it also initiated a back up program at the insistence of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) for a mixed-powerplant fighter that combined a conventional piston radial engine with a jet engine. There were still a lot of unknowns about the operation of jet aircraft from fleet carriers and the concept of a mixed powerplant fighter would combine what was known- that a conventional radial engine had the performance for a carrier takeoff and a wave-off from landing and that a jet engine could provide a boost for high speed performance. At the same time as the start of the FD-1/FH-1 program, BuAer held a competition for a mixed-powerplant fighter which was won by San Diego-based Ryan Aeronautical Corporation which started work in 1943 on the prototype for the FR-1 Fireball.

Ryan FR-1 Fireball
(Wikipedia)

The Fireball's radial engine was a Wright R-1820 Cyclone 9-cylinder radial engine generating 1,425 horsepower. The R-1820 was used on a variety of World War 2 aircraft from the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress to the Douglas SBD Dauntless and Curtiss SB2C Helldiver. This was a surprising choice given that the standard engine of the Navy fighters of the day was the 2,000 horsepower Pratt & Whitney R-2800 18-cylinder Double Wasp. The jet engine in the rear fuselage, fed by wing root intakes, was a General Electric I-16 (later redesignated J31) developing approximately 1,600 lbs of thrust. The I-16/J31 was a GE production version of the Whittle W.1 centrifugal flow turbojet and was the first production jet engine built in the United States. Outside of the Fireball, two of the same jet engine were used on the Bell P-59 Airacomet. Development of the three prototype XFR-1 airframes proceeded along remarkably smoothly and the prototype made its first flight on 25 June 1944 powered only by its piston engine. On the third flight, the I-16 engine was fitted to the prototype and used successfully.

The Fireball boasted excellent cockpit visibility but one of its other unique features was it was the first production carrier-borne aircraft to have a tricycle landing gear. This was done primarily out of necessity to elevate the jet engine exhaust up and away from the wooden decks of the Navy's fleet carriers. Despite the loss of the three prototypes, the Navy was anxious to field the FR-1 Fireball and had already ordered 100 aircraft a year before the first flight of the prototype. With satisfactory flight testing and excellent performance, another 600 aircraft were added to the order in 1944. The Navy wanted the Fireballs in the Pacific as a Kamikaze interceptor- Fireballs were planned to be used in combat air patrols, loitering on their radial engines. When inbound Kamikazes were detected on radar, the Fireballs would light up the jet engine and speed off to intercept the enemy. At the end of 1944, the Navy ordered 600 of a faster variant, the FR-2, that had a more powerful R-1820 engine that developed 1,500 horsepower. 

VF-66 Fireballs in formation flight
(San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives)

Navy fighter squadron VF-66 stood up at NAS North Island where the Ryan plant was located to speed the introduction into service of the Fireball. Instead of the usual operational evaluations and demonstrations, VF-66 was tasked to get the Fireball into action as soon as possible. Unusual for a Navy squadron of the day, VF-66 was made up of senior officers and experienced pilots. Five days after VF-66 stood up on New Year's Day 1945, the first FR-1s were making their initial carrier qualifications aboard the USS Ranger in preparation for combat deployment. The squadron pilots enjoyed flying the FR-1 for its speed and maneuverability. Pilots often would make low passes at area airfields with the front prop feathered to confuse tower and airport personnel. By July 1945 VF-66 was in final preparations to take the FR-1 into combat but it was all for naught when the Pacific War ended the following month with surrender of Japan after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Fireball was officially unveiled to the public in September 1945 but only 66 FR-1s were produced and delivered before the war ended, the balance of orders for the FR-1 and FR-2 being canceled. After the war in November 1945 a Fireball that suffered a radial engine failure landed on the USS Wake Island to be come the first jet landing on an aircraft carrier, but obviously not intentionally!

Looking to improve the Fireball's performance, Ryan proposed the FR-3 that would have taken the faster FR-2 design and swapped out the I-16 engine for a more powerful GE I-20 engine that offered 2,000 lbs of thrust. The FR-3 never got built, but Ryan did a contract for a prototype of the FR-4, which used a 3,400-lb thrust Westinghouse J34 engine in the rear fuselage. The XFR-4 did fly, and the main external difference was the relocation of the jet intakes from the wing roots to the lower sides of the nose just aft of the radial engine. Doors could close off the NACA-style flush intakes to keep the jet engine from windmilling and producing drag and small eyelid doors could increase the area of the intake as well. The XFR-4 added 100 mph to the top speed of the Fireball, but only one prototype was built. The small number of FR-1s, however, were withdrawn from service when in 1947 they were found to have significant structural fatigue in the aft fuselage just behind the wings. The last flyable FR-1 arrived at the Naval Air Technical Training Center in Memphis, Tennessee, to be used as a maintenance trainer.

Ryan F2R Dark Shark configuration
(San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives)

It wasn't the end of the road for the Fireball just yet, though. The Powerplant Division of BuAer still remained skeptical of the performance of jets in the carrier landing pattern. Ryan was asked to further develop the FR-1design by replacing the radial engine with a General Electric 1,700-horsepower XT31 turboprop engine. The XT31 was the first turboprop engine designed and built in the United States and was also used on the Air Force's Convair XP-81 turboprop/jet fighter. The new Ryan fighter was designated the F2R Dark Shark and though it retained the wing root intakes and the I-16/J31 engine of the FR-1, it had an impressive climb rate but lacking the drag-reducing jet intakes of the FR-4, it was actually slower than the XFR-4 in level flight. With the large 8-foot prop, the Dark Shark demonstrated improved performance in the carrier landing pattern over the FR-1, but by the time of its first flight in November 1946 McDonnell had proven the practicality of pure-jet carrier operations with the FD-1/FH-1 Phantom and the last resistance within BuAer to pure jets had ended as the Navy decreed that all future fighters after the Grumman F8F Bearcat would be pure jets.

The Dark Shark in flight
(San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives)

The Air Force (then still the USAAF) was impressed with the performance of the XF2R-1 Dark Shark prototype and asked Ryan to make some modifications to evaluate it in competition against the Convair XP-81. What was designated the XF2R-2 featured the NACA flush intakes on the nose of the XFR-4 feeding a Westinghouse J34 engine. The XF2R-2 was ultimately never built other than as a mockup, as the Air Force decided, like the Navy, that mixed powerplant fighters were an evolutionary dead end and the future lay with pure jets.

I should also mention the Curtiss XF15C which was also planned as a Navy mixed-propulsion fighter. But that aircraft will be getting its own article at a later date here at Tails Through Time!

Further reading: 

The Coming Kamikaze Threat in World War II We Never Faced
Refining Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Grumman AF Guardian
The Ground-Breaking Gun Turret of the Grumman TBF Avenger
The Boeing PBB Sea Ranger: The Best Flying Boat at the Worst Possible Time

Source: U.S. Naval Air Superiority- Developement of Shipborne Jet Fighters 1943-1962 by Tommy H. Thompson. Specialty Press, 2008, p28-30.

