Delta Air Lines and the Boeing 747-100

On 9 September 2015, the very first Boeing 747-400 built, N661US, touched down at Atlanta from Honolulu as Delta Flight 836 for the last time in revenue passenger service. Ship 6301 was the Boeing 747-400 prototype which was then delivered to launch customer Northwest Airlines on 8 December 1989 and came over to Delta with the 2008 merger. There are twelve remaining 747-400s flying with Delta, all of which came over from Northwest. Current fleet planning will have these 747s retired in 2017. Delta did however, for a brief time, operate the first variant of the 747 family, the 747-100, from September 1970 to April 1977. Only five aircraft were taken on strength with Delta and while the 747-100 was but a short historical footnote in Delta’s history, its legacy looms large to this day with the airline.

My own profile art of Delta’s first 747-100, N9896 “Ship 101” as it looked on her delivery in 1970.

(JP Santiago)

In order to understand what the 747 was for Delta at the time, one has to consider that as the 1960s were drawing to a close, Delta was in the midst of transition on several fronts. The first change change came with the Southern Transcontinental Route Case of 1961. Prior to deregulation, airlines often had to make a case for the opening of new services and routes to the Civil Aeronautics Board. Often these cases consisted of years of deliberation and often politics played a central role in airlines winning favorable rulings from the CAB. In the 1950s, the CAB favored interchange services as a means for airlines to open up new markets without saturating a given route with an excess of seats, harming profitability. Having a predominantly Southeastern US-anchored network, Delta linked up with several other airlines to offer interchange services which allowed it to fly as far west as California. As traffic grew on the interchange services to the West Coast, Delta petitioned the CAB to operate the West Coast services on its own and in one of the more historic decisions made by the CAB, both Delta and National were given route authorities to California from the southeast in what was called the Southern Transcontinental Route Case. Starting in 1961, the previous interchange agreements were declared redundant and Delta opened up a range of nonstop services to San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco from Atlanta, Dallas, and New Orleans. Within a year, Las Vegas was added as well as Miami which for the first time made Delta a transcontinental airline. By 1963, the CAB permitted Delta to carry West Coast traffic to its Caribbean destinations via New Orleans and onward to Florida (Orlando and Miami) via Atlanta. In an unrelated decision by the CAB, Delta was allowed to interchange on routes to London from Washington Dulles with Pan American and soon Delta’s DC-8s were flying to Europe as part of that interchange agreement.

The second and biggest of these changes came with the death of Delta’s founder, C.E. Woolman, on 11 September 1968. In his 1841 essay “Self-Reliance”, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that “An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man...all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons." From Delta’s founding in 1927 to his death in 1968, no other individual was so closely identified with Delta than C.E. Woolman. He became the airline’s president and general manager in 1945 and became its chairman of the board only a year before his death. Though viewed as a stern autocrat by the press, Woolman was beloved by Delta employees. On his 25th anniversary with Delta, the employees presented him with a new Cadillac and though he had own several other cars, he kept that Cadillac until he died. Though ably succeeded C.H. “Charlie” Dolson, W.T. “Tom” Bebe and David Garrett, there was no question it was still Woolman’s airline for years to come.

The last change that frames the selection and operation of the Boeing 747-100 by Delta was its 1972 merger with Northeast Airlines. Throughout its history, adversity plagued Northeast which always seemed be hobbled by the CAB with a small network and when Northeast finally did break out of New England in 1968 with new routes to Florida, it ran square into the crosshairs of Eastern which was the incumbent giant of the US East Coast at the time. With Northeast literally going from cash crisis to cash crisis, its New England route authorities soon proved to be ripe for acquisition via merger. The first suitor was Northwest Airlines in 1969. Interestingly, the CAB approved the merger in 1970 but it would be without some of Northeast’s more attractive route authorities like Miami-Los Angeles. Northwest withdrew its merger offer in 1971 as a result. Eastern and TWA then offered merger terms, with Eastern in particular seeing a merger as a way of knocking a competitor out of the New England-Florida market. Those negotiations also fell through and ultimately it was Delta that came through with a suitable merger offer that also met with the approval of the CAB. On 19 May 1972, President Richard Nixon signed off on the Delta-Northeast merger (since foreign routes were involved).

So these are three events in which to put the context of the Delta’s order of the Boeing 747-100- the Southern Transcontinental Route Case of 1961, C.E. Woolman’s death in 1968, and the merger with Northeast Airlines in 1972.

Prior to the launch of the Boeing 747, the “big jet” of the day were the Douglas Super Sixty series DC-8s which had surpassed the Boeing 707 in utility and passenger capacity. While the 747’s launch has been historically associated with Juan Trippe and Pan Am, at the time, Boeing was keen on getting one up on Douglas and the 747 was the aircraft that would capture the “jumbo” jet title from the DC-8 Super 61/63. Delta representatives had visited Boeing to view the progress on the 747 program and were suitably impressed with the aircraft. Despite their favorable views on the 747 though, it was clear to all of Delta’s management from the outset that the 747 was too much airplane for the airline which had a predominantly short- and medium-haul route network with its longer routes suitably (not to mention cost-effectively) served by the DC-8 fleet. On the other hand, two of Delta’s biggest competitors, Northwest and American, had already placed orders for the 747. Delta’s fellow “southern transcontinental route” airline, National, was also expected to place orders for the 747 as well. The writing was on the wall- Delta’s DC-8s were no match for the expected spacious comfort of the big Boeing and the prudent move was to get the 747 as well, even if was just a small number on a temporary basis. In April 1967, Charlie Dolson, the airline president of the time, announced Delta’s order for three 747-100s for $20 million each with options for two more aircraft. It marked the very first time that Delta had ordered from Boeing. Preparations were made at six Delta destinations and three alternate cities for operation of the massive jet. When Pan American launched the world’s first 747 passenger services in January 1970, Delta had two representatives aboard the inaugural passenger flight.

