CHECK SIX: KLM Becomes the First European Airline Postwar to Serve America

21 MAY 1946: Seventy years ago today, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines was the first European airline postwar to launch scheduled services to the United States with the arrival of a KLM Douglas DC-4 at New York Idlewild Airport (today's JFK Airport). The aircraft was PH-TAR "Rotterdam". After the end of the Second World War, KLM's long-haul fleet consisted of former military Douglas C-54 Skymasters, the military transport derivative of the DC-4. To augment this fleet, right after the war, KLM ordered four DC-4s and PH-TAR was one of these four aircraft. It was delivered to KLM on 12 April 1946 and flew the first US services just five weeks later.

PH-TAR "Rotterdam" arrives in New York City
(KLM Royal Dutch Airlines)

This newsreel clip is in Dutch, but the images are wonderful even for us non-Dutch speakers!

Further reading: 

CHECK SIX: The Douglas DC-7

Scandinavian Airlines System Pioneers Polar Commercial Routes

The Last Savoia-Marchetti Airliner

Discord at the 1944 Chicago Convention and the Formation of ICAO

CHECK SIX: The Douglas DC-7

18 MAY 1953: FIRST FLIGHT OF THE DOUGLAS DC-7

Douglas launched the DC-7 program at the prodding of C.R. Smith of American Airlines who wanted a competitor to TWA's Lockheed Super Constellations for the first transcontinental nonstop services. American's requirement even called for the same engines as the Super Constellation, the Wright R-3350 Turbo Compound (the DC-6 used the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp) radial. Douglas didn't think there was a market for such an aircraft, but Smith ordered 25 of what would become the DC-7 for $40 million which pretty much covered Douglas' development costs. To save time and make the most of the $40 million, the DC-7 was a stretched DC-6 with Wright R-3350 engines. The DC-7 was slightly faster than the Super Consellation and could under *ideal* conditions (which was rare) do a nonstop transcon in under 8 hours. 

The first variant of the DC-7 was good for transcon runs but was no better than the DC-6 for oceanic routes. That first variant went exclusively to US operators- American (34), United (57), Delta (10), and National (4). American Airlines inaugurated its own nonstop "Mercury Service" DC-7 flights between Los Angeles and New York Idlewild on 29 November 1953. As the DC-7 had a higher cruising speed than the Super Constellation, the eastbound LA-New York run was made easily in 7 hours, 15 minutes (a fact not lost upon American's marketing department, hence the name "Mercury Service"), but the westbound run from New York to LA couldn't be made within 8 hours. Despite over a dozen modifications to the DC-7s made by American's engineers which included tweaks of the Wright R-3350 radial engines to squeeze every bit of horsepower out of the engines, the DC-7s still couldn't beat the prevailing winds. American's pilot union repeatedly pointed this fact out, but C.R. Smith's influence in Washington left the issue unaddressed by federal regulators. In the following year, federal regulators adjusted the time limit to allow the flight to be made legally and American's DC-7s blocked in at 8 hours, 15 minutes on a westbound nonstop.

The next DC-7 variant was the DC-7B which had uprated engines and more fuel tanks in the engine nacelles which made oceanic crossings possible. Pan American launched its own transatlantic services in the summer of 1955 and South African Airways was finally able to fly Johannesburg-London nonstop.

The final DC-7 variant had longer wings and a stretched fuselage, the DC-7C "Seven Seas". The fuel capacity of the Seven Seas allowed full westbound nonstop transatlantic capability, something that the DC-7B couldn't routinely perform. 

There was a DC-7D which would have Rolls-Royce Tyne turboprops (same engine as the Vickers Vanguard) and a swept back vertical fin, but it never made it off the drawing board as Donald Douglas decided jets were the way to go and development of the DC-8 was given priority. 

Further reading: 

The Holy Grail of Nonstop Transcontinental Service

Scandinavian Airlines System Pioneers Polar Commercial Routes

The Cadillac of the Constellation Line

The Rise of Coach Class Air Fares

(Photos: Vintage Ad Browser, California Classic Forums)

CHECK SIX: Trans World Airlines Goes All-Jet

As the sun rose on 7 April 1967, history was made as TWA became first US airline to go all pure-jet, having retired its Constellations and Starliners the night prior. The last TWA passenger Connie service was Flight 249 JFK-Philadelphia-Pittsburgh-Columbus-Louisville-St. Louis. The next day the last one flew to storage in Kansas City where there were 35 other Super Constellations and Starliners awaiting their fate. The night of 6 April, ground service crews put a booklet in all the seat back pockets of the TWA passenger aircraft titled "Props Are For Boats". 

The introduction of the Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-9 accelerated the Constellation retirement which by the 1960s were relegated to short haul domestic routes and some cargo flying. Two Connies soldiered on after 7 April on cargo-only duties, though. From the introduction of the Lockheed Constellation with TWA's dramatic 1944 delivery flight to Washington flown by Howard Hughes to its retirement to the 1967 retirement from passenger service, the Constellation family served TWA for 23 years with over 140 examples. 

Within two years, by 1969, Trans World Airlines had surpassed the iconic Pan American in the number of passengers carried across the Atlantic. 

Further reading: 

Amidst Internal Turmoil, TWA Orders the Boeing 727

The History of the TWA Moonliner

The Cadillac of the Constellation Line

The Holy Grail of Nonstop Transcontinental Service

(Photo: FlyerTalk Forums)

The Bomber Career of the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior, 1955-1968

Douglas ad for the A-3 Skywarrior

The origins of the Douglas A-3 Skywarrior lay in a 1948 Navy requirement for a jet-powered, carrier-based, nuclear attack bomber. Even though at the time, the Navy's first purpose-built carrier bomber capable of nuclear attack, the North American AJ Savage, was in the midst of flight testing, the Navy had set its eyes on a more capable successor aircraft that could carry a 10,000 lb nuclear bomb over a combat radius of 2,000 miles. The planned operating weights of the new jet bomber would limit its use to the new 61,000-ton super carrier USS United States as it was too large to operate off the Essex-class carriers and even the much larger Midway class carriers. The program was seen as the most challenging of the Navy's postwar aircraft programs and the VAX(H) Program only received two formal submissions- one from Douglas and the other from Curtiss-Wright. Headed by the legendary designer Ed Heinemann who was already widely regarded for his work on the SBD Dauntless and the AD Skyraider, the Douglas team emphasized that a smaller aircraft was possible that could meet the stringent requirements of the VAX(H) specification. Heinemann championed a smaller aircraft that could also operate safely from the 45,000-ton Midway class carriers as well as even the smaller 29,000-ton Essex class carriers and still accommodate a notional 10,000 lb nuclear weapon. 

The preliminary Douglas designs were for a twin jet aircraft that was less than half the planned operating weight limit set by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. BuAer felt that the nuclear attack mission required an aircraft of 200,000 lbs weight but Ed Heinemann felt that he could meet the mission requirements with an aircraft only 70,000 lbs at maximum operating weight. Naturally his design was met with considerable skepticism within the Navy but Heinemann's planning for a more flexible design not limited to super carriers was validated with the 1949 cancellation of the USS United States. Given that the Douglas submission could also operate off smaller carriers made it the winner of the VAX(H) competition. 