The Bomber Career of the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior, 1955-1968

Douglas ad for the A-3 Skywarrior

The origins of the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior lay in a 1948 Navy requirement for a jet-powered, carrier-based, nuclear attack bomber. Even though at the time, the Navy's first purpose-built carrier bomber capable of nuclear attack, the North American AJ Savage, was in the midst of flight testing, the Navy had set its eyes on a more capable successor aircraft that could carry a 10,000 lb nuclear bomb over a combat radius of 2,000 miles. The planned operating weights of the new jet bomber would limit its use to the new 61,000-ton super carrier USS United States as it was too large to operate off the Essex-class carriers and even the much larger Midway class carriers. The program was seen as the most challenging of the Navy's postwar aircraft programs and the VAX(H) Program only received two formal submissions- one from Douglas and the other from Curtiss-Wright. Headed by the legendary designer Ed Heinemann who was already widely regarded for his work on the SBD Dauntless and the AD Skyraider, the Douglas team emphasized that a smaller aircraft was possible that could meet the stringent requirements of the VAX(H) specification. Heinemann championed a smaller aircraft that could also operate safely from the 45,000-ton Midway class carriers as well as even the smaller 29,000-ton Essex class carriers and still accommodate a notional 10,000 lb nuclear weapon. 

The preliminary Douglas designs were for a twin jet aircraft that was less than half the planned operating weight limit set by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. BuAer felt that the nuclear attack mission required an aircraft of 200,000 lbs weight but Ed Heinemann felt that he could meet the mission requirements with an aircraft only 70,000 lbs at maximum operating weight. Naturally his design was met with considerable skepticism within the Navy but Heinemann's planning for a more flexible design not limited to super carriers was validated with the 1949 cancellation of the USS United States. Given that the Douglas submission could also operate off smaller carriers made it the winner of the VAX(H) competition. 

VAH-4 Skywarrior pilot. Note the set back B/N console.
(Wikipedia)

The prototype A3D Skywarrior took the air for the first time on 16 September 1953. Initially low-powered with the troublesome Westinghouse J40 turbojet, the Navy wisely switched the more powerful and widely used Pratt & Whitney J57 engine. A three year flight test program ensued and proved the Skywarrior able to safely operate not just off the super carrier decks of the United States' replacement, the Forrestal class, but also the Midway and Essex classes as well that had been duly upgraded with angled decks and steam catapults. The crew of three consisted of the pilot on the left side, the bombardier/navigator (B/N) on the right side and slightly more aft than the pilot, and the plane captain/navigator who sat behind them facing aft who controlled the twin 20mm cannon in the tail. The cannons proved to be a maintenance nightmare and were all removed from the Skywarrior flight between 1960 and 1961 and replaced with a dovetail or "duck butt" fairing that contained electronic warfare gear. 

The first production Skywarriors weighed in at 43,000 lbs empty, the maximum weight for a catapult launch was 73,000 lbs, and the maximum landing weight was 50,000 lbs. In 1959 an A3D-2 was catapulted from the USS Saratoga with a weight of 84,000 lbs, setting a record that still stands for the heaviest aircraft to be catapulted from an aircraft carrier. 

The first Skywarrior squadron was Heavy Attack Squadron ONE (VAH-1) established on 1 November 1955 a NAS Jacksonville, followed by VAH-3 on 1 June 1956. "Heavy One" went to sea first aboard the USS Forrestal in October 1956, followed by a Mediterranean deployment in January 1957. "Heavy Three" went to sea next, embarked aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt for a Mediterranean cruise in July 1957. Getting used to operating the A3D took a lot of work given it's size which gave it its nickname "Whale". In the first full year of fleet deployments, there were seven flight deck accidents that cost the lives of nine crew. One of the main issues with the high accident rate was that many A3D crew came from the land-based patrol community as it was assumed they were most experienced at handling large aircraft. Turns out, it was carrier experience that was needed as well as more standardized training. As new Skywarrior squadrons were established, they were assigned to NAS Jacksonville to pool experience and training. Eventually Heavy Attack Wing ONE moved to NAS Sanford north of Orlando. By 1958, the accident rate was dropping significantly with the influx of personnel experienced in carrier jet operations. Previously the Navy preferred to keep its carrier air wings united at a single base, but the Skywarrior community set the pattern for the future, for the first time the Navy based all of one aircraft type together at a single base at NAS Sanford. 

With the new A3D-2 variant entering service to replace the earlier A3D-1, a second Skywarrior base for the Pacific Fleet was established at NAS Whidbey Island in Washington. Heavy Attack Wing TWO was set up in Washington, having previously been based at NAS North Island when its heavy attack squadrons flew the AJ Savage. Even numbered VAH squadrons were with the Pacific Fleet, odd numbered VAH squadrons were with the Atlantic Fleet in Florida. The first Pacific Fleet deployment was carried out by VAH-2 aboard the USS Bon Homme Richard in July 1957. Interestingly at the time, there were no Forrestal class carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet, so nearly all of the Pacific Fleet Skywarrior cruises at the time were done aboard the small Essex-class carriers.

Special nuclear storage facilities were set up on the carriers where the nuclear weapons were stored, guarded by special Marine detachments. Alert aircraft on the carrier deck were also guarded by Marines. Essex class carriers carried three A3D-2s, nine to eleven A3D-2s were embarked on the Midway class and full twelve-aircraft squadrons were sent aboard the Forrestal class decks when they were finally assigned to the Pacific Fleet.  While tanking and conventional bombing were routinely practiced, they were considered secondary to the nuclear deterrent mission. At any given time, a carrier with Skywarriors aboard had at least one or two aircraft armed and on alert for immediate launch. Alert Skywarriors were sometimes kept in the hangar deck near an elevator for immediate movement to the flight deck. The Skywarrior's preferred nuclear attack profile was to make the run into the target at low level at 520 knots. Once the B/N had the target on his radar, the A3D would pull up at 2.5Gs at full throttle, pitching up to 60 degrees climb to release the weapon. After release, the Skywarrior would roll 120 degrees, still pulling 2.5Gs, and hit the deck to egress the target area to escape the nuclear blast. 

By 1960, NAS Whidbey Island was home to five A3D Skywarrior squadrons- four operational squadrons and one training squadron. The last of the Skywarriors were delivered in January 1961, from a production run of 283 aircraft. The zenith of Skywarrior operations was in mid-1961 when there were 227 aircraft in service. With the entry into service of the Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1961, the nuclear deterrent mission of the Skywarrior and its replacement, the supersonic North American A3J (designated A-5 after 1962) Vigilante, was soon to end. The Skywarrior units with the Atlantic Fleet based at NAS Sanford transitioned to the Vigilante, the first fleet deployment taking place in 1963 aboard the USS Independence. By 1965-1966, there were no more Skywarriors with the Atlantic Fleet as all the squadrons in Florida had converted to the Vigilante, leaving NAS Whidbey Island in Washington as the center of the Skywarrior's world with four operational squadrons, VAH-2, -4, -8, and -10, with VAH-123 acting as the training squadron. 