Delta marketed the upper deck lounge of its 747s as the “Private Penthouse”.

(JP Santiago)

While Delta was making preparations for the arrival of the 747, it was carefully considering its future widebody needs which were better met by a smaller aircraft in the form of either the Douglas DC-10 or the Lockheed L-1011. Delta’s technical staff liked both aircraft and it was believed the DC-10 was favored given Delta’s long association with Douglas Aircraft and its extensive use of both the DC-8 and DC-9 in the 1960s. Delta’s close association with Douglas as one of its most loyal customers was the product of a friendship between C.E. Woolman and Donald Douglas. In the 1960s, Douglas encountered repeated financial and technical difficulties with both the DC-8 and DC-9 programs that resulted in financial losses that led to its merger with McDonnell Aircraft in 1967 which effectively put Donald Douglas out of the executive suite. And keep in mind it was the following year that C.E. Woolman passed away. In a sense, Delta was now a “free agent” no longer tied to Douglas. Lockheed, eager to put its reputation back on good standing after the issues with the Lockheed L-188 Electra, pulled out all the stops in the Tristar program, engaging potential airline customers aggressively and early on in the Tristar development, resulting in an aircraft that at least in Delta’s eyes, was practically custom-built for them. Delta did, however, order five DC-10 Series 10s as insurance against the Tristar program when Rolls Royce ran into serious financial trouble during the development of the RB.211 engine used on the Tristar.

Delta’s 747-100 order was fulfilled quickly with N9896 being handed over to Delta on 25 September 1970 with the aircraft arriving in Atlanta to great fanfare on 2 October 1970. N9897 was delivered on 25 October 1970 and N9898 was delivered on 18 November 1970. While Pan American was first to launch 747 services on 22 January 1970 on its New York JFK-London Heathrow route, mostly domestic 747 services were launched in quick succession that year:

25 February: Trans World Airlines, New York JFK-Los Angeles (first domestic 747 service)

2 March: American Airlines, New York JFK-Los Angeles

26 June: Continental Airlines, Chicago-Los Angeles-Honolulu

1 July: Northwest Airlines, Chicago-Seattle-Tokyo

23 July: United Airlines, New York JFK-San Francisco

25 October: National Airlines, Miami-New York, Miami-Los Angeles

25 October: Delta Airlines, Atlanta-Dallas-Los Angeles

21 December: Eastern Airlines, New York JFK-Miami

15 January 1971: Braniff International, Dallas Love Field-Honolulu

By the end of 1970, Delta put the other two 747-100s into service with flights to Chicago, Detroit, and Miami. The options for the two aircraft were exercised the following year with N9899 being delivered to Delta on 30 September 1971 and N9900 arriving on 11 November 1971. While Delta’s 747-100s flew amongst Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit and Miami, they were also put to use on the Pan Am interchange services between Washington Dulles and London Heathrow. In the space of just over ten years, Delta went from a mostly regional airline anchored in the southeastern United States with some Caribbean routes to a transcontinental airline operating the Boeing 747 with limited interchange services to London. Never before in Delta’s prior history had it grown so much. But its fleet was quite diverse as a result of the merger of Northeast Airlines- it had twelve different aircraft with eight different engine types in service- in August 1972, Delta had three variants of the Douglas DC-8 in service, three variants of the Douglas DC-9, two variants of the Boeing 727, the Boeing 747-100, the Convair CV-880, the Fairchild-Hiller FH-227, the Lockheed L-100 Hercules for its cargo division, and it was anticipating the arrival of both the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the Douglas DC-10! In the interests of reducing the maintenance costs, standardizing operations, and holding down spare parts inventories, the fleet types had to be pared down. By this point, David Garrett had become president of the airline and it was his legacy that Delta streamlined its fleet which gave it record breaking profits in the late 1970s. Garrett’s primary imperative was fuel savings- the 1973 OPEC oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East caused a sharp spike in the cost of fuel.

The Pratt & Whitney JT9D was the first production high bypass turbofan used on a production airliner.

(JP Santiago)

For smaller markets and the short- to medium-haul flying, Delta standardized on the Douglas DC-9 Series 32. For medium-sized markets and medium-haul flying, Delta standardized on the Boeing 727-200. It had acquired them via its merger with Northeast Airlines and found them to have superior economics to the Convair CV-880s and to some degree even the DC-8s. In addition, the 727-200 used similar Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines as the DC-9. There were thirteen 727-200s that came over with the merger with Northeast and Delta wanted more- in March 1972, Delta returned to Boeing once again, this time with an order for fourteen 727-200s (the order was placed before final approval of the Northeast merger by President Nixon)- Boeing even took Delta’s remaining Convairs as a trade-ins on the 727 order. By 1977, there would be 88 727-200s in Delta’s fleet. Delta’s first experience in working with Boeing on the 747-100 order was so favorable the airline was eager to work with Boeing quite readily again. The arrival of more 727-200s allowed Delta to dispose of the Convairs and the oldest DC-8s first. While most of the Series 51s and Super 61s were sold off, a sizeable number were kept on for several more years with some of the Super 61s getting the Cammacorp re-engining with the CFM56 to become Super 71s.

By this point it was clear the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar would be the long-haul workhorse of the Delta fleet. The DC-10s were eventually sold off to United. The first Tristar arrived in Atlanta on 12 October 1973 with the first passenger services on 15 December 1973 on the Atlanta-Philadelphia route. By 1974 there were ten Tristars in service but their spacious underfloor cargo holds meant they carried 25% of Delta’s cargo despite being less than 10% of the fleet. That allowed the L-100 Hercules transports to be sold off that year. When the Boeing 747-100 was ordered in 1967, it was with the understanding it was too big of an airplane for Delta but it was needed to compete in the marketplace. With the Tristar quickly proving itself, the 747-100’s days were quickly numbered and arrangements were made for the first two 747-100s to be sold off but the last three stayed on just a bit longer until more Tristars were in service. Delta’s last Boeing 747-100 service was flown 23 April 1977 Las Vegas-Atlanta.