VAH-4 Skywarrior pilot. Note the set back B/N console.
(Wikipedia)

The prototype A3D Skywarrior took the air for the first time on 16 September 1953. Initially low-powered with the troublesome Westinghouse J40 turbojet, the Navy wisely switched the more powerful and widely used Pratt & Whitney J57 engine. A three year flight test program ensued and proved the Skywarrior able to safely operate not just off the super carrier decks of the United States' replacement, the Forrestal class, but also the Midway and Essex classes as well that had been duly upgraded with angled decks and steam catapults. The crew of three consisted of the pilot on the left side, the bombardier/navigator (B/N) on the right side and slightly more aft than the pilot, and the plane captain/navigator who sat behind them facing aft who controlled the twin 20mm cannon in the tail. The cannons proved to be a maintenance nightmare and were all removed from the Skywarrior flight between 1960 and 1961 and replaced with a dovetail or "duck butt" fairing that contained electronic warfare gear. 

The first production Skywarriors weighed in at 43,000 lbs empty, the maximum weight for a catapult launch was 73,000 lbs, and the maximum landing weight was 50,000 lbs. In 1959 an A3D-2 was catapulted from the USS Saratoga with a weight of 84,000 lbs, setting a record that still stands for the heaviest aircraft to be catapulted from an aircraft carrier. 

The first Skywarrior squadron was Heavy Attack Squadron ONE (VAH-1) established on 1 November 1955 a NAS Jacksonville, followed by VAH-3 on 1 June 1956. "Heavy One" went to sea first aboard the USS Forrestal in October 1956, followed by a Mediterranean deployment in January 1957. "Heavy Three" went to sea next, embarked aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt for a Mediterranean cruise in July 1957. Getting used to operating the A3D took a lot of work given it's size which gave it its nickname "Whale". In the first full year of fleet deployments, there were seven flight deck accidents that cost the lives of nine crew. One of the main issues with the high accident rate was that many A3D crew came from the land-based patrol community as it was assumed they were most experienced at handling large aircraft. Turns out, it was carrier experience that was needed as well as more standardized training. As new Skywarrior squadrons were established, they were assigned to NAS Jacksonville to pool experience and training. Eventually Heavy Attack Wing ONE moved to NAS Sanford north of Orlando. By 1958, the accident rate was dropping significantly with the influx of personnel experienced in carrier jet operations. Previously the Navy preferred to keep its carrier air wings united at a single base, but the Skywarrior community set the pattern for the future, for the first time the Navy based all of one aircraft type together at a single base at NAS Sanford. 

With the new A3D-2 variant entering service to replace the earlier A3D-1, a second Skywarrior base for the Pacific Fleet was established at NAS Whidbey Island in Washington. Heavy Attack Wing TWO was set up in Washington, having previously been based at NAS North Island when its heavy attack squadrons flew the AJ Savage. Even numbered VAH squadrons were with the Pacific Fleet, odd numbered VAH squadrons were with the Atlantic Fleet in Florida. The first Pacific Fleet deployment was carried out by VAH-2 aboard the USS Bon Homme Richard in July 1957. Interestingly at the time, there were no Forrestal class carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet, so nearly all of the Pacific Fleet Skywarrior cruises at the time were done aboard the small Essex-class carriers.

Special nuclear storage facilities were set up on the carriers where the nuclear weapons were stored, guarded by special Marine detachments. Alert aircraft on the carrier deck were also guarded by Marines. Essex class carriers carried three A3D-2s, nine to eleven A3D-2s were embarked on the Midway class and full twelve-aircraft squadrons were sent aboard the Forrestal class decks when they were finally assigned to the Pacific Fleet.  While tanking and conventional bombing were routinely practiced, they were considered secondary to the nuclear deterrent mission. At any given time, a carrier with Skywarriors aboard had at least one or two aircraft armed and on alert for immediate launch. Alert Skywarriors were sometimes kept in the hangar deck near an elevator for immediate movement to the flight deck. The Skywarrior's preferred nuclear attack profile was to make the run into the target at low level at 520 knots. Once the B/N had the target on his radar, the A3D would pull up at 2.5Gs at full throttle, pitching up to 60 degrees climb to release the weapon. After release, the Skywarrior would roll 120 degrees, still pulling 2.5Gs, and hit the deck to egress the target area to escape the nuclear blast. 

By 1960, NAS Whidbey Island was home to five A3D Skywarrior squadrons- four operational squadrons and one training squadron. The last of the Skywarriors were delivered in January 1961, from a production run of 283 aircraft. The zenith of Skywarrior operations was in mid-1961 when there were 227 aircraft in service. With the entry into service of the Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1961, the nuclear deterrent mission of the Skywarrior and its replacement, the supersonic North American A3J (designated A-5 after 1962) Vigilante, was soon to end. The Skywarrior units with the Atlantic Fleet based at NAS Sanford transitioned to the Vigilante, the first fleet deployment taking place in 1963 aboard the USS Independence. By 1965-1966, there were no more Skywarriors with the Atlantic Fleet as all the squadrons in Florida had converted to the Vigilante, leaving NAS Whidbey Island in Washington as the center of the Skywarrior's world with four operational squadrons, VAH-2, -4, -8, and -10, with VAH-123 acting as the training squadron. 

VAH-4 Skywarrior in a shallow dive bombing run
(Skywarrior Association)

On the night of the Tonkin Gulf incident on 2 August 1964 that set in motion the long US involvement in the Vietnam War, VAH-4 had three A-3B Skywarriors embarked on the USS Ticonderoga and twelve A-3Bs with VAH-10 aboard the USS Constellation. The A-3B (as the A3D-2 was redesigned after 1962) could carry up to 8,000 lbs of conventional bombs. Usually the high drag box fin Korea-era bombs were carried as most could fit in the A-3B's bomb bay. The low drag Mark 82 series bombs were reserved for aircraft that had to carry their bomb loads externally. The first bombing missions by Skywarriors in Vietnam were carried out by VAH-2 in 1964 which was uniquely split between two aircraft carriers, the USS Ranger and the USS Coral Sea. Many Skywarrior missions going into 1965 were level bombing runs at night using radar. Most Skywarriors did dual roles, both tanking and bombing. During VAH-2's marathon 331-day deployment 1964-1965, the unit's A-3Bs flew 4900 hours, dropped over 400,000 lbs of bombs, and offloaded over 4 million pounds of fuel. 

During 1966-1967, many of the targets in the North weren't good radar targets for the Skywarrior. Driven as well by concerns about the A-3B's survivability in the increasingly lethal air defenses of North Vietnam, Skywarrior squadrons shifted Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam as well as missions against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. But there was a problem. If the juicy targets in North Vietnam weren't very good radar targets, how much better was a target somewhere in the jungles of South Vietnam and Laos? The Skywarrior crews adopted dive bombing, attacking in 30-degree dives. While it wasn't anything new as it had been done in exercises in the past, the A-3B lacked an optical sight for dive bombing. Skywarrior pilots resorted to grease pencil marks on the windscreen, some used the refueling probe as an improvised aim point in their dive attacks. The pilots began their attack runs at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, pulling out at 3,000 feet to avoid light caliber anti-aircraft guns and to avoid over stressing the aircraft. More enterprising units resorted to bolting gunsights from A-1 Skyraiders to the glare panel and one unit even got its hands on some gunsights from A-4 Skyhawks. Some Skywarrior missions involved leading groups of A-4 Skyhawks on level bombing runs, the Skyhawks dropping on command from the A-3B's B/N. 