VAH-4 Skywarrior in a shallow dive bombing run
(Skywarrior Association)

On the night of the Tonkin Gulf incident on 2 August 1964 that set in motion the long US involvement in the Vietnam War, VAH-4 had three A-3B Skywarriors embarked on the USS Ticonderoga and twelve A-3Bs with VAH-10 aboard the USS Constellation. The A-3B (as the A3D-2 was redesigned after 1962) could carry up to 8,000 lbs of conventional bombs. Usually the high drag box fin Korea-era bombs were carried as most could fit in the A-3B's bomb bay. The low drag Mark 82 series bombs were reserved for aircraft that had to carry their bomb loads externally. The first bombing missions by Skywarriors in Vietnam were carried out by VAH-2 in 1964 which was uniquely split between two aircraft carriers, the USS Ranger and the USS Coral Sea. Many Skywarrior missions going into 1965 were level bombing runs at night using radar. Most Skywarriors did dual roles, both tanking and bombing. During VAH-2's marathon 331-day deployment 1964-1965, the unit's A-3Bs flew 4900 hours, dropped over 400,000 lbs of bombs, and offloaded over 4 million pounds of fuel. 

During 1966-1967, many of the targets in the North weren't good radar targets for the Skywarrior. Driven as well by concerns about the A-3B's survivability in the increasingly lethal air defenses of North Vietnam, Skywarrior squadrons shifted Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam as well as missions against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. But there was a problem. If the juicy targets in North Vietnam weren't very good radar targets, how much better was a target somewhere in the jungles of South Vietnam and Laos? The Skywarrior crews adopted dive bombing, attacking in 30-degree dives. While it wasn't anything new as it had been done in exercises in the past, the A-3B lacked an optical sight for dive bombing. Skywarrior pilots resorted to grease pencil marks on the windscreen, some used the refueling probe as an improvised aim point in their dive attacks. The pilots began their attack runs at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, pulling out at 3,000 feet to avoid light caliber anti-aircraft guns and to avoid over stressing the aircraft. More enterprising units resorted to bolting gunsights from A-1 Skyraiders to the glare panel and one unit even got its hands on some gunsights from A-4 Skyhawks. Some Skywarrior missions involved leading groups of A-4 Skyhawks on level bombing runs, the Skyhawks dropping on command from the A-3B's B/N. 

A steeper bombing attack by the Skywarrior over Vietnam
(Skywarrior Association)

A usual A-3B bombing mission involved both bombing and tanking. A Skywarrior would launch, refuel aircraft in the departing strike package, then go on its own bombing mission. On return to the carrier, it would refuel the next outgoing strike package before recovering. When not loaded with bombs or a tanker package, the bomb bay could carry critical spare parts, mail and other high priority items. It was common for a spare A-3B to be sent to NAS Cubi Point in the Philippines for critical aircraft spare parts or get sent to Japan to pick up combat pay for the ship's crew. 

The Skywarrior's role in Vietnam as a bomber began to wind down in late 1967 as it was deemed that its air refueling role was a more vital mission and that more capable, more survivable attack aircraft like the Grumman A-6 Intruder and Vought A-7 Corsair were available. The last bombing missions were carried out in 1968. But there is an oft-repeated apocryphal story amongst Skywarrior veterans of Vietnam that General William Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, himself ordered an end of A-3 bombing missions. The story goes that he was shocked when visiting an aircraft carrier that Skywarriors were providing close air support to Army troops "without the benefit of a proper gunsight". 

Nearly every aircraft carrier that participated in Vietnam had A-3 Skywarriors aboard, mostly as tankers, bombers until 1968, and later in the war, in reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles. Just in the bomber/tanker roles, Skywarrior squadrons made 62 combat cruises in Southeast Asia, ranging from three-aircraft detachments on the Essex class to full twelve-aircraft squadron deployments on the larger super carriers. Sixteen different aircraft carriers operated Skywarriors in Vietnam, only the USS Intrepid and USS Saratoga never operated Skywarriors during the war. Six Skywarriors were lost in combat, twelve were lost to operational accidents in the theater, and 35 crew were lost. 

Related reading:

Atomic Neptunes: The Navy's Interim Nuclear Bombers

The Achilles Heel of the Douglas B-66 Destroyer

Regulus: The US Navy's First Operational Nuclear Missile

Sources: A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War by Rick Morgan. Osprey Combat Aircraft No. 108, Osprey Publishing, 2015, pp8-30. Strike From the Sea: US Navy Attack Aircraft from Skyraider to Super Hornet 1948-Present by Tommy Thomason. Specialty Press, 2009, p75-87.

Captain Joseph M. Reeves: Leading Carrier Aviation From Experiment to Fighting Force

Captain Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves, USN

In writing this particular article for TAILS THROUGH TIME, I had wrestled with how best to title the subject on Captain Joseph Reeves as the father of carrier aviation. He certainly wasn't the first, and he most certainly wasn't the only pioneer in the field. Anything I came up with sounded to complicated from "Father of the Modern Carrier Flight Deck" to more esoteric things I'm too embarrassed to share here on this blog. When he assumed command of the US Navy's sole aircraft carrier, the USS Langley (CV-1) on October 1925, he wasn't there to break new ground, but to learn more about what aviation could contribute to naval operations and in the process, forged carrier aviation into a fighting force that shaped military operations in the Second World War and beyond. On that day in 1925 when he set foot aboard the Langley, there was no dispute as to carrier aviation being part of naval operations as it had been so in various capacities going back to the First World War. I think what is interesting about Captain Reeves' role in the development of carrier aviation stems from the fact that in those days, he was one of the foremost battleship tacticians of the day. Nicknamed "Bull" from his days playing football as a midshipman at the US Naval Academy, Reeves' appointment to command the Langley and by extension, all of naval aviation in the 1920s, comes from a background based on two factors. The first one was his own time as the head of the Tactics Department of the Naval War College. It was there he came to be known for his innovative tactics and being uncharacteristically forward-thinking for an officer of his stature. His time working on naval tactics exposed him to the potential of aviation in future naval operations and he himself once did admit that despite having a "Big Gun" battleship background, he saw the submarine and the airplane as possibly being decisive in the next war, he just didn't know which one. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Edward Eberle, had served with Reeves on the battleship USS Oregon and was well aware of his innovative thinking when he selected Reeves to command the Langley. Perhaps the CNO wanted someone in charge of aviation who could creatively make something of the whole enterprise. 