Of the five original Delta 747-100s, only the first one, N9896 “Ship 101” can still be seen today at the Evergreen Aviation Museum.

(JP Santiago)

The fates of Delta’s five 747-100s:

N9896: Returned to Boeing 1974, leased to China Airlines 1976-1978, operated by Pan Am 1978-1991, then flew with Evergreen International. Preserved at the Evergreen Aviation Museum in 2010 (it’s on the roof as part of the waterpark with waterslides coming out of it!)

N9897: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989 (leased to El Al Israel for a year), operated by FedEx 1989-1991, operated by Air Hong Kong 1991-1996, then Polar Air Cargo, now scrapped.

N9898: Returned to Boeing 1975, operated by China Airlines 1975-1976, leased out by Guiness Peat Aviation 1976-1984, operated by Pan Am 1984-1991, operated by Evergreen International starting in 1991 and converted to a water bomber “Evergreen Supertanker”, retired with Evergreen’s bankruptcy in 2013. In storage at Pinal Air Park.

N9899: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989 (leased to El Al Israel for a year), operated by FedEx 1989-1991, operated by Air Hong Kong 1991-1995, then Polar Air Cargo, now scrapped.

N9900: Returned to Boeing 1977, operated by Flying Tiger 1977-1989, operated by FedEx 1989-1993, operated by Air Hong Kong 1993-1994, operated by Kalitta 1994-2008. Stored at Oscoda, then scrapped 2015.

As an interesting historical footnote, the first officer on the delivery of Delta’s first Lockheed Tristar was Captain Jack McMahan who at the time was one of only two men in the United States certificated to fly the DC-10, L-1011 and 747. The other pilot was an FAA examiner. He was asked by a reporter on his impressions of all three widebodies- he praised the handling of the DC-10, the overall design of the 747, and the advanced systems of the L-1011. He remarked “Flying the three planes is like going out with three sisters. They have the same background but different personalities!”

This article was originally posted on AirlineReporter.com on 23 October 2015.

Sources: Delta: The History of an Airline by W. David Lewis and Wesley Phillips Newton. University of Georgia Press, 1979, pp 340-392. Delta: An Airline and Its Aircraft by R.E.G. Davies. Palawdr Press, 1990, pp 76,80-86,96-97. 

The Rocky History of Ariana Afghan Airlines

Ariana's logo- note the use of the Pan Am font

Prior to the Second World War, air services to Afghanistan were adventurous to say the least, given the inhospitable terrain of the area. Most air links to South Asia of the day that connected the region to Europe passed via India and were controlled by primarily the British. The first air links to Afghanistan, however, came by way of the Soviet Union starting on 14 September 1926 when the Russian airline Dobrolyot connected Kabul to the other Central Asian cities under Soviet control with Junkers F13 monoplanes. Dobrolyot was founded in 1923 to develop air services in the Soviet Union and in 1932 it was Dobrolyot that formed the nucleus of a new airline, Aeroflot. Dobrolyot's air services to Kabul continued until the outbreak of the Second World War. Interestingly enough, Dobrolyot was not the only foreign airline active in Afghanistan in the interwar period- DLH (Deutsche Luft Hansa, predecessor to today's Lufthansa) also opened air services to Afghanistan. At the time, DLH was looking to extend its route network to China where there were substantial German business interests. However, remaining bitterness from the First World War stymied DLH's attempts to open routes to China via India, so going through Afghanistan was seen as a short cut around British influence in the area. DLH extended its network eastward from Istanbul to Baghdad in October 1937 and then extended again from Iraq to the Iranian capital of Teheran in April 1938. Two weeks later, DLH extended its network again, this time connecting the Afghan cities of Kabul and Herat via Teheran and at the time, it was the furthest corner of DLH's airline network. Services ended abruptly, though, in August 1939 on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War. 

Air services to Afghanistan were spotty at best and ad hoc for the duration of the Second World War  and aside from a small air mail service using Hawker Hart biplanes, it would be an American businessman in India who would forge new air links into Afghanistan again at the end of the war. New York native Peter Baldwin had served with the US Army Air Force in India during the war and returned in 1945 leading a US government mission to oversee the disposal of surplus USAAF aircraft in the region. His job finished, he elected to stay in India and in 1947 formed a company in Bombay (Mumbai today) for the sales of light aircraft and airport equipment. By 1950, he had his own fleet of thirteen Douglas DC-3s that he was flying all over the region on charter flights all over India, the Middle East and as far as Africa. His small charter operation even operated Hajj flights to Mecca. It was in this capacity that he came into partnership with the Afghan government. 

The DC-3 services were a boon to a country without railroads.

In 1951, the Kabul government established a branch of the Royal Afghan Air Force that was tasked with civil aviation development with Colonel Gulbar Khan as the head of what was called the "Hawabazi Mulki". Colonel Khan worked out a partnership with Peter Baldwin to form a new Afghan airline which was established on 27 January 1955 as Aryana Afghan Airlines in Kabul with Peter Baldwin holding 49% ownership of the airline and the Kabul government owning 51%. I haven't been able to determine if the airline's first three DC-3 aircraft were from Baldwin's charter operation, but it would make sense given his signifcant ownership in the new venture. The first services were launched at the end of 1955 connecting Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif in the north near the Soviet border via the city of Kunduz. What had taken a week on the region's poor roads now only took three hours. 