A steeper bombing attack by the Skywarrior over Vietnam
(Skywarrior Association)

A usual A-3B bombing mission involved both bombing and tanking. A Skywarrior would launch, refuel aircraft in the departing strike package, then go on its own bombing mission. On return to the carrier, it would refuel the next outgoing strike package before recovering. When not loaded with bombs or a tanker package, the bomb bay could carry critical spare parts, mail and other high priority items. It was common for a spare A-3B to be sent to NAS Cubi Point in the Philippines for critical aircraft spare parts or get sent to Japan to pick up combat pay for the ship's crew. 

The Skywarrior's role in Vietnam as a bomber began to wind down in late 1967 as it was deemed that its air refueling role was a more vital mission and that more capable, more survivable attack aircraft like the Grumman A-6 Intruder and Vought A-7 Corsair were available. The last bombing missions were carried out in 1968. But there is an oft-repeated apocryphal story amongst Skywarrior veterans of Vietnam that General William Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, himself ordered an end of A-3 bombing missions. The story goes that he was shocked when visiting an aircraft carrier that Skywarriors were providing close air support to Army troops "without the benefit of a proper gunsight". 

Nearly every aircraft carrier that participated in Vietnam had A-3 Skywarriors aboard, mostly as tankers, bombers until 1968, and later in the war, in reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles. Just in the bomber/tanker roles, Skywarrior squadrons made 62 combat cruises in Southeast Asia, ranging from three-aircraft detachments on the Essex class to full twelve-aircraft squadron deployments on the larger super carriers. Sixteen different aircraft carriers operated Skywarriors in Vietnam, only the USS Intrepid and USS Saratoga never operated Skywarriors during the war. Six Skywarriors were lost in combat, twelve were lost to operational accidents in the theater, and 35 crew were lost. 

Related reading:

Atomic Neptunes: The Navy's Interim Nuclear Bombers

The Achilles Heel of the Douglas B-66 Destroyer

Regulus: The US Navy's First Operational Nuclear Missile

Sources: A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War by Rick Morgan. Osprey Combat Aircraft No. 108, Osprey Publishing, 2015, pp8-30. Strike From the Sea: US Navy Attack Aircraft from Skyraider to Super Hornet 1948-Present by Tommy Thomason. Specialty Press, 2009, p75-87.

Delta Air Lines and the Boeing 747-100

On 9 September 2015, the very first Boeing 747-400 built, N661US, touched down at Atlanta from Honolulu as Delta Flight 836 for the last time in revenue passenger service. Ship 6301 was the Boeing 747-400 prototype which was then delivered to launch customer Northwest Airlines on 8 December 1989 and came over to Delta with the 2008 merger. There are twelve remaining 747-400s flying with Delta, all of which came over from Northwest. Current fleet planning will have these 747s retired in 2017. Delta did however, for a brief time, operate the first variant of the 747 family, the 747-100, from September 1970 to April 1977. Only five aircraft were taken on strength with Delta and while the 747-100 was but a short historical footnote in Delta’s history, its legacy looms large to this day with the airline.

My own profile art of Delta’s first 747-100, N9896 “Ship 101” as it looked on her delivery in 1970.

(JP Santiago)

In order to understand what the 747 was for Delta at the time, one has to consider that as the 1960s were drawing to a close, Delta was in the midst of transition on several fronts. The first change change came with the Southern Transcontinental Route Case of 1961. Prior to deregulation, airlines often had to make a case for the opening of new services and routes to the Civil Aeronautics Board. Often these cases consisted of years of deliberation and often politics played a central role in airlines winning favorable rulings from the CAB. In the 1950s, the CAB favored interchange services as a means for airlines to open up new markets without saturating a given route with an excess of seats, harming profitability. Having a predominantly Southeastern US-anchored network, Delta linked up with several other airlines to offer interchange services which allowed it to fly as far west as California. As traffic grew on the interchange services to the West Coast, Delta petitioned the CAB to operate the West Coast services on its own and in one of the more historic decisions made by the CAB, both Delta and National were given route authorities to California from the southeast in what was called the Southern Transcontinental Route Case. Starting in 1961, the previous interchange agreements were declared redundant and Delta opened up a range of nonstop services to San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco from Atlanta, Dallas, and New Orleans. Within a year, Las Vegas was added as well as Miami which for the first time made Delta a transcontinental airline. By 1963, the CAB permitted Delta to carry West Coast traffic to its Caribbean destinations via New Orleans and onward to Florida (Orlando and Miami) via Atlanta. In an unrelated decision by the CAB, Delta was allowed to interchange on routes to London from Washington Dulles with Pan American and soon Delta’s DC-8s were flying to Europe as part of that interchange agreement.

The second and biggest of these changes came with the death of Delta’s founder, C.E. Woolman, on 11 September 1968. In his 1841 essay “Self-Reliance”, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that “An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man...all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons." From Delta’s founding in 1927 to his death in 1968, no other individual was so closely identified with Delta than C.E. Woolman. He became the airline’s president and general manager in 1945 and became its chairman of the board only a year before his death. Though viewed as a stern autocrat by the press, Woolman was beloved by Delta employees. On his 25th anniversary with Delta, the employees presented him with a new Cadillac and though he had own several other cars, he kept that Cadillac until he died. Though ably succeeded C.H. “Charlie” Dolson, W.T. “Tom” Bebe and David Garrett, there was no question it was still Woolman’s airline for years to come.

The last change that frames the selection and operation of the Boeing 747-100 by Delta was its 1972 merger with Northeast Airlines. Throughout its history, adversity plagued Northeast which always seemed be hobbled by the CAB with a small network and when Northeast finally did break out of New England in 1968 with new routes to Florida, it ran square into the crosshairs of Eastern which was the incumbent giant of the US East Coast at the time. With Northeast literally going from cash crisis to cash crisis, its New England route authorities soon proved to be ripe for acquisition via merger. The first suitor was Northwest Airlines in 1969. Interestingly, the CAB approved the merger in 1970 but it would be without some of Northeast’s more attractive route authorities like Miami-Los Angeles. Northwest withdrew its merger offer in 1971 as a result. Eastern and TWA then offered merger terms, with Eastern in particular seeing a merger as a way of knocking a competitor out of the New England-Florida market. Those negotiations also fell through and ultimately it was Delta that came through with a suitable merger offer that also met with the approval of the CAB. On 19 May 1972, President Richard Nixon signed off on the Delta-Northeast merger (since foreign routes were involved).

So these are three events in which to put the context of the Delta’s order of the Boeing 747-100- the Southern Transcontinental Route Case of 1961, C.E. Woolman’s death in 1968, and the merger with Northeast Airlines in 1972.