That same year Reeves assumed command of the USS Langley, a very public dispute had broken out between Rear Admiral William Moffett, the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), and Rear Admiral William Shoemaker, the head of the Bureau of Navigation (BuNav). At the time, BuNav was in charge of personnel matters for the entire Navy. Moffett, taking it as his personal mission to nurture and grow naval aviation, felt that aviation personnel should be the responsibility of BuAer rather than BuNav. After all, in Moffett's eyes, only aviators knew what was best for other aviators. While this important administrative dispute was going on within the halls of power of the Navy, the CNO's selection of Captain Reeves was one of careful selection to avoid ruffling any feathers at either BuAer or BuNav- after all, Reeves had a respected reputation as a tactician, he was a trained engineer, and he came from the battleship side of the Navy. Commanding the Langley as a politically sensitive post and it probably helped Reeves that he was seen by BuNav as an acceptable choice. A law, however, passed in 1921, stipulated that all aviation units of the US Navy, including aircraft carriers (of which there was only one, the USS Langley) had to be commanded by naval aviators. Reeves wasn't a pilot and naval aviation was so new to the Navy that there weren't any senior officers in aviation with the qualifications, time served, and rank to fill aviation command billets. The most senior naval aviator, Commander John Towers, didn't have the qualifications to command the Langley- in fact, Towers wouldn't make captain for another ten years! So BuAer created a special course for naval aviation observers at NAS Pensacola to train senior officers in the basics of flight for postings to aviation units until there were enough senior aviation officers in the ranks. As a prerequisite to Reeves getting to command the Langley, he had to complete the naval aviation observer course at Pensacola, which he did the month prior to assuming command of the Langley in San Diego. 

The Navy's first aircraft carrier, USS Langley (CV-1)

When he took command of the USS Langley, the pace of operations on the converted carrier (it was once the collier USS Jupiter before a flight deck was built atop the hull, giving the Langley its nickname "Covered Wagon") reflected the experimental nature of carrier operations. For a whole month, Reeves observed shipboard operations both below decks and on the flight deck. He was rather surprised that the Langley's air wing was composed of only eight aircraft. But he took notes, made observations and then in November 1925, he gathered the officers of the carrier and its air wing to a meeting at NAS North Island and bluntly told all of them "They had no conception of either the capabilities or limitations of the air force". He fired off a long series of questions to his officers about carrier operations like "What is the most efficient way of launching planes?" or "What is the maximum interval between planes in a scouting screen?". He then told his men to their surprise he didn't know the answers either "But unless we can answer them, we are of little use to the fleet." Reeves' questions came to be called "A Thousand and One Questions" and his men sought to figure out each one. As each one was answered, it went into what would become the textbook of naval aviation. It was Reeves' mission statement- the USS Langley and her air wing would become a school before becoming an air force of use to the fleet.

From his time as a tactician at the Naval War College, Reeves was quite familiar with English engineer Frederick Lanchester's N-Square Law when it came to defining the relative power of opposing forces- the combat effectiveness of a military force is proportional to the square of its numerical strength multiplied by the fighting value of its individual units. The fighting value was determined by training and Reeves would relentless drill the Langley's crew and air wing and make sure the ship participated in as many fleet exercises as possible. The numerical strength aspect was solved by getting as many aircraft as possible on the Langley. If the crew could launch and recover aircraft quickly and efficiently, then the carrier could support a much bigger air wing than its current paltry complement of eight aircraft. His first order of business was to increase the Langley's air wing to fourteen. No one thought it was possible, but Reeves' order stood and on the first day of fleet exercises, VF-2 managed to launch six aircraft quickly and get a second group of six airborne right after that- after all, the day would come that a carrier would have to defend itself against air attack and its aircraft were its own best defense. 

In the months that followed, Reeves trained the Langley crew and air wing hard. He pushed them endlessly to increase the tempo of flight deck operations as a carrier was useless if its planes weren't in the air. He steadily increased the air wing of the Langley as well and frequently took charge of flight operations himself, acting as the "Air Boss". In less than six months, he had twenty aircraft operating routinely off the Langley's small deck, quite a feat given that prior to his command, there were only eight aircraft in the air wing. Before he took command, it was customary to let a plane land and then lower it to the hangar deck before allowing the next plane to land. This was time consuming and Reeves pushed his men to orchestrate their movements on the flight deck. As each plane landed, it was disengaged from the arresting gear and pushed forward to the bow to make way for the next aircraft. A collapsible barrier was used at the midpoint of the flight deck to protect the parked aircraft forward. Working with his executive officer (XO), Commander John Towers, Reeves worked out a system of specialized groups of deck crew- each group was assigned a specific task on the flight deck- arresting gear, releasing tail hooks, fueling aircraft, arming aircraft, and more. To delineate their roles to each other, Reeves and Towers had each group wear colored shirts. The blue shirts moved aircraft forward, the brown shirts were crew chiefs, the purple shirts were in charge of refueling, and so on. The yellow shirts were the plane directors, the elite of the flight deck crew. The yellow shirts orchestrated all the action of the other groups and movement of aircraft on the deck. Hand signals were developed to make communication clear and concise over the roar of aircraft engines. Once all the aircraft landed, they were all pushed aft for fueling and rearming to prepare for the next launch cycle. A subset of the plane directors were assigned the role of flight control officers who used a checkered flag to signal each pilot to firewall the throttles and race down the deck for takeoff. By increasing the speed of the launch and recovery cycle, the Langley made more use of its air wing- it was a force multiplier. 

A Curtiss F6C Hawk of VF-2 embarked on the USS Langley

In preparation for the fleet exercises in the summer of 1926, Reeves had all the squadrons under his command (two fighter squadrons, three observation squadrons, one utility squadron and one torpedo/bombing squadron) train together as an integrated air wing. Changes and improvements to operating tactics were to be shared amongst all the squadrons as it was important that each unit know the strengths and limitations of the other squadrons of the air wing. Befitting his nickname of "Bull", Reeves pushed his men to turn around aircraft faster on the deck and further reduce launch and recovery times. By this point, it wasn't unusual for the Langley's air wing to have 24 to 30 aircraft, quite a feat compared to just a year prior. Reeves would stand on the deck during each launch and recovery cycle with a stopwatch. Only 15 seconds were to elapse between each launch and only 90 seconds were to elapse between each landing. And even that was too long for him! By the time of the summer fleet exercises, VF-1 had conducted 127 takeoffs and landings in a single day. Just a year prior that might have been VF-1's sum total of takeoffs and landings for an entire month! As far as Reeves was concerned, he was abiding by the old adage "Fight like you train, train like you fight". The increased pace of operations increased the proficiency of his men from the pilots and deck crew to the crew in engineering spaces that kept the ship operating. 

When the USS Langley and her air wing set sail for the fleet exercises in the summer of 1926, many of Captain Reeves' "A Thousand and One Questions" had been answered and formulated into naval air doctrine. But one question nagged him that summer and that was how to sink ships. He had seen level bombing in action during his naval aviation observer course in Pensacola and he felt that was a useless endeavor as bombsights were inaccurate, targets had to be more or less stationary and they definitely shouldn't be shooting back. Torpedo bombers were still limited in their carrying capacity and no one was keen on the idea of a low, slow approach to an enemy warship for a torpedo launch. 

The solution of course, would be dive bombing and it came from one of Reeves' officers, Lt. Commander Frank Wagner, the skipper of VF-2. But that's going to be a topic for a future blog posting- so stay tuned! 

*As a historical aside, in 1893 when Joseph Reeves played football at US Naval Academy, he was advised by a physician he had to give up football or risk a kick to the head which could kill him. Reeves then went to a local shoemaker and had a protective helmet made out of leather and mole skin so he could play in the Army-Navy game. He is considered one of the inventors of the football helmet.