During the Pan Am years, the Ariana chief pilot was a Pan Am pilot

On 27 June 1956, the Kabul government signed an air transport and development agreement with the United States. At the time, both the Soviet Union and the United States were eager to get Kabul's business and the Afghans astutely played both sides off each other to get economic development agreements. The air agreement with the United States included Pan American buying out Peter Baldwin's interest in Aryana. As a result, Pan Am become responsible for all operational and technical matters and also changed the spelling of the airline's name to Ariana, ostensibly to eliminate any possible references to the word "Aryan" that had been corrupted by the Nazi regime during the Second World War. On 3 June 1956, an Ariana Douglas DC-4 with an all-Afghan crew trained by Pan Am departed New York for Kabul to begin Hajj flights to Mecca. The DC-3s were used for internal domestic services that connected Kabul to Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Maimana. New Delhi was connected to Kabul via the Indian city of Armistar and Karachi, the Pakistani port city, was connected via Kandahar. The DC-4 was used to connect Kabul to Teheran, Beirut and Damascus via Kandahar where American economic development funds were used to build a modern airport and terminal facility. 

Ariana launched services to Europe on 11 September 1959 on what they called the "Marco Polo Route" which used the DC-4 on services to the Turkish capital of Ankara via Beirut. The flight then continued on to Prague and then terminated in Frankfurt. The airline had to replace its DC-4 with a larger DC-6B as adventurous European tourists began to fly the "Marco Polo Route" to Kabul. The airline soon found that it was more profitable for the DC-6B services to bypass Kabul and instead fly Kandahar to New Delhi. Political instability in the region in the 1960s resulted in the termination of services to Karachi and the services that connected Frankfurt to New Delhi could only be flown twice a month- soon after, European services were cut altogether with Ariana's westernmost destination being Beirut by 1962.

Ariana Afghan 727-200

Ariana was near dormant when American development funds arrived again in 1963. This was a time of superpower rivalry and Afghanistan was no different than any other non-aligned nation of the time that had both American and Soviet interests competing for influence. Ariana got an extremely low-interest loan (it was pretty much a gift) that included a second Douglas DC-6 and two ex-Pan American Convair CV-340s to replace the DC-3 on the domestic services. A third CV-340 was purchased from Allegheny Airlines and this allowed a return to Karachi via Kandahar as diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan improved. In July 1965, Ariana opened DC-6 services to the Uzbek capital of Tashkent in a pooling agreement with Aeroflot and in the following month, services to Europe resumed with DC-6 services from both Kabul and Kandahar to London Gatwick, stopping only in Beirut and Frankfurt. In April 1968, Ariana got its first jet equipment with a Boeing 727-100 which replaced the DC-6s on the European services. The route to London was reconfigured to route via Teheran, Istanbul and Frankfurt, but as Ariana had no fifth freedom rights, only Kabul/Kandahar-bound passengers could be boarded at London Gatwick. That first 727 crashed in dense fog on approach to London on 5 January 1969, but two more 727s were added- the first a lease from World Airways that was bought outright and a second purchase from Executive Jet Aviation, arriving in 1971. 

Ariana Afghan Airlines Tu-154- note the continued use of the Pan Am font!

The domestic routes of Ariana were spun off under a subsidiary airline called Bakhtar Afghan Airlines. This was a political move more than anything else as some Afghan officials wanted to limit US influence in the northern tier of cities along the Soviet frontier- this was accomplished by cutting Pan Am out of Bakhtar's operations. In 1973, Bakhtar took delivery of three Yakovlev Yak-40 trijets, becoming one of the few non-Soviet client state customers for the 28-seat feeder jet. Pan Am was still needed in the Ariana international operation, though, as Pan Am sold Ariana a Boeing 720B on very generous terms (again, it was pretty much a gift) in May 1973. That year, though, on the heels of a severe drought 1971-1972, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan seized power in a non-violent coup, deposing King Zahir Shah and ending the Afghan monarchy. A republic was proclaimed to institute economic reforms but only political instability was established as various Afghan leaders relying on tribal loyalties began to vie for control of the country. A series of coups followed starting in 1978, but despite this, Ariana launched Douglas DC-10 Series 30 services with a single aircraft in October 1979 on its services to London which could now be served nonstop. On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan which for all intents and purposes ended Ariana's operations. The two 727s and DC-10 were parked and eventually sold off under Soviet pressure by 1985. Its regional subsidiary, Bakhtar, took over Ariana's operations with two Tupolev Tu-154M aircraft starting in 1987, but the following year the Ariana name was resurrected and Bakhtar's domestic routes and operations folded into Ariana. 

Ariana's sole Douglas DC-10

The country descended into outright civil war following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Communist President Najibullah's regime only lasted to 1992 and with the Taliban takeover in 1996, worldwide sanctions crippled what was left of Ariana's operation. Pakistan set up a temporary maintenance base for the airline in Karachi, and only Dubai remained as the airline's only international destination. During the Taliaban's regime, Al-Qaeda operatives were given Ariana identification to allow them to move arms, personnel and opium shipments between Dubai and Pakistan. There were indications that Russian arms dealers were operating Ariana during this period. By November 2001, only a month before US-led forces toppled the Taliban regime, Ariana was finally grounded for good. Ariana would be resurrected in the post-Taliban era, but that's a subject for another blog posting in the future!

Source: Airlines of Asia Since 1920 by R.E.G. Davies. Palawdr Press, 1997, pp 84-88. Photos: Marc Riboud/Magnum Photos, Wikipedia, National Archives

David Neeleman's First Venture in the Airline Business

David Neeleman, founder of JetBlue

Three years after the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1979, the US airline industry was in the midst of upheaval as many of the legacy carriers that long dominated the commercial skies since the second decade of the century were under siege from free market forces. Unshackled from the strict regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, airlines now had a free hand to adapt and adjust to the demands of the US travel market. Now you would think this would be a great thing, but a lot of the majors weren't adapting. And their attempts to adjust to the market were under attack from a new legion of airlines that hadn't been seen in the US market before- the start up. 