Prior to the launch of the Boeing 747, the “big jet” of the day were the Douglas Super Sixty series DC-8s which had surpassed the Boeing 707 in utility and passenger capacity. While the 747’s launch has been historically associated with Juan Trippe and Pan Am, at the time, Boeing was keen on getting one up on Douglas and the 747 was the aircraft that would capture the “jumbo” jet title from the DC-8 Super 61/63. Delta representatives had visited Boeing to view the progress on the 747 program and were suitably impressed with the aircraft. Despite their favorable views on the 747 though, it was clear to all of Delta’s management from the outset that the 747 was too much airplane for the airline which had a predominantly short- and medium-haul route network with its longer routes suitably (not to mention cost-effectively) served by the DC-8 fleet. On the other hand, two of Delta’s biggest competitors, Northwest and American, had already placed orders for the 747. Delta’s fellow “southern transcontinental route” airline, National, was also expected to place orders for the 747 as well. The writing was on the wall- Delta’s DC-8s were no match for the expected spacious comfort of the big Boeing and the prudent move was to get the 747 as well, even if was just a small number on a temporary basis. In April 1967, Charlie Dolson, the airline president of the time, announced Delta’s order for three 747-100s for $20 million each with options for two more aircraft. It marked the very first time that Delta had ordered from Boeing. Preparations were made at six Delta destinations and three alternate cities for operation of the massive jet. When Pan American launched the world’s first 747 passenger services in January 1970, Delta had two representatives aboard the inaugural passenger flight.

Delta marketed the upper deck lounge of its 747s as the “Private Penthouse”.

(JP Santiago)

While Delta was making preparations for the arrival of the 747, it was carefully considering its future widebody needs which were better met by a smaller aircraft in the form of either the Douglas DC-10 or the Lockheed L-1011. Delta’s technical staff liked both aircraft and it was believed the DC-10 was favored given Delta’s long association with Douglas Aircraft and its extensive use of both the DC-8 and DC-9 in the 1960s. Delta’s close association with Douglas as one of its most loyal customers was the product of a friendship between C.E. Woolman and Donald Douglas. In the 1960s, Douglas encountered repeated financial and technical difficulties with both the DC-8 and DC-9 programs that resulted in financial losses that led to its merger with McDonnell Aircraft in 1967 which effectively put Donald Douglas out of the executive suite. And keep in mind it was the following year that C.E. Woolman passed away. In a sense, Delta was now a “free agent” no longer tied to Douglas. Lockheed, eager to put its reputation back on good standing after the issues with the Lockheed L-188 Electra, pulled out all the stops in the Tristar program, engaging potential airline customers aggressively and early on in the Tristar development, resulting in an aircraft that at least in Delta’s eyes, was practically custom-built for them. Delta did, however, order five DC-10 Series 10s as insurance against the Tristar program when Rolls Royce ran into serious financial trouble during the development of the RB.211 engine used on the Tristar.

Delta’s 747-100 order was fulfilled quickly with N9896 being handed over to Delta on 25 September 1970 with the aircraft arriving in Atlanta to great fanfare on 2 October 1970. N9897 was delivered on 25 October 1970 and N9898 was delivered on 18 November 1970. While Pan American was first to launch 747 services on 22 January 1970 on its New York JFK-London Heathrow route, mostly domestic 747 services were launched in quick succession that year:

25 February: Trans World Airlines, New York JFK-Los Angeles (first domestic 747 service)

2 March: American Airlines, New York JFK-Los Angeles

26 June: Continental Airlines, Chicago-Los Angeles-Honolulu

1 July: Northwest Airlines, Chicago-Seattle-Tokyo

23 July: United Airlines, New York JFK-San Francisco

25 October: National Airlines, Miami-New York, Miami-Los Angeles

25 October: Delta Airlines, Atlanta-Dallas-Los Angeles

21 December: Eastern Airlines, New York JFK-Miami

15 January 1971: Braniff International, Dallas Love Field-Honolulu

By the end of 1970, Delta put the other two 747-100s into service with flights to Chicago, Detroit, and Miami. The options for the two aircraft were exercised the following year with N9899 being delivered to Delta on 30 September 1971 and N9900 arriving on 11 November 1971. While Delta’s 747-100s flew amongst Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit and Miami, they were also put to use on the Pan Am interchange services between Washington Dulles and London Heathrow. In the space of just over ten years, Delta went from a mostly regional airline anchored in the southeastern United States with some Caribbean routes to a transcontinental airline operating the Boeing 747 with limited interchange services to London. Never before in Delta’s prior history had it grown so much. But its fleet was quite diverse as a result of the merger of Northeast Airlines- it had twelve different aircraft with eight different engine types in service- in August 1972, Delta had three variants of the Douglas DC-8 in service, three variants of the Douglas DC-9, two variants of the Boeing 727, the Boeing 747-100, the Convair CV-880, the Fairchild-Hiller FH-227, the Lockheed L-100 Hercules for its cargo division, and it was anticipating the arrival of both the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the Douglas DC-10! In the interests of reducing the maintenance costs, standardizing operations, and holding down spare parts inventories, the fleet types had to be pared down. By this point, David Garrett had become president of the airline and it was his legacy that Delta streamlined its fleet which gave it record breaking profits in the late 1970s. Garrett’s primary imperative was fuel savings- the 1973 OPEC oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East caused a sharp spike in the cost of fuel.

The Pratt & Whitney JT9D was the first production high bypass turbofan used on a production airliner.

(JP Santiago)

For smaller markets and the short- to medium-haul flying, Delta standardized on the Douglas DC-9 Series 32. For medium-sized markets and medium-haul flying, Delta standardized on the Boeing 727-200. It had acquired them via its merger with Northeast Airlines and found them to have superior economics to the Convair CV-880s and to some degree even the DC-8s. In addition, the 727-200 used similar Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines as the DC-9. There were thirteen 727-200s that came over with the merger with Northeast and Delta wanted more- in March 1972, Delta returned to Boeing once again, this time with an order for fourteen 727-200s (the order was placed before final approval of the Northeast merger by President Nixon)- Boeing even took Delta’s remaining Convairs as a trade-ins on the 727 order. By 1977, there would be 88 727-200s in Delta’s fleet. Delta’s first experience in working with Boeing on the 747-100 order was so favorable the airline was eager to work with Boeing quite readily again. The arrival of more 727-200s allowed Delta to dispose of the Convairs and the oldest DC-8s first. While most of the Series 51s and Super 61s were sold off, a sizeable number were kept on for several more years with some of the Super 61s getting the Cammacorp re-engining with the CFM56 to become Super 71s.

By this point it was clear the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar would be the long-haul workhorse of the Delta fleet. The DC-10s were eventually sold off to United. The first Tristar arrived in Atlanta on 12 October 1973 with the first passenger services on 15 December 1973 on the Atlanta-Philadelphia route. By 1974 there were ten Tristars in service but their spacious underfloor cargo holds meant they carried 25% of Delta’s cargo despite being less than 10% of the fleet. That allowed the L-100 Hercules transports to be sold off that year. When the Boeing 747-100 was ordered in 1967, it was with the understanding it was too big of an airplane for Delta but it was needed to compete in the marketplace. With the Tristar quickly proving itself, the 747-100’s days were quickly numbered and arrangements were made for the first two 747-100s to be sold off but the last three stayed on just a bit longer until more Tristars were in service. Delta’s last Boeing 747-100 service was flown 23 April 1977 Las Vegas-Atlanta.