Source: Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Air Power by Thomas Wildenberg. Naval Institute Press, 1998, pp 24-36. Photos: Wikipedia, US Navy

The Bell L-39 Swept-Wing Demonstrator

The Bell L-39 making a simulated carrier approach.

Following the end of the Second World War, captured German aerodynamic research had indicated the high-speed benefits of swept wings and many designs under development in the mid to late 1940s were revised to incorporate swept wings- two such examples being the North American F-86 Sabre and the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. While the USAF might have been enthusiastic about the benefits of swept wings, the US Navy still had its reservations- the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), the Navy organization tasked with the development and support of naval aircraft, had concerns about the low-speed handling characteristics of swept wings as it was this particular flight regime that was critical in flight operations aboard aircraft carriers. While there was no questioning the high-speed benefits, the Navy didn't have the luxury of long runways to land at high speeds. To determine the scope of the problem, BuAer solicited bids from industry for a swept-wing flying demonstrator to explore the low-speed handling qualities of swept wings. Grumman tendered two proposals, one based on a modified F4F Wildcat as well as an all new aircraft that would have allowed wings of differing sweep to attached to the fuselage. Bell submitted a modification of its P-63 Kingcobra which won the contract as it offered lower development costs using two P-63 aircraft. The aircraft would be designated L-39. In those days, the Navy designated its research aircraft with a letter denoting the manufacturer followed by the manufacturer's model number- as exemplified by the more well-known D-558 Skystreak and later Skyrocket- "D" for Douglas, Model 558. In the case of the L-39, "L" was Bell Aircraft's letter designation and the swept wing demonstrator had the company designation Model 39. The design had really only a tangential relationship to the P-39 Airacobra (more on this in a bit). 

The wings were basically P-63 Kingcobra outer wing panels that were modified to be swept to 35 degrees and attached to an unswept center stub section. This was done for aerodynamic balance purposes. The wings were further modified with slats which could be positioned before flight either open or closed. Because of the wing modifications, the landing gear was non-retractable, but since BuAer was more interested in low speed landing, this was of no consequence. Two L-39s were built, differing only in the size of the slats.

The swept outer panels attached to an unswept center section.

The first L-39 was ready to fly only 10 weeks after the go-ahead from the Navy and made its first flight on 23 April 1946. The initial set of flight tests showed some handling issues that were easily resolved with further modification to the first aircraft- namely a fuselage extension aft of the wing to increase the moment arm of the tailplane to provide more pitch authority, a ventral fin for stability, and to shift the center of gravity rearward more, the original four-bladed P-63 propeller was replaced with a lighter three-bladed unit from a P-39 Airacobra (and thus the only real link between the P-39 and the L-39). The second L-39 demonstrator was completed with the additional modifications and joined the flight test program.

It was quickly determined that the swept wing with the slats closed possessed entirely unacceptable stall characteristics- namely it was abrupt and caused the aircraft to roll to one side. However, if the wing were slatted, then the stall characteristics become acceptable. Simulated carrier approaches and landings were made by both BuAer test pilots and even Corky Meyer, Grumman's chief test pilot (as Grumman was in the process of designing swept wing aircraft for the Navy). Handling and stall characteristics in the low speed regime around the carrier were quickly determined to not be an issue as long as the swept wing were slatted and the L-39 flight test program concluded in August 1946.

Close up of the L-39's wing slats.

One issue that did come up during the L-39 test program was that swept wings needed a responsive power source in the carrier landing pattern. On aircraft there is a relationship between power required for flight and airspeed. As the airspeed decreases, the power needed also decreases, but it then reaches a point due to drag that the power needed starts to go up even as the airspeed decreases. This is called the "back side" of the curve. In carrier aircraft, they are flown on this backside because the approach to the deck must be at as low as a speed is possible. On a propeller-driven aircraft, power can be immediately applied to halt the aircraft from settling in the approach and striking the ramp. But swept wings had a steeper "back side" and early jet engines took time to spool up. And it would be jet engine development that would later dog the Navy's aircraft programs in the 1950s. But more on that in a later post!

Source: U.S. Naval Air Superiority- Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters 1943-1962 by Tommy H. Thompson. Specialty Press, 2008, p69-73.

The Fairchild XNQ-1/T-31 Trainer

In USAF markings as the T-31

As the Second World War began to wind down with victory in Europe established and the end of the Pacific War on the horizon, the US Navy set out to issue specifications for a replacement for the basic and primary aircraft trainers that were used during the war (like the PT-19 or the BT-13, PT standing for "Primary Trainer" and BT standing for "Basic Trainer in the Navy lexicon) as well as the North American SNJ/T-6 Texan. These specifications were released to the industry on 26 April 1945 by the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer). Three companies entered designs- Temco entered the T-35 Buckaroo which was adapted from the Globe Swift general aviation aircraft, Beechcraft entered the T-34 Mentor which was a tandem seat adaptation of the Bonanza and Fairchild entered a custom-designed aircraft that had the Navy designation XNQ and the later USAF designation T-31. History, of course, shows that the Beech Mentor won the competition and one of it's strong points was its tricycle undercarriage layout compared to the taildragger layout of both the Buckaroo and the XNQ. For the forward thinking armed services, taildragging aircraft were obsolete. 

Fairchild's chief engineer, Armand Thiebolt, had already established a name for himself having designed a number of training aircraft during the war, from the PT-19 Cornell to the AT-21 Gunner. His work on the XNQ was based on his own experiences and what he felt was a balance between state of the art and simplicity. Registered with a civilian tail number N5726, the first XNQ, built at Fairchild's Hagerstown, Maryland, plant, made its first flight there on 10 February 1947 with Fairchild's chief test pilot, Richard Hansen, at the controls. The 20-minute maiden flight was uneventful and showed only some simple rework of the aileron tabs were necessary. After a series of company test flights, the XNQ was delivered to the US Navy at Anacostia, Washington for formal evaluation. After an initial series of flights in the Washington DC area, the flight test program continued at NAS Patuxent River after which the aircraft returned to Fairchild to prepare it for evaluation by the USAF as the T-31. 

By this point the second aircraft had been completed and both XNQs as T-31s were flown to Randolph AFB outside of San Antonio, Texas, for their formal USAF evaluation in a fly-off with both the Beech and Temco candidates. At the time the USAF also considered the De Havilland Canada DHC-1 Chipmunk as well as the British Boulton Paul Balliol, but both were quickly eliminated from consideration, leaving Fairchild, Beech, and Temco remaining in the USAF evaluation. Like the US Navy, the USAF selected the Beech T-34 Mentor, again, its tricycle landing gear layout being one of its strong points. It was the second rejection of the Fairchild design. The aircraft was passed on to the US Navy where it was flown by student test pilots at the US Navy's Test Pilot School at NAS Patuxent River and after a gear up landing that resulted in only minor damage in 1953, the Navy declared the unique aircraft surplus to its needs after it had only amassed just over 1,000 flight hours. 