National Airlines found itself swallowed up by a now-bloated Pan Am in an effort to build an instant domestic network for what was once America's "Chosen Instrument". Eastern Airlines found itself under attack by a brash low-cost upstart called PeoplExpress. American began to build the first "fortress hub" in the industry at its new base at Dallas/Fort Worth. Western and United found themselves under attack by PSA's breakout of the intrastate market in California. Labor strife reigned at Texas International and a resurgent Air Florida found its operation cast into doubt after a tragic crash in a blizzard at Washington National Airport. And most telling of what the next several years would bring, Braniff International Airways shut down for good that same year, a victim of over-expansion and bad business decisions reaching back into the 1970s. An airline with a storied history and legacy going back to the 1920s simply shut down to the shock of the industry.

It was amidst this chaotic marketplace that a bored and poorly performing college student in accounting at the University of Utah sensed opportunity. In 1982 David Neeleman had been reading pieces in the Wall Street Journal regarding Braniff's shutdown as the first convulsion to wrack the incumbent airlines in a newly deregulated market. Long an under performer in school (thanks to what we now know today as attention-deficit disorder), Neeleman did have a gift for numbers and customer service groomed from his earliest years working for his grandfather in a small Salt Lake City market. With a shift in the airline marketplace, Neeleman found there were opportunities for smaller carriers like Southwest and Midway Airlines who as smaller entities, were nimble to adjust to marketplace and could operate tightly-knit employees for lower costs. He approached his father, Gary Neeleman, telling him "Dad, I think we should get into the airline business." To which the elder Neeleman responded "How on Earth do you think we could do that? Airplanes cost money!"

Neeleman pointed out that his father was absolutely right- to start an airline is a insanely capital-intensive venture. What Neeleman proposed to his father was to get into the airline business via the back door through the package tour business. Arranging packaged tours was far less capital intensive as the various parts of the package, from airfare, hotel, and so on, were already out there, they only had to be combined in a single package to make it easy for the consumer to travel to exotic locales for vacation with the least amount of hassle possible. In the days before internet booking, package tours were usually the most convenient way for the average American to jet away for a few days or more. 

Developing his business plan and arranging for investors, Neeleman found out from a college classmate that she know someone who bought four hotels in Hawaii and converted them into condominiums. However, with a recession taking place, the owner found it difficult to sell the units- Neeleman saw an opportunity- he could rent out the condos for customers wanting a quick escape. He literally cold-called the owner with a sales pitch: pay me your maintenance fee, $100 per empty unit per week, and I'll fill them all up with vacationers. He would mark up the price for renting them and collect the difference. Neeleman then placed an ad in the Salt Lake City papers that brazenly pitched "$50 a night for your own condo in Hawaii!"

The response was amazing, the condos were getting filled and David Neeleman was getting $250 a week off each rental he set up. Making $1000 a day, school got very uninteresting, very quickly, so he dropped out during his junior year at the University of Utah to run his business full time. Although his condo rental business was booming, there was one problem that always nagged at him- his customers always had a difficult time getting good airfares out of Salt Lake City to Honolulu via the various Pacific gateways of the established majors. Figuring he could do better buying blocks of seats on charter or budget airlines, he set out see which airline could best meet the needs of his customers for an inexpensive flight to Hawaii. The cheapest he could find? 

One of The Hawaii Express's two Douglas DC-10s.

Enter The Hawaii Express. They were a small charter that flew only 2 DC-10s (and at one time a single 747) out of LAX to Honolulu. The Hawaii Express was founded and run by a Hawaii-based businessman, Michael Hartley. Hartley had his start in the airline business going back to 1975 when he started an intrastate commuter airline in Hawaii, Island Pacific Airlines. Island Pacific operated a small fleet of Cessna 402s out of Honolulu and in 1978, his airline was acquired by fellow commuter rival Air Hawaii. During the same period, Hartley and his wife also ran a large FBO operation at HNL. In 1981 he seized upon the opportunity brought about by deregulation start The Hawaii Express to offer cheap fares between Honolulu and Los Angeles. 

Travel poster for The Hawaii Express

Neeleman now had a cheap condo in Hawaii and a cheap airfare to Hawaii for his customers and he formed a travel company called Independent Flight Services to handle the booking arrangements with The Hawaii Express (or "Big Pineapple" as it was billed in its ads). All his customers had to do was find a way to Los Angeles from Salt Lake and the overwhelming number of them would make the long drive to LAX since Neeleman's package was so inexpensive. In less than a year, he was doing eight million dollars in sales and had 20 employees. He upgraded from his modest family car (he had two children at that point) to a BMW sedan. Each flight had a sizeable block of seats set aside just for Neeleman's customers.

In 1983, barely over a year after he began, it all unravelled with little warning. United Airlines and Western Airlines both had the lion's share of passenger traffic between California and Hawaii for quite some time and both took a very dim view of Michael Hartley's low-fare interloper that was skimming increasing amounts of traffic from their flights. A vicious price war ensued and a dissident board ended up sacking Michael Hartley for failing to respond aggressively and wisely to the onslaught by United and Western. In less than eight months, The Hawaii Express shut down in bankruptcy and with the airline went hundreds of thousands of dollars of deposits Neeleman's company put down for seats on each flight. He had no money left to refund his customers' deposits and he in turn had to declare bankruptcy. 

In the book Blue Streak Neeleman states "And I had a hundred thousand dollars in the bank and no debts and if I only had several thousand dollars more, I could have saved the company." Neeleman was also on the verge of signing on with a different charter airline fly direct from Salt Lake City to Honolulu. The need for a large cash cushion definitely made a powerful impression on the 24-year old David Neeleman. Overnight, the Neelemans lost everything. Home, assets, car. He went back to working as a cashier in his grandfather's small store, stocking shelves at night- the very job he held before going to college. He resolved to never go back to the airline business again. David's father, however, saw that his son was probably meant to do more and introduced him to a family friend, June Morris. She owned the largest travel agency in Utah. She made him a deal- work for me for six months, if you don't like it, no hard feelings. 