Of the five original Delta 747-100s, only the first one, N9896 “Ship 101” can still be seen today at the Evergreen Aviation Museum.

(JP Santiago)

The fates of Delta’s five 747-100s:

N9896: Returned to Boeing 1974, leased to China Airlines 1976-1978, operated by Pan Am 1978-1991, then flew with Evergreen International. Preserved at the Evergreen Aviation Museum in 2010 (it’s on the roof as part of the waterpark with waterslides coming out of it!)

N9897: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989 (leased to El Al Israel for a year), operated by FedEx 1989-1991, operated by Air Hong Kong 1991-1996, then Polar Air Cargo, now scrapped.

N9898: Returned to Boeing 1975, operated by China Airlines 1975-1976, leased out by Guiness Peat Aviation 1976-1984, operated by Pan Am 1984-1991, operated by Evergreen International starting in 1991 and converted to a water bomber “Evergreen Supertanker”, retired with Evergreen’s bankruptcy in 2013. In storage at Pinal Air Park.

N9899: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989 (leased to El Al Israel for a year), operated by FedEx 1989-1991, operated by Air Hong Kong 1991-1995, then Polar Air Cargo, now scrapped.

N9900: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989, operated by FedEx 1989-1993, operated by Air Hong Kong 1993-1994, operated by Kalitta 1994-2008. Stored at Oscoda, then scrapped 2015.

As an interesting historical footnote, the first officer on the delivery of Delta’s first Lockheed Tristar was Captain Jack McMahan who at the time was one of only two men in the United States certificated to fly the DC-10, L-1011 and 747. The other pilot was an FAA examiner. He was asked by a reporter on his impressions of all three widebodies- he praised the handling of the DC-10, the overall design of the 747, and the advanced systems of the L-1011. He remarked “Flying the three planes is like going out with three sisters. They have the same background but different personalities!”

This article was originally posted on AirlineReporter.com on 23 October 2015.

Sources: Delta: The History of an Airline by W. David Lewis and Wesley Phillips Newton. University of Georgia Press, 1979, pp 340-392. Delta: An Airline and Its Aircraft by R.E.G. Davies. Palawdr Press, 1990, pp 76,80-86,96-97. 

The Douglas F6D Missileer

The F6D Missileer's resemblance to the F3D Skyknight is apparent

In 1957 the US Navy issued a specification for carrier-based fleet defense fighter that could loiter for long periods of time at long distances from the carrier. In addition, the aircraft had to be able to engage enemy aircraft at 100 nautical miles with a powerful onboard radar and long-range air-to-air missiles. Under the assumption that enemy aircraft were to be destroyed at well beyond visual range, dogfighting capability was not necessary and the need for long endurance dictated a subsonic design. Six hours was the specified endurance for this fighter and in turn this meant a large fuel load. The complex radar systems planned called for a three-man crew, with the pilot and co-pilot on each side of the radar intercept officer, this way both of the flying crew man could share some of the same displays with the radar intercept officer (RIO). 

There were four components to 1957 concept for fleet air defense that would be issued to industry for submissions. The first, of course, was for the aircraft itself, which was awarded to Douglas Aircraft Company in 1959 for what was designated the F6D Missileer. But in addition, a contract was awarded to Westinghouse for the AN/APQ-81 radar that would be used by the F6D to track and engage enemy aircraft. The third component was a contract awarded to the Bendix Corporation for the large AAM-N-10 Eagle missile. What is little-known about the F6D program was the fourth component, for an advanced airborne early warning aircraft to search out targets for patrolling Missileers. This contract would go to Grumman Aircraft which resulted in the W2F Hawkeye (later redesignated E-2 Hawkeye) with its advanced AN/APS-125 radar which could scan an area 400 miles in diameter and cue several F6D Missileers. 

Overall configuration of the F6D Missileer

The F6D itself resembled a scaled-up version of the Douglas F3D Skyknight twin-seat all-weather/night fighter. The nose section was quite bulbous to house the Westinghouse AN/APQ-81 radar and the three man crew were seated side-by-side in a cockpit that resembled that of the Grumman A-6 Intruder. Two non-afterburning Pratt & Whitney TF30 turbofans were mounted on each side of the fuselage just under the unswept wings. At the time, the use of a turbofan engine in a combat aircraft was a new concept and the TF30 was selected for its fuel economy. Since the Missileer didn't have to be supersonic, there was no need for a heavy and fuel-hungry afterburner. 

The Westinghouse AN/APQ-81 radar would have been the most advanced radar of its day using pulsed-Doppler technology years before the first production pulse-Doppler radars would enter service. The radar had a maximum range against large aircraft of 120 miles and could track as many as eight targets at once. The radar could also send mid-course corrections to the Eagle missiles. 

Overall configuration of the AAM-N-10 Eagle missile

The Bendix AAM-N-10 Eagle was the first of the four components from the 1957 fleet defense concept to be awarded. A large solid rocket booster would boost the Eagle to Mach 3.5 after launch on a loft trajectory for maximum range. After the booster was jettisoned, the Eagle's own sustainer motor ignited and further accelerated the missile to Mach 4.5. The use of a loft trajectory gave the Eagle missile a range of 160 miles and on final approach to the target, the missile's own onboard radar system (based on the radar used on the Bomarc surface-to-air missile) switched on. The Eagle could be armed with either a conventional or nuclear warhead.

Despite the advanced nature of the technology used in the F6D Missileer program, many quarters in the Navy fundamentally opposed the concept, arguing that once the Missileer had fired its six Eagle missiles, it was left vulnerable and unable to defend itself as it lacked any other armament and its large subsonic size precluded any evasive maneuvers. Once firing its missiles, the Missileer faced a long return flight to the carrier to refuel and re-arm. In 1960, the building opposition within the US Navy won out and the F6D Missileer program was canceled along with the Westinghouse AN/APQ-81 radar and what was becoming an enormously complex AAM-N-10 Eagle missile. The cost of developing the missile itself was estimated to be more than the aircraft development cost. 

However, the development of the Grumman W2F/E-2 Hawkeye continued and the aircraft is still in production today, albeit with more advanced radar systems, and is perhaps sole remaining legacy of the ambitious, but flawed, F6D Missileer program. 

Source: American X & Y Planes: Volume 2; Experimental Aircraft Since 1945 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Kev Darling. The Crowood Press, 2010, p60-61. Photos: Wikipedia, various internet forums.