The wing commander for the National Capital Wing of the Civil Air Patrol arranged to take ownership of the XNQ and in October 1953 the aircraft was repaired at NAS Patuxent River before being flown to a small airfield south of Alexandria, Virginia where it was stationed for the next 2 years, only clocking 12 flight hours in that time period. Part of the problem with the XNQ wasn't its performance or handling, but that its wingspan was just over a foot too wide for the standard 40-foot hangar at the airfield and it ended up spending most of its time outdoors which adversely affected its condition. In 1955 the aircraft was ferried to Rockville, Maryland, but again, was stored outdoors which resulted in further deterioration. When that small airfield was closed, the Fairchild was abandoned in situ. 

In her original US Navy markings

John St. Clair, the operations officer of the Congressional Squadron of the Civil Air Patrol, trucked aircraft to his home 8 miles away to try and save it given its unique history. He later assumed formal ownership of the aircraft to keep it from going to the junkyard. Fast forward to 1978, the aircraft is still on the St. Clair farm in rural Maryland and Armand Thiebolt's son visited John St. Clair and asked about purchasing the aircraft, the deal of which fell through. Later, Robert Taylor, the founder of the Antique Airplane Association, asked St. Clair if he would done the XNQ to a museum, which he agreed to and a crew from the association trucked what was left of the aircraft to Waco, Texas with plans of restoring her to flight status. The history of the XNQ took a new turn after its arrival in Waco when general aviation pilot Don Pellegrino and his wife were weathered in at the airport and he found the XNQ in storage in a hangar and approached Taylor about purchasing the aircraft. 

While negotiations proceeded, the aircraft was moved to Oklahoma City in 1982 but still no restoration work had started. At a fly-in in Iowa, Taylor approached Pellegrino and told him "Make me an offer I can't refuse" and with that, Pellegrino become the XNQ's new owner for $800. In September that year Pellegrino trucked the aircraft to his farm in Iowa and began restoration work in earnest. After ten years of working on it in his free time, the XNQ made its second maiden flight on 1 June 1992, the first time the aircraft had flown since 1955! Pellegrino flew the 25 FAA-required hours of flight testing himself and since then he has since moved to Rhome, Texas, just outside of the Dallas-Fort Worth area and has flown the XNQ to airshows around the country. And yes, she still has her same tail number of N5726 after all these years!

Bill Spidle has three pages of detailed photographs of a walk around of the XNQ.

Source: Air Enthusiast, No. 117, May/June 2005. "Their Loss, My Gain: Fairchild's XNQ-1- Twice Rejected for Service" by Gilles Auliard, p78-79. Photos: US Naval Test Pilot School Alumni.

How the Lockheed P-80 Saved McDonnell Aircraft

In 1942 James McDonnell was summoned to Washington to meet with officials from the US Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer). At the time McDonnell Aircraft only built parts for other aircraft manufacturers at its St. Louis facilities and only had one aircraft program going, the XP-67 Moonbat fighter. To McDonnell's surprise, BuAer asked McDonnell and his small team to design a carrier-based jet fighter. Not having had any prior experience worked in McDonnell's favor- the Navy felt that he was free of any bias or prejudices and was therefore most likely to come up with an innovative design. McDonnell's design would be come the FD-1/FH-1 Phantom, the first purpose-built carrier-borne jet fighter. But BuAer's decision was not without its controversy in the Navy and to satisfy the critics, it was agreed to evaluate an existing jet fighter that by that point was only a year from its first flight- the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, which first flew in June 1944. With a more powerful engine, the P-80 was faster than the FD-1 Phantom. In early 1945, the Navy purchased two P-80 Shooting Stars for evaluation, one of which would be suitably modified for evaluation as a carrier-borne fighter. 

The first Navy P-80 was flown from Lockheed's California facility to the Navy's flight test center at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, incidentally becoming the first transcontinental jet flight on 29 June 1945 (though it wasn't a nonstop jet flight). The pilot was a young 1st Lt. Najeeb Halaby, at the time a US Navy test pilot who later on would become the FAA Administrator under JFK and later become CEO of Pan Am. The plan was to conduct shore-based trials first before going through with ship-board trials. Through 1946 the P-80 was flown in mock combat against the Navy's main fighter of the day, the Grumman F8F Bearcat. Though not as maneuverable as the Bearcat, the P-80 had the luxury of speed to engage and disengage in combat much to the Bearcat pilots' frustration. The second P-80 arrived at NAS Patuxent River in December 1945 after being modified by Lockheed with a tailhook, catapult hooks (for use with a catapult bridle) and a catapult shuttle holdback. Shore-based tests to simulate carrier operations were used to determine the operating parameters for the P-80 on the carrier deck. Catapult shots were easily accomplished on land-based gear, but it was found that the P-80 was exceptionally clean aerodynamically on approach and had to be "flown" onto the deck, but the nose gear design was too weak for a firm carrier-style three-point landing. But if the P-80 landed to hard on its mains, it would rock forward and the hook would miss the arresting wires. 

After more testing, the project pilot, the legendary Marine Corps ace Lt. Col. Marion Carl and his LSO managed to determine the proper approach speed (just 5 mph above the stall speed of the P-80) and flare to minimize the forward rocking motion on landing. Though the margin was considered too close to the stall speed, Carl found that the P-80 had good stall warnings well in advance of the actual stall. On 1 November 1946 Carl took the P-80 to sea aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt. Catapult launches and arrested landings were made safely, but it was found that the P-80 needed 900 feet of deck with 35 knots of wind over the deck to take off without the catapult, over twice the distance the McDonnell FD-1 required. To put that into perspective, the length of the FDR's flight deck was just shy of 961 feet! It was also found that the J33 engine of the P-80 took as long as 2 minutes to spool up to full power after starting, which would greatly lengthen the deck launching cycle. From catapult takeoff, one circuit in the carrier landing pattern, and then an arrested landing, the P-80 used 37 gallons of fuel. By comparison, the Vought F4U Corsair only used 6 gallons. 

The next phase of carrier testing then involved flying the P-80 at operational loads which also included use of the tip tanks that were a fixture on USAF aircraft during the Korean War. It was quickly found that in this more realistic configuration the catapults of the day even with a strong wind over the deck were unable to launch the P-80. In addition, the wing structure where the tanks were attached was too weak and a stronger catapult would have just launched the P-80, leaving its tip tanks behind!

Before the carrier tests were performed, some in the Navy unhappy with BuAer's decision to go with McDonnell wanted to purchase the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star instead. Lockheed even did some design work on what they called a P-80B for the Navy which would have had the Navy designation FO-1 (Lockheed's designator become V in the 1950s, so it would have been then known as FV-1). The deck trials quickly ended this proposal and McDonnell would go on to develop a whole line of fighters for the Navy from FD-1 Phantom, the F2H Banshee, the F3H Demon, the superlative F-4 Phantom II and today's F/A-18 Hornet. The Navy, did however, buy 50 P-80s to be used as shore-based trainers to allow naval aviators to gain jet experience. VF-6A (later renumbered VF-52) at NAS North Island and Marine squadron VMF-311 at MCAS El Toro operated the P-80s. Lockheed did, however, develop the TV-2 SeaStar based on the Lockheed T-33 in the 1950s. The T-33 required an extensive amount of modification to be suitable for carrier operation. In 1962 the TV-2 was redesignated the T-1 and was ultimately replaced by the North American T-2 Buckeye.