The rest, is history. With June Morris he ended up founding Morris Air (which ironically had Salt Lake City-Los Angeles as its busiest route) and when Morris Air was bought by Southwest in 1993, Neeleman ended up working with the one man who he admired immensely- Herb Kelleher. After leaving Southwest amidst a personally conflict with everyone at Southwest except Herb, Neeleman went on to found Westjet in 1996 and you know where he ended in 2001- launching JetBlue. After JetBlue, he headed to Brazil to found Azul Brazilian Airlines in 2008.

Neeleman's experience with The Hawaii Express was formative, though. He vowed to never be undercapitalized again (when he launched JetBlue, it had amassed an industry-leading over $100 million in capital before even leaving the ground). He learned that the deregulated marketplace, while it favored start up carriers, also gave the legacy carriers the ability to respond aggressively. Michael Hartley established ticket consolidator Cheaptickets.com. June Morris still sits on the board of Southwest Airlines. JetBlue has definitely made a mark on the industry. And it all began with some empty Hawaii condos and a little known charter airline.

Source: Blue Streak: Inside JetBlue, the Upstart That Rocked an Industry by Barbara Peterson. Portfolio Publishing, 2004. Photos: Wikipedia, Frank Duarte/Airliners.net.

The Difficult Birth of Laker Skytrain

On 8 February 1966 when Freddie Laker formed Laker Airways, he already had an established reputation as an aviation entrepreneur, having already established his name with the maintenance and overhaul company Aviation Traders and with the independent airline British United Airways (BUA). In the very beginning, using loans and financing, Laker bought a pair of used Bristol Britannias from BOAC and three brand-new BAC One-Elevens and started flying services in July 1966 under a contract with Air France while entering the package holiday market. By the following year Laker introduced time-charters which committed tour operators to contacts with Laker that guaranteed him a fixed number of flying hours per year to carry tour operators' customers to holiday destinations in the Mediterranean. His innovative contracts allowed him to sell seats on his One-Elevens two years before he took delivery of the aircraft. In 1969 Laker purchased two used Boeing 707s and with other European independent carriers, began trans-Atlantic services at low prices to travel groups. 

At the time these travel groups were set up for a variety of reasons that often were simply to evade the high prices on established airlines across the Atlantic. At the time there were strict rules governing the carriage of such passengers and the charter airlines were held legally responsible to verify the authenticity of a group's operation. Since the fares were strictly regulated between the United States and the UK at the time, an airline that sold seats to non-members of such groups could face heavy fines. Despite Laker employing lawyers to take sworn statements from his passengers, he still was accused of circumventing the rules and was threatened with heavy fines that could have shut down his airline. 

Laker became an outspoken critic of what he felt was a protected market with the implicit collusion of the regulatory authorities. He decided to do away with advance booking and the need for groups to fly between the US and the UK for reasonable prices. The Skytrain was born- all a passenger had to do was show up at the airport with a valid passport, buy a ticket and board the aircraft. Laker's inaugural prices were set at approximately US$60, about 25% of the lowest advance fare on an IATA carrier. When Laker applied to the British Air Transport Licensing Board (ATLB) in 1971 for the rights to operate services between New York and London, both the British and US governments along with IATA and its member airlines immediately protested. In 1971 14 million passengers a year were crossing the Atlantic by air and Laker believed he could grow the market by another 2 million easily with his pricing structure and no-frills service. 

The ATLB rejected his application and also rejected his subsequent appeal. However, Laker's efforts at launching service caught the attention of the newly-formed Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which was established in 1972 to regulate all aspects of UK civil aviation. The CAA was empowered to take over several regulatory areas that were previously the responsibility of the ATLB and one of its first acts was to overturn the rejection of Laker's application and offered him traffic rights at London Stansted. Laker wanted to operate out of London Gatwick which had rail connections to central London where Laker's main ticket offices were located. In 1972, Stansted was a small airport that lacked good ground transport links to central London. Despite this, however, the CAA designated Laker as a national flag carrier so that the airline could not be blocked by the US government. 

Laker went ahead and ordered two McDonnell Douglas DC-10s which he first put into service on his Mediterranean holiday services with the intent of using them on his innovative Skytrain services. However, in 1973, the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) refused to grant Laker traffic rights for the United States on the basis that he was still in violation of the old rule regarding travel groups flying across the Atlantic. Laker was fined despite a lack of proof that he had violated the rules back in 1969. After a lengthy series of discussions, by 1974 the CAB decided to retract the fines and approved his applications for services to the United States. However, under pressure from the US airlines that held a significant share of the trans-Atlantic market (led by TWA and Pan Am), President Nixon refused to approve the application. Laker responded by threatening lawsuits against the US and UK airlines that were lobbying the refusal of his application. Under pressure from BOAC, the CAA eventually canceled the license for Laker Skytrain. 

This started a long public debate that by 1976 the UK Parliament's House of Lords called on the government to approve the Laker license on the basis that it was in line with public opinion of the day. The UK courts agreed with the House of Lords after Laker proved that the British government and the CAA were violating their own regulations in rejecting his license application. In the United States, though, Laker found an ally in President Jimmy Carter who was an advocate of deregulation (Carter would later sign the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978) and readily signed off on the US regulatory application to allow the Laker Skytrain to begin services. With victory in the UK courts in hand and victory in the United States with the help of President Carter, the first Laker Skytrain flight departed London Gatwick for New York JFK on 26 September 1977. Freddie Laker himself was aboard that aircraft which had been christened "Eastern Belle". His second DC-10 was christened "Western Belle". 