Birth of a Breed: The Development of the Douglas DC-1

The Douglas DC-1 at its 1933 handover to TWA
(San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives)

The crash of a TWA (Transcontinental & Western Air) Flight 599 on 31 March 1931 served as a major catalyst in the airline industry for adoption of all-metal aircraft. The Fokker F.10 was on a scheduled flight from Kansas City to Los Angeles when it encountered turbulence on its first leg between Kansas City and Wichita. As the Fokker F.10 airline had wings of wood laminate, accumulated moisture had caused a weakening of the glue used which led to delamination and structural failure. Aboard Flight 599 was the famed Notre Dame head football coach Knute Rockne, who along with five other passengers and two crew, were lost in the crash when the aircraft went down between the rural Kansas towns of Bazaar and Matfield Green. As a result of the crash, the Bureau of Air Commerce required operators of aircraft with wood wing structures to undergo frequent inspections- as this was economically unfeasible for most operators, all-metal designs were procured as soon as possible. TWA nearly shut down for good while its Fokker fleet was grounded for  inspections. Most of the types that were procured were interim types- but in 8 February 1933, a new airliner made its first flight that was a quantum leap over anything that had proceeded it, and that was the Boeing 247 which entered service with United Air Lines just fifty days later. All metal with a retractable undercarriage, the Boeing 247 was sleek and much faster than anything that had flown passenger services up to that point. Even the most current designs were instantly obsolete- for example, the Curtiss Condor biplane airliner had entered service with Eastern Air Lines and American Airlines just five weeks before United put its Boeing 247s into service. 

United's main rival on the transcontinental market was TWA- the Boeing 247 could now make the east to west transcontinental run in only 21 hours 30 minutes including technical stops. By comparison, TWA's Fokkers took 28 hours 43 minutes to fly from New York to Los Angeles. When TWA learned of United's order for the Boeing 247, he contacted Boeing about ordering the aircraft for TWA, but at the time, United and Boeing were part of the same holding company, United Aircraft and Transport Corporation and Boeing was contractually bound to deliver 60 Boeing 247s to United before it could supply airframes to other customers. TWA's vice president for operations, Jack Frye, wasted little time in sending a letter to other aircraft manufacturers soliciting interest in building at least 60 three-engined airliners for the airline. That letter went to Consolidated Aircraft, Curtiss-Wright, Douglas Aircraft, General Aviation Manufacturing, Stout (Ford) Aircraft, and Glenn Martin Aircraft. The letter included general performance specifications that any design had to meet: 

Jack Frye of TWA
(FindAGrave.com)

1. All metal, trimotor preferred, combination structures and biplane would be considered, but the internal structure had to be metal. 

2. Thee engines of 500-550 hp. 

3. Maximum gross weight of 14,200 lbs. 

4. Weight allowance for radio and mail carriage of 350 lbs. 

5. Weight allowance for full instrumentation, including night flying, fuel to fly 1,080 miles at 150 mph, crew of two, at least 12 passengers in comfort. Payload had to be at least 2,500 lbs with full equipment and fuel for maximum range. 

6. Minimum top speed of 185 mph, cruising speed at least 146 mph. Landing speed not to exceed 65 mph, rate of climb at least 1,200 feet/min, minimum service ceiling of 21,000 feet and a minimum service ceiling with one engine out of 10,000 feet. 

The specifications page also emphasized that any design, fully loaded, "must make satisfactory take-offs under good control at any TWA airport on any combination of two engines." This landmark letter from Jack Frye is considered the "birth certificate" of the DC-1. When Donald Douglas received the letter in Santa Monica, he immediately convened a meeting with his top heads- James "Dutch" Kindelberger (of P-51 Mustang fame) who was his chief engineer, Arthur Raymond who was the deputy to Kindelberger, and Harry Wetzel, the Douglas Santa Monica plant director. With the United States in the midst of the Great Depression, it didn't take long for them to decide this was a tremendous business opportunity for the company. Just ten days after Jack Frye sent his letter of proposal, Douglas dispatched Arthur Raymond and Harry Wetzel with a ten-person team by transcontinental train to New York to meet with TWA. The Douglas team by this point had moved quickly and concluded that even though TWA was leaning towards a three engined design, they would offer a twin engined design that would be equal if not superior to TWA's specifications. The design would be an all-metal monoplane with a retractable undercarriage that would have passenger comfort as a priority. With Kindelberger supervising the design work in California and telephoning design details to Raymond and Wetzel as they were enroute to New York, the design was refined as the team prepared for its presentation to the TWA evaluation team which consisted of Jack Frye, Richard Robbins, president of TWA, and Charles Lindbergh, the airline's technical consultant. Also present were the teams from four other aircraft manufacturers, all of whom tendered three-engined designs. 

Having prior flying experience with other Douglas designs, Frye was favorable to the Douglas proposal, but Lindbergh had his doubts that a twin engined design could meet the airline's stringent specifications. Lindbergh in particular was concerned about single-engined performance at TWA's hot and high airports in the southwestern United States. The Douglas team in consultation with the engineerings staff in California rechecked their calculations repeatedly to be sure that their design could take off with a single engine from any of TWA's airports. With considerable trepidation, Douglas instructed his team meeting with TWA that he would agree to a contract provision guaranteeing this particular specification to satisfy Lindbergh's concerns. On 20 September 1932, TWA signed a contract for the first Douglas DC-1 for $125,000 (about $2 million of today's dollars) with options for 60 more aircraft based on the flight tests and performance of the DC-1. As an insurance policy against a possible failure of the DC-1, General Motors, which owned TWA, had its General Aviation Manufacturing subsidiary work on the GA-38X which was a three-engined larger derivative of the smaller single engined GA-43 airliner. Construction had started on the prototype, but work ceased early on when it became clear the DC-1 would be successful. 

Arthur E. Raymond, chief designer for the Douglas DC-1
(General Aviation News)

With a signed contract in hand, Donald Douglas assigned Arthur Raymond as the DC-1 project manager. Assisting him would be the legendary Jack Northrop, who was at the time managing the Douglas El Segundo division and would be managing the structural design of the DC-1. Other able Douglas engineers were put in charge of various systems and components for the DC-1. In addition and a first for a transport aircraft, extensive wind tunnel testing at Cal Tech's facilities in Pasadena, California, would be an integral part of the design and development process. Cal Tech's aeronautical faculty would head this effort to uncover as many issues as possible before any metal got cut for the prototype- it was wind tunnel testing that found the planned wing design was unstable and further wind tunnel testing at Cal Tech showed that sweeping the wing leading edge back addressed the stability issue. This was how the DC-1 and later DC-2 and DC-3 got their unique wing shape. 

With passenger comfort a priority, it was decided that the benchmark would be the interior noise of a Pullman rail car. The DC-1 cabin had to have the same level of noise or less. As the design effort proceeded, the early specifications for the Boeing 247 were published in Popular Mechanics and Arthur Raymond had copies of the article posted everywhere with the admonition "Do Better than Boeing!" It was vital at every step of the design process that the DC-1 be more comfortable than the Boeing 247 and an important design step was Northrop's wing design that would fit at the bottom of the fuselage without intruding into the cabin as was the case with the Boeing 247. Northrop's wing center section was relatively flat with the engine nacelles at the ends, outboard of which the outer wing panels were attached with the needed dihedral for stability. In a unique feature of the day, the passenger seats could also be reclined. Heating, ventilation, and the aforementioned soundproofing efforts were as considerable as any aircraft system to meet Douglas's desire for the DC-1 to be comfortable. The aisle width was a then-generous 16 inches (Americans in those days were nowhere near as obese as they are now) with a cabin height of 6 feet 4 inches. This would lay down the reputation of Douglas aircraft for years to come to be considered passenger-friendly.