Source: U.S. Naval Air Superiority- Developement of Shipborne Jet Fighters 1943-1962 by Tommy H. Thompson. Specialty Press, 2008, p23-33.

Sunset of the Seaplane- The Convair P6Y

With the rapid expansion of the Soviet submarine fleet in the 1950s, the US Navy embarked on a series of programs to improve its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Some of these efforts paid off handsomely with the development of new detection equipment and the rise of the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN). At the time, though, what the Navy really wanted was a means to quickly detect and prosecute enemy submarines as far away as possible from the carrier task forces. This meant the use of aircraft to cover the distances involved and to search the large areas of open ocean. At the time the furthest advances were being made in sonar technology and the Navy began work on the concept of using a dunking sonar on a seaplane. The seaplane could seed an area of interest with sonobuoys and then land on the water and use a dunking sonar to further track an enemy submarine. Dunking sonars had already come into use in helicopters but these were strictly short range options as helicopters didn't have the speed and range of a conventional aircraft. 

In 1954 the US Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) met with Convair which had long established its credentials in the seaplane field from before World War 2 onward with legendary aircraft like the PBY Catalina and an aggressive postwar program of hydrodynamics research for flying boat aircraft. Convair developed what was called the "Dunker" which was to be powered by two Wright R-3350 Double Cyclone radial engines and capable of operating from rough ocean seas. Tested in model form, the Dunker's most distinctive feature was a very deeply sculpted hull form designed to "cut" through the waves. The wing was high-mounted above the fuselage on a pylon like that of the PBY Catalina to provide the necessary clearance for the engines when operating in rough seas. By 1956 the Dunker's design refined further to a three-engined aircraft using three Pratt & Whitney R-2800 radial engines which allowed for a larger and more capable design. 

As a result of Convair's ongoing work, BuAer issued a Request for Proposals (RfP) in May 1956 for an advanced ASW seaplane of flying boat configuration capable of operating from rough ocean seas to use dunking sonar. Martin submitted a four-engined design that was designated the P7M Submaster and was based in large part on Martin's existing work on the jet-powered P6M Seamaster. Convair's submission was a further refinement of the Dunker design and was designated P6Y. Convair's design was much more advanced that Martin's submission. The P6Y retained the three R-2800 radial piston engines, but in order to allow slow flight and softer landings in rough seas, an innovative full-span boundary layer lift control (BLC) system would be installed. Two General Electric J85 turbojet engines were installed side-by-side in the central engine nacelle behind the R-2800 engine. The inboard flaps of the 127-foot wing used both suction above and just ahead of the flaps and jet exhaust from the J85s blowing head of the flaps to dramatically increase the effectiveness of the flaps. The wings outboard of the left and right engine nacelles used BLC to blow a sheet of high-velocity air across the top of the flaps. Wingtip mounted swivelling jet nozzles were used to augment the control authority of the ailerons in low speed regimes. Convair estimated that the BLC system on the P6Y would allow landings as slow as 40 kts, impressive for an aircraft with a crew of 10 and a gross weight of over 100,000 lbs. The design of the P6Y was led by German engineer Hans Amtmann, who during the Second World War had designed a flying boats for Blohm und Voss. Reportedly Amtmann even spent time on US subs to see first hand the challenges of hunting submarines in the open ocean!

The dunking sonar and sonobuoys were housed in the center of the fuselage with a weapons bay aft of the sonar compartment that could carry depth charges, torpedoes or even nuclear weapons. A rotating bomb bay door was used to create a smooth and watertight seal on the bottom of the hull. The P6Y would have been able to operate in rough seas up to 12 feet with its deeply cut hull and BLC flap system. 

By 1957 despite advanced design work, the maritime patrol community in the US Navy was less-than-enthused about open ocean rough water operation. Experience in the Second World War showed this to be highly uncomfortably and extremely rough on the structures and systems of even the most robust flying boats. With a general lack of support from the US Navy's operational patrol squadrons, the Convair P6Y was canceled in December 1957. From that point on, the role of maritime patrol and ASW would pass on to landplanes. That same year the Navy issued an RfP for successor to both the Lockheed P2V Neptune and the Martin P5M Marlin and specified a land-based aircraft to satisfy the demands of the patrol community. This aircraft would be a derivative of the Lockheed Electra and first flew in 1958 as the YP3V. In production the P3V was named Orion and after 1962 it was redesignated P-3. 

Though the cancellation of the Convair P6Y marked a turning point in naval aviation as landplanes took over roles traditionally assigned to seaplanes, the concept behind the P6Y didn't die there. In 1966 the Japanese Defense Agency issued a contract to flying boat builder Shin Meiwa for an ocean-going ASW flying boat which became the Shin Meiwa PS-1. The PS-1 was powered by four General Electric T64 turboprop engines, but like the P6Y, it had an extra engine in the form of a T58 turboshaft mounted in the dorsal center fuselage to drive a powerful BLC system that allowed the PS-1 to land as slowly as 50-55 kts. Robustly built with a deep hull form influenced by the P6Y, the PS-1 could operate in seas as rough as 14 feet. Like the P6Y, the PS-1 would alight on the ocean and use a dunking sonar to prosecute submarine contacts. 

The last PS-1 was delivered to the Japanese Martime Self-Defense Force in 1978. Further procurement after only 21 airframes ended after the open ocean ASW mission went to the Lockheed P-3C Orion which cost much less to procure and operated than the PS-1. However, 12 examples of a search and rescue version of the PS-1 were built starting in 1975 and remain in service to this day as the US-1. In 2003 Shin Meiwa first flew an upgraded version of the US-1 flying boat designated the US-1 Kai ("Kai" meaning upgraded) that kept the deep hull form and BLC system but mated the design with advanced Rolls-Royce AE2100 turboprop engines and a Lycoming CTS800 turboshaft driving the BLC system. 

Source: Convair Advanced Designs: Secret Projects From San Diego, 1923-1962 by Robert E. Bradley. Specialty Press, 2010, p99-102.

Following the end of the First World War, Britain and France were determined to put the German aeronautical industry out of business for good with harsh terms being imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. One of the terms involved getting Germany's prized advanced Zeppelin fleet divided between Britain and France. The United States, having operated several LTA (lighter-than-air) patrol stations in France during the war where blimps were used to protect the Atlantic convoys, wasn't a party to the deal but rather than taking on Zeppelins (which the Germans ended up scuttling, infuriating the British and French), Navy personnel were sent throughout Europe to act as "observers" to the Armistice Commission that was essentially dissolving the German aviation industry. One of those Navy personnel, Commander Jerome Hunsaker, who after World War II would become chairman of NACA, NASA's predecessor, made several trips to Europe to study German Zeppelin technology between 1918 and 1920.