Source: Airliner Classics (in association with Airliner World), November 2009. "Sir Freddie Laker: The Man Who Gave Us Skytrain" by Bob Bluffield, p81-83.

How American Airlines Shaped the A300

In 1966, Sud Aviation and Breguet of France signed an agreement to cooperate with fellow French aircraft company Nord Aviation and British manufacturer Hawker Siddeley on a medium-range twin-aisle widebody aircraft with two engines tentatively designated HBN100. French President Charles De Gaulle asked Roger Beteille, an experienced technical manager who was the head of Alcatel Space, a French space systems company, to head the new joint venture. Beteille was one of the few French aeronautical managers who was fluent in English as well and highly regarded by the Hawker Siddeley team. For the next year, Beteille honed the HBN100 design to reflect the European marketplace as well as to accommodate the delicate political aspirations of each of the partners in the program. Size, capacity, range and even engine options were hammered out.

By 1967 Beteille was aware of the coming widebody competition in the United States with the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar. Both aircraft were trijets whereas the HBN100 design would be a twin jet of slightly smaller size. Rolls-Royce was already working with Lockheed to launch the RB.211 engine for the Tristar whilst working on the proposed RB.207 engine for the HBN100. At the time, the HBN100 design was larger than what it would be come as the A300 and Rolls-Royce was investing more time and energy in getting the RB.211 to market than the RB.207, something that troubled Beteille (it would also ultimately lead to Great Britain pulling out of the Airbus consortium). In a master stroke, Beteille convinced the partner nations to accept a smaller design that could use the same engines as were being developed for the Lockheed Tristar (the Rolls-Royce RB.211) and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (the General Electric CF6). By getting the partners to agree to a smaller design, Beteille insured that Rolls-Royce wouldn't delay the program by dragging its feet on the more powerful RB.207 engine. Ultimately in 1969 Rolls-Royce abandoned development of the RB.207, so Beteille's decision was a prescient one. 

With the Tristar and the DC-10 flying first, the engines could be debugged and by the time what would become the A300 first flew, the engine choices would be operationally mature. It was a master stroke that saved the A300 at its most nascent stage. But Beteille was no gambler and deliberate in his calculations to keep the program moving. He often told his associates that it would be necessary to understand the American market as it was the biggest passenger market in the world. If Beteille's aircraft was going to be a success, they needed to make it in the United States as well. The airlines of the United States at the time were the operational envy of the world and Beteille decided he needed to meet with both United and American, as both airlines were known for the technical expertise and operational efficiency. And it didn't hurt that both airlines were launching the DC-10 which was powered by the same GE CF6 engine that Beteille wanted as an option on the A300. 

I had posted earlier about American Airlines' selection of the DC-10 and how American had laid out the original specifications for a widebody twin. The other airlines briefed wanted either three engines or four engines and American was the only airline who wanted only two engines. After meeting with United Airlines in San Francisco, Beteille met with Frank Kolk, American Airlines' VP for Development Engineering who originally authored the specifications that led to the DC-10. When Beteille met with Kolk, the tough-talking Texan admitted that he was disappointed that the DC-10 would have three engines as he would have much preferred a widebody twinjet. Neither McDonnell Douglas or Lockheed was interested in a twinjet and Kolk was very enthusiastic to meet with a team that shared his vision for widebody twin despite American's launch of the DC-10. In their discussions, Kolk discussed in detail what American wanted and its reasons for wanting a twinjet (fuel economy, operating economics, lower price per aircraft given that engines can amount to 35-40% of the cost of a new jet). Knowing what Beteille had planned, Kolk shared the original specifications with him and Beteille quickly returned to Europe and used American's specification and results of his discussion with Frank Kolk to nail down the final configuration and operating parameters of the A300. 

On 11 December 1968, the newly-formed Airbus Industrie revealed its Airbus A300B design to the aviation world. To this day Roger Beteille believes that it was the advice and discussions with Frank Kolk that made the A300 so successful that it formed the basis of the later A310, A330 and A340 jetliners. Ironically, it wasn't until April 1988 that American Airlines took delivery as the launch customer of the extended range A300-600R that was recently retired after over 20 years of service with American. Despite already having the Boeing 767-200/300 in the fleet, the A300 in its penultimate incarnation did eventually serve with Frank Kolk's airline!

Source: Flight of the Titans: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the Future of Air Travel by Kenny Kemp. Virgin Books, 2006, p71-77.

American Airlines Picks the DC-10

American Airlines' involvement in the development of the Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas widebody trijets was extensive. It all goes back to when George Spater took over the reins of the airline from the legendary C.R. Smith.  In the 1960s, Spater was faced with trying to decide between the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. By some accounts, it was probably the most difficult decision Spater had to make while at the helm of American, all while living in the shadow of C.R. Smith.

Back in 1966, American's VP of development engineering, Frank Kolk, was worried about the frenzy surrounding Boeing's launch of the 747 program with order committments from Pan Am. Many airlines besides American began to wonder if they could fill 400 seats and at American, it was Kolk who sounded the alarms to C.R. Smith. "C.R., it's just too damn big for our route network!" he'd exhort every chance he got. But because American's transcontinental 707 services boasted the highest load factors in the airline's network, the 747 order was placed anyway. But, since C.R. Smith found Kolk's arguments compelling, he sent Kolk to talk with the major airframe manufacturers about a smaller widebody jet.

Boeing wasn't interested as it was immersed with the 747 and the 727/737 production lines were running at maximum capacity. The manpower just couldn't be spared. Douglas was also not interested as it had its own financial problems that would result in its merger with McDonnell the following year- the DC-8 line hadn't recouped its costs yet and the company was scrambling to pacify its DC-9 customers who were upset with production problems and delays (at one point Eastern even filed suit).