Note the faired struts ahead of the wings on the DC-1
(San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives)

Both the Pratt and Whitney 9-cylinder R-1690 Hornet radial engine and the Wright 9-cylinder R-1820 Cyclone radial engine were evaluated with the Douglas team selecting the Hornet as the DC-1's power plant. Fixed pitch metal propellers were to be used for the prototype. Developments of both engines would figure prominently in American aircraft of the Second World War- the Cyclone would be progressively developed into larger versions that would power the B-17 Flying Fortress, the TBF Avenger, the B-25 Mitchell and in its ultimate development, the B-29 Superfortress and Lockheed Constellation. The Pratt and Whitney Hornet radial engine was a modest success but was developed into a twin row radial as the Twin Wasp which would be used on the DC-3 which in turn was developed into the outstanding Double Wasp and Wasp Major engines. The engine development is of course a future topic here at Tails Through Time! The engines of the DC-1 were one of the first transport aircraft to use the NACA cowling which streamlined radial engines by as much as 60%. When the prototype was rolled out in the summer of 1933, there were also faired struts that connected the forward fuselage with the engine nacelles ahead of the wings- in the prototype these carried sensor cables from the engines for test instrumentation but were later removed. 

On 9 April 1934, Dutch Kingleberger and Arthur Raymond filed for Patent No. 94,427 "Design for an Airplane" which described the layout and configuration of the DC-1 and later DC-2 development. Despite the patent's rather sparse documentation, it was issued by the US Patent Office in the following year. 

On 1 July 1933, the DC-1 would make its first flight as the birth of the Douglas breed of airliners. The story of the flight test program and service history of the DC-1 will be the subject of a subsequent article here, but it should be noted that in 1918, a very young Donald Douglas was working for Glenn L. Martin where he designed bombers for Martin but it was a transport derivative of his bomber designs that fascinated Douglas- the GMT or Glenn Martin Transport was a 15 seat aircraft that had a fully enclosed cockpit. Only one was built and it was destroyed in an accident in March 1920. The GMT was the first Douglas-designed transport and it was where Donald Douglas resolved that his dream was to design and build an aircraft that whose sole purpose was to carry passengers in comfort. That was in 1919-1920, the DC-1 when it made its maiden flight in 1933 was just the start of Donald Douglas's dreams coming true. 

Source: Douglas Propliners: Skyleaders, DC-1 to DC-7 by Rene J. Francillon. Haynes Publishing, 2011, pp 9-11, 46-53. 

The XB-15: Getting Boeing Back On Its Feet

Clairmont Egtvedt led Boeing during its most precarious times
(Boeing Historical Archives)

The Boeing Company of the mid-1930s was existing by only a razor-thin margin and at any moment in those times, could have shut down for good with the Boeing name a mere footnote in aviation history. Why one of the dominant aviation companies of today nearly ceased to exist eighty years ago we have to move the clock back to 1929 when President Herbert Hoover appointed Walter Fogler Brown to be the Postmaster General. Within a year, Brown had lobbied Congress for more authority to improve the air mail system which he felt was inefficient and piecemeal in the organization of the existing airline networks that carried the mail. The Air Mail Act of 1930 (also known as the McNary-Watres Act after its Senate sponsors) gave Brown the authority to rationalize the US air mail system, which in effect, led to the rationalization of the US airline system of the day. The details of that controversial move will of course will be the topic of a future blog article here at Tails Through Time- but the key event here was the so-called "Spoils Conference" of 1930 where Brown consolidated the existing air mail routes which by extent led to the consolidation of the US airline system to just three airlines- United, TWA, and American- essentially forcing out of business the other airlines. One of the effects of this move was that Bill Boeing teamed up with Frederick Rentschler of Pratt & Whitney to form a large business conglomerate with diverse interests in aviation called United Aircraft and Transport Corporation. United Aircraft was the holding company for both Boeing Aircraft and Pratt & Whitney and also held ownership of Hamilton Standard, the propeller manufacturer, as well as the aircraft companies of Chance Vought, Sikorsky, and Stearman along with United Air Lines. In late 1933, Senate investigations opened on the 1930 Spoils Conference which led to the Air Mail Scandal of 1934 which led to the Roosevelt Administration canceling all the air mail contracts and handing the air mail delivery to the US Army Air Corps with disastrous results. With no choice but to return air mail service to the airlines, the government did so with punitive conditions that large consolidated aviation firms with airline interests had to be broken up in order to win back air mail contracts. United Aircraft was broken up back into its constituent companies and Bill Boeing resigned from aviation altogether. 

Replacing Bill Boeing was his general manager, Clairmont "Claire" Egtvedt, who had risen up the ranks at Boeing after starting out as a draftsman in 1917 fresh out of college. Of all the pieces of the now-broken up United Aircraft, Egtvedt had to take charge of the smallest and weakest piece- Boeing Aircraft itself which included its Stearman subsidiary in Wichita, Kansas. The first year of Boeing's new independent existence found it operating at a loss of over $200,000, a crushing loss in those days. Egtvedt wanted to get Boeing back into business by building a twin-engined bomber and twin-engined transport, but there was just barely enough money in the company's accounts to make payroll. By the late summer of 1934, Boeing's workforce had fallen from 2,275 a year earlier to only 600. The remaining employees as a testament to their faith in Boeing, offered up a plan to Egtvedt where half the group would work two weeks and then the other half of the group would then work the next two weeks and keep alternating so that only half the employees needed to be paid but the core experience of Boeing could be kept intact. Egtvedt naturally approved of the plan and true to the loyalty of the Boeing employees, some of those where not assigned to work in a particular two week block came to work anyway to help out without asking for payment. 

What Boeing products were available needed to be sold overseas to earn income for the company, so Egtvedt hired a young engineer, Wellwood Beall, who had been an instructor at Boeing's own school of aeronautics. Beall was an enthusiastic and gregarious individual who Egtvedt tasked with selling the Boeing P-26 Peashooter to the Chinese, who ended up ordering eleven aircraft in 1935. But it wasn't enough, and even the in-house company newspaper shut down publication to save money. Ever looking for opportunities to turn Boeing's fortunes around, Egtvedt had always thought the Boeing 247 airliner was too small, which as it turned out, became its biggest liability to the roomier and bigger Douglas DC-3 which proved to be an immense success. Several years earlier Egtvedt actually watched flight operations with Boeing fighters aboard the first US aircraft carrier, the USS Langley. A Navy rear admiral who was hosting the Boeing delegation remarked that battleships made more sense than bombers (this was in the wake of General Billy Mitchell's demonstration where he sank captured German warships with bombers) for US defense because a battleship could defend itself. When pressed further by Egtvedt, the admiral responded that the only practical bomber would be one that would be able to defend itself like a "flying dreadnaught". The remark must have stuck with Egtvedt that bigger was the way to go, but the only large aircraft of the day in the United States was the Barling bomber of 1920 that had a 120-foot wingspan, six engines and needed a tailwind to break 90 mph and had a range of only 300 miles on account of its heavy weight. Large aircraft simply had a lousy track record in those days. But that didn't stop Egtvedt from thinking about the large aircraft problem. Bill Boeing himself once said: 

"I've tried to make the men around me feel as I do, that we are embarked as pioneers upon a new science and industry in which our problems are so new and unusual that it behooves no one to dismiss any novel idea with the statement that 'It can't be done'. Our job is to keep everlastingly at research and experiment, to adapt our laboratory results and those of other laboratories to production as soon as practicable, to let no new improvement in flying and flying equipment pass us by."