By 1919 Commander Hunsaker's influence on what he was learning in Europe convinced the then-Acting Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to approve preliminary construction of dirigibles to gain experience in LTA operations. The first designs were, like their British and German counterparts, designed for the use of hydrogen gas. But by the end of 1919 FDR on behalf of the Navy established the naval air station at Lakehurst, New Jersey by purchasing 1,700 acres from land that the Army thought was of little use.

During the testing of helium extraction, production and transport methods, the first helium gas arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia, for testing in a Navy C-class blimp, the C-7. Ten C-class blimps were built in 1918 with production split between Goodyear and B.F. Goodrich and the control cars built by Curtiss Aircraft. It took several months to accumulate enough helium from Fort Worth and on 2 December 1921, the C-7 lifted off with 180,000 cubic feet of helium, making the world's first flight of a helium-filled airship. Fifteen sorties were made to determine the flight characteristics as well as handling methods for a helium-filled airship.

In 1921 the US Navy took the lead in aeronautical development by establishing the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) with the airship-minded Captain William A. Moffett (later Rear Admiral) as its firs chief. One of Moffett's first acts as the head of BuAer was to rationalize airship development, placing Commander Hunsaker in charge. By the following year, the first American dirigible was ready for its first flight. The USS Shenandoah, designated ZR-1 and based on the LZ-49 Zeppelin design would be lifted by helium and the success of the Shenandoah led to the Navy pushing for control of the US helium supply as a strategic asset.

Early flight operations with the USS Shenandoah validated Hunsaker's belief that helium, something that was plentiful in the United States, would be a more suitable lifting gas as it was inert. Helium is often found in some natural gas deposits. Two of Hunsaker's assistants spent most of 1921 working with Linde Air Products Laboratory (then a division of Union Carbide) learning techniques and methods for the extraction, isolation and purification of helium. In 1925 the Bureau of Mines was assigned control of helium extraction and production, taking control of the only helium production plant in the United States at the time in Fort Worth, Texas. Funding would come from both the Army and the Navy defense budgets as helium was already considered a strategic asset.

In the late 1940s the Navy's BuAer was responsible for the development of airborne countermeasures systems and the idea of spraying chemicals into the air to produce large radar echoes as a "liquid chaff" attracted significant effort. Iron pentacarbonyl, a straw-colored liquid used in the cores of electrical transformers and in the magnetic coils of certain radio and TV coils, was the subject to much experimentation in 1948. Upon contact with the air, iron pentacarbonyl undergoes a chemical reaction which results in a cloud of iron oxide particles which the Navy surmised might block radar beams. Initial experiments involved spraying the chemical from a boat, but results were inconclusive.

On 10 November 1948 a Curtiss SB2C Helldiver was used to spray 60 gallons of iron pentacarbonyl over Chesapeake Bay while flying at 130 knots and 500 feet altitude. Along the shoreline, the Navy set up various radar systems at six different locations operating at different wavelengths from 200 to 9100 MHz to track the Helldiver as it sprayed the chemical.

There was a brief signal at 700 MHz, but for the most part the radars saw nothing. Visually, however, it was spectacular according to eyewitnesses to the tests. As the clear chemical came in contact with the air, it turned into a black vapor which several feet behind the aircraft then burst into a brilliant flame that varied between dark red and light orange that extended past the Helldiver for approximately 10 plane lengths and persisted for several seconds. As the flame darkened to a red color, the cloud turned black again and then a rust color before dispersing.

The pilot during the tests refused to fly further missions to test the iron pentacarbonyl and the Navy ended its tests with no indication that it blocked radar beams. However, for days after that November tests, reports came from different communities along Chesapeake Bay of some sort of "burning rain" that damaged paint on cars, discolored houses, and allegedly damaged clothing on clotheslines. With the Pentagon and the Navy quiet, the state of Maryland conducted an investigation and concluded that the culprit were rotting skunk cabbages on the bay shore that exuded sulphur dioxide that reacted with water vapor to produce sulphuric acid vapor (acid rain).

Naturally, the Navy didn't feel the need to correct the conclusions of the state investigation and no further tests of liquid radar countermeasures were attempted again.

Source: The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, Volume II- The Renaissance Years, 1946-1964 by Alfred Price. The Association of Old Crows/Port City Press, 1989, p24-25.

Following General Billy Mitchell's dramatic demonstration of airpower in July 1921 with the sinking of the captured German battleship Ostfriesland by Martin MB-2 bombers, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett ordered that the US Navy expeditiously get aircraft on its battleships and get aircraft carriers as quickly as possible. Within a year of Mitchell's bombing demonstration, Moffett had organized the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) with himself as its first chief. In the first ten years of BuAer's existence, the Glenn L. Martin Company would produce over 400 aircraft in over a dozen different types from scouts to patrol bombers. The first contracts for experimental aircraft to expand the Navy's aerial reach were awarded in 1922 and in 1923 Admiral Moffett and BuAer were even wanting a scouting aircraft for submarines.

The Martin MS-1, a submarine observation aircraft, was one of the more unusual designs of its day and one of the rarest of Navy aircraft. Measuring in right at seven and a half feet in height, the float-equipped biplane was only seventeen feet long and had a removable wing only eighteen feet in wingspan. A three-cylinder radial engine powered the MS-1 to top speed of 100 mph. It was rolled out on 17 April 1923 at Martin's Cleveland, Ohio, plant.

At sea, the submarine would surface underneath the alighted MS-1, lifting it up out of the water. The wings were then removed and stored with the scout plane in a watertight compartment on the deck. To launch the MS-1, the procedure was reversed. The Navy bought six MS-1 scouts.

Source: Raise Heaven and Earth- The Story of Martin Marietta People and Their Pioneering Achievements by William B. Harwood. Simon and Schuster, 1993, p99-102.

An act of Congress signed on 12 July 1921 officially created the Naval Aviation Observer to partner with naval aviators on multi-crew aircraft. The same act created the US Navy Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) and specified that BuAer's chief must be a qualified pilot or as the newly-created naval aviation observer. As a result, the first Chief of BuAer, RADM William A. Moffett, entered flight training and in June 1922 became Naval Aviation Observer No. 1.

Following the creation of the NAO, duly-qualified crew served in a wide variety of aircraft that required specialized, non-pilot crew. By the postwar period in the 1950s, both officers and enlisted personnel filled roles from bombardiers and radar operators to navigators and flight engineers. Most, however, were enlisted men. For instance, nearly all of the radar operators on the Douglas F3D Skyknight were enlisted or warrant officers. In the heavy attack squadrons, the bombardiers were all uniformly enlisted.

However, with the arrival of advanced aircraft in the 1960s like the Grumman A-6 Intruder and the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II, the NAOs became indispensable in the operation of the new generation of aircraft. In the A-6 community, the bombardier/navigator (B/N) was considered so vital to the employment of the Intruder that the early B/Ns who were enlisted were converted over to Limited Duty Officer status.

As a result, on 8 February 1965 the Navy's Bureau of Personnel replaced the designation "Naval Aviation Observer" with "Naval Flight Officer" and by 1968, newly-minted NFOs received wings like the aviators only the NFO wings had two crossed anchors.

Source: Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 by Mark Morgan and Rick Morgan. Schiffer Publishing, 2004, p21-22.