Lockheed, however was very receptive and went to work immediately on a design based on Kolk's specifications for a twin-aisle twinjet that carried 250 passengers and could operate out of New York La Guardia. But other airlines, once briefed on Lockheed's work, didn't like two engines. United, in particular, wanted four but could live with three engines. Eastern would accept no less than three engines as the overwater flight rules of the day dictated that a twin jet could not fly further than 60 minutes from a diversion airport. With many of its destinations in the Caribbean, a three or four engined jet could fly direct over the Atlantic from the Northeastern United States. As other potential customers like TWA provided their opinions, the consensus over-ruled American Airlines and the Lockheed widebody jet would be a trijet.

With Douglas financially invigorated after the merger with McDonnell, in-house studies to Kolk's initial brief would become the DC-10 to compete with what would become the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar. American now faced a choice between two very similar widebody trijets. But there was a hitch- American preferred the new Rolls-Royce RB.211 engine, but the RB.211, being a more compact design thanks to its three-spool system, was too short for the DC-10 tail nacelle. As advanced as the Tristar was, Spater and the American engineering staff preferred the DC-10. Though C.R. Smith himself expressed a strong preference for the Tristar, it was Spater's call to make. Some accounts on this period in American's history point to the experience with the Lockheed Electra having biased the airline against Lockheed despite the more advanced features of the L-1011 Tristar.

Spater even talked with the head of Rolls Royce about modifying the RB.211 for the DC-10, but given that American was the only airline making the request, no guarantees could be offered to American.

There was even consensus among the various US airlines that there wasn't a sufficient market to justify two competing widebody trijet designs and there were even discussions between Spater and other airline presidents about settling on a single type. Many analysts crunching the numbers for the airlines pointed out that both aircraft being produced would eventually (and prophetically) be detrimental to the future of the commercial aircraft manufacturing at both Douglas and Lockheed. When Delta, Eastern, and TWA ordered the L-1011, the assumption was that American and United would follow suit. But United refused to accept a British engine and ordered the the DC-10 with the General Electric CF6 engine. With what was thought to be a unified front shattered by United's surprise decision to break ranks, Spater felt more comfortable and went ahead and sign a launch order for  25 DC-10s along with United Air Lines with ordered 30 aircraft. On 29 July 1971 at a joint delivery ceremony at Long Beach, the first DC-10s for United and American were handed over together.

Source: Eagle- The Story of American Airlines by Robert Serling. St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Scandanavian Airlines System Pioneers Polar Commercial Routes

Only seven weeks after being established on 1 August 1946, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) inaugurated its first long-haul services across the Atlantic with Douglas DC-4s from Stockholm to New York La Guardia via Copenhagen, Prestwick, and Gander for a flying time of 25 hours. The New York services quickly become profitable for SAS and despite an expansion of its international network to South America and Asia in the years that followed, the US market remained SAS's most profitable overseas destination. Wishing to expand its network to the US West Coast (San Francisco and Los Angeles), SAS didn't want to put its DC-4s on a long transcontinental run across the United States after a trans-Atlantic crossing.

Route planners decided the best "short cut" was a polar flight on the Great Circle Route from Scandinavia to California. But it was 1947 and the most advanced aircraft in the SAS fleet, the Douglas DC-4, didn't have the range. Even more problematic, no airline had ever operated in the polar regions, so in that year SAS set out on a series of trial flights to gain polar operating experience as well as refine polar navigational techniques. Since magnetic compasses didn't work in the regions around the North Magnetic Pole, SAS worked with US avionics manufacturer Bendix to create a precision gyro compass to replace the traditional magnetic compass. During the summer months, the sun would prevent use of a sextant for stellar navigation, so the airline worked with another US avionics company to develop a solar compass that used polarized light to determine the direction of the sun. The airline also developed its own polar charts that laid down a grid over the polar region with the Greenwich meridian as the starting point.

Having created the navigational aids, SAS then set about establishing radio stations across Norway, Greenland and Northern Canada since the only existing radio stations in the region were for military use only. In 1952 sixty trial flights were conducted using the new Douglas DC-6 between Copenhagen and Sondre Stromfjord in Greenland. In December of that year SAS took delivery of its first long-range DC-6B in Long Beach, christened "Arild Viking" and flew it from Long Beach to Copenhagen via Edmonton and Thule. The trip took 28 hours and was the first commercial flight over the Arctic.

With all the pieces in place, all that awaited were route authorities from the United States. The first rights granted were only to Seattle, but persistence on the part of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce gained SAS its prized rights to that city. Specially provisioned with Arctic survival equipment, the SAS DC-6B "Helge Viking" departed Copenhagen for Los Angeles on 15 November 1954 via Sondre Stromfjord and Winnipeg. Taking off from Los Angeles and headed in the opposite direction was the DC-6B "Leif Viking".

On 24 February 1957 SAS made its first flight over the North Pole with services between Copenhagen and Tokyo via Anchorage, saving 18 hours and 2,400 miles over previous routings that passed via the Mediterranean and South Asia. That same year, SAS introduced the Douglas DC-7C on its polar routes and the flying time between Copenhagen and Tokyo was cut from 50 hours to 32 hours. By this time, however, SAS's monopoly on the polar routes was over as Canadian Pacific, TWA, Pan American, and BOAC introduced services using the "short cut" over the Arctic region.

Pure jets were introduced by SAS on the polar routes with the Douglas DC-8-33 in 1960, then the DC-8-62 in 1967 and the DC-8-63 in 1968. In 1974, widebody service arrived on SAS polar services with the introduction of the Douglas DC-10. With the liberalization of travel markets, deregulation in the United States, the end of the Cold War (which opened up Russian airspace) and open skies agreements, the polar routes have diminished in importance for SAS but there is still nonstop service between Copenhagen and Tokyo taking only 11 hours.

Source: Aircraft, January 2010, Vol. 43, No. 1. "Polar Pioneers- How SAS pioneered airline services over the inhospitable polar regions" by Roy Allen, p62-66.