The XB-15
(Boeing Historical Archives)

Boeing wasn't just thinking about bigger aircraft. There were also some officers with the US Army Air Corps that saw Billy Mitchell's 1921 demonstrations as prescient and the key to making the United States an aviation power. At the lowest point of Boeing's fortunes in the spring of 1934, Egtvedt got a phone call from Brigadier General Conger Pratt who was head of the Air Corps Materiel Division at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio (predecessor to today's USAF Systems Command). Pratt wanted Egtvedt's presence at a secret conference in Dayton to which he also invited the heads of several other aircraft companies. Within the Air Corps, many of Mitchell's subordinates were imbuing the USAAC with ideas of long range bombers which received high level support with the command staff in Washington. At the meeting on 14 May 1934, General Pratt informed the aircraft company leaders that the Army wanted proposals for a long range bomber that could carry at least 2,000 lbs of bombs at least 3,000 miles and weigh no more than 32 tons. Nothing like it had been done before and the invited guests were quite startled. 

Egtvedt immediately put Boeing engineers to work on a 150-foot wingspan bomber called "Project A". The speed at which Boeing got to work on Project A resulted in a design contract from the Army. A large hangar at Boeing Field was set aside with a partitioned area only cleared personnel were allowed along with Army representatives from Wright Field. Excitement built quickly at Boeing with word of a mammoth bomber in the works. Despite the Army contract, Boeing's financial state was still quite precarious, but Egtvedt pressed on- Boeing, in his mind, had to learn how to build large aircraft if it was going to survive and Project A would be the company's school house, even if the company ran in the red- which it did. 

With work proceeding on what would become the XB-15, a second proposal was issued by Air Corps Materiel Division at Wright Field. While the first project was to be a technology demonstrator of a large bomber aircraft, the second proposal that was issued on 8 August 1934 just months later called for a production bomber with a 2,000 lb bomb load, a top speed of 250 mph, a range of 2,200 miles and a crew of around six. Companies were asked for designs and bids for an initial production run of just over 200 aircraft. You can imagine Claire Egtvedt's excitement with this second proposal- he had been thinking about larger aircraft and Boeing was learning all about designing and building larger aircraft with the XB-15 demonstrator. He had been thinking about a flying dreadnaught that a Navy admiral referred to years earlier and now the Army was asking for that very aircraft. Egtvedt wanted the Boeing proposal for the production bomber to be a four engine aircraft, but in those days, four engine aircraft were rare and seen as risky from a technological standpoint. He even flew to Wright Field to get further clarification on the production bomber specifications to be sure a four-engined design was acceptable. 

Egtvedt didn't just want to submit a proposal- he wanted to something daring. He wanted to proceed with a prototype of Boeing's proposal and fly it to Wright Field to demonstrate its performance. This was an immense gamble- Boeing was already operating in the red, it was busy working on the XB-15 project and now Egtvedt wanted to build and fly a prototype of Boeing's submission within one year. Egtvedt turned to his friend for guidance- Boeing's company lawyer and future CEO, William M. Allen. Allen came from the University of Montana but had a Harvard law degree- he first worked with Boeing in setting up Boeing Air Transport in 1926 (the predecessor to United Air Lines). Allen was an unusual sort for the Boeing team- he wasn't a pilot and he wasn't an engineer. But he had a remarkable clarity of thought that many at Boeing came to rely on to help with tough decisions and he asked Egtvedt bluntly "Do you think you can build a successful four-engined airplane in a year?" Egtvedt's response evoked the spirit of Bill Boeing: "Yes I know I can." So with Bill Allen's support, on 26 September 1934, Boeing's board of directors authorized Egtvedt to borrow money to the limit to begin work on the Model 299. 

Model 299 prototype
(USAF Museum)

In less than three months the production drawings for the Model 299 were in the hands of assembly shop who began building the prototype, all while work continued on the XB-15 program. As assembly of the Model 299 prototype began, the company ran out of money and the board, putting its faith in Claire Egtvedt, arranged to borrow more money. While it was clear that the XB-15 would never be a production aircraft, what had been learned from the design effort paid dividends for Boeing in the speed at which the design and fabrication of the Model 299 proceeded. Final assembly began in June 1935 and soon workers disregarded their shifts in an all-out effort to finish the Model 299 prototype. At sunrise on a Sunday, 28 July 1935, the Model 299 prototype was rolled out at Boeing Field for its successful maiden flight. Keep in mind the go-ahead to launch the Model 299 program was on 26 September 1934! After a stunning first flight, the Model 299 was then flown to Wright Field on 20 August 1935, taking only nine hours to cover over 2,000 miles with an average speed of 252 mph. Boeing's other competitors also built flying prototypes of their submissions but they paled in comparison to the Model 299. Martin entered the YB-12 which was just a re-engined version of the B-10 twin-engined bomber and Douglas entered the B-18 Bolo which was based on the DC-2 airliner. 

Then tragedy struck. During a flight test out of Wright Field in October, the control locks were left in place and the Model 299 prototype stalled at takeoff and crashed with the loss the pilot and varying degrees of injuries to the rest of the crew. Under the rules of the competition laid down by the Army, the Model 299 had to be eliminated from competition as it was unable to complete its flight tests. It was a somber Christmas 1935 when Douglas won the contract with the B-18 Bolo. But there was a silver lining in the loss of the Model 299 prototype- the flight test program won the Model 299 many advocates within the US Army Air Corps who saw the Boeing design as the future of long range bombers. A service order was placed for thirteen aircraft and a fourteenth aircraft that would be a structural test article. The aircraft's designation would be a name that would echo in the annals in the history of aviation- B-17. When the Seattle Times reporter Richard Williams dubbed the Model 299 a "flying fortress" on account of its six gun turrets, Boeing astutely saw the value of the name and the B-17 became the Flying Fortress. 

Work did continue on the XB-15, though- it made its first flight on 15 October 1937. It was 26 feet longer than the B-17 with a 36-foot greater wingspan and at the time of its rollout, it was the largest bomber ever built. The aircraft was christened "Old Grandpappy" in recognition of the role its design played in the B-17 Flying Fortress. The service history of the XB-15 will also be the subject of a future article here at Tails Through Time, so stay tuned! 

Sources: Boeing: The First Century by Eugene E. Bauer. TABA Publishing, 2000, pp 59-69. Legend & Legacy: The Story of Boeing and Its People by Robert J. Serling. St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp 27-35.