The American V-1 Program 1944-1950

Beginning in 1942, Allied intelligence began a systematic analysis of the Fiesler Fi 103 flying bomb better known as the V-1. Analysis of crashed test articles combined with photoreconnaissance and intelligence collected by agents within occupied Europe led the United States in particular to restart its flying bomb programs in 1943 that had laid dormant for the most of the Second World War on account of what was felt to be beyond the current state of the art. In 1944, Northrop was contracted to begin development of the first US flying bomb, designated the JB-1. Running parallel to the Northrop effort was the reverse-engineering of the V-1 using 2,500 lbs of salvaged V-1 parts that had been provided by Great Britain. The parts arrived at Wright-Patterson Field in Dayton, Ohio, on 13 July 1944 and the US Army Air Forces directed the engineering staff there to build 13 copies of the V-1. Quite remarkably, the USAAF technical staff completed the first copy in just three weeks! To put the scope of the success of the Allied intelligence effort and the work the Wright-Patterson Field team into perspective, the first German V-1s struck Britain on 12-13 June 1944. By the end of the following month, the USAAF had its first copy of the V-1 and they had test fired the reverse-engineered pulse jet engine. A memo from the technical team responsible to General Henry Arnold, head of the USAAF, recommended mass production at the earliest opportunity- however, General Arnold and his advisors were well aware of the V-1's inaccuracy and despite reservations that production of an American V-1 would divert crucial wartime resources and manpower from battle-proven weapons, it was felt that if the guidance of the V-1 could be improved, an American version might be useful. 

The Republic-Ford JB-2 differed from the V-1 in minor details
(USAF/Wikipedia)

Republic Aviation was tasked with producing the American V-1 which was designated JB-2 with the first of the thirteen USAAF copies arriving on 8 September 1944 from Wright-Patterson Field. The USAAF ordered 1,000 JB-2s from Republic. The Ford Motor Company was tasked with producing the JB-2's pulse jet engine which was designated the PJ31. With Republic's resources nearly all committed to the production of the P-47 Thunderbolt, the company subcontracted the airframe assembly to Willys-Overland, the same company that built the Jeep. With Ford responsible for engine production, the Jack & Heintz Company of Cleveland which had been building aircraft electrical components and autopilots as a subcontractor was given responsibility for the JB-2's control system. Alloy Products of Wisconsin was given responsibility for the fuel tanks and pressure vessels used in the JB-2 while the Northrop was contracted for the JB-2's launch sled. The booster rockets that actually propelled the JB-2 off the ground were contracted to Monsanto. 

By the end of September 1944, the USAAF revised its initial order for 1,000 JB-2s to 1,000 JB-2s *per* month with a target goal to reach that rate by April 1945. The first JB-2 launch took place at Eglin Airfield in Florida on 12 October 1944- just three months had elapsed since start of the German V-1 campaign against London and the first American copy had made its first flight! Flight testing was also carried out at Wendover Field in Utah at the same time that the B-29 Superfortress unit that dropped the atomic bombs, the 509th Composite Group, was a tenant at Wendover training for their special mission. The flight tests didn't go too smoothy- by the first week of December, there were two successful flights out of ten launches. 

JB-2 air launch from a B-17 at Eglin Army Air Field in 1944
(USAF/Wikipedia)

Northrop's own flying bomb design, the JB-1, made its first launch in December 1944 but crashed after launch. (The JB-1 will be the subject of its own later article here at Tails Through Time.) With the the early failures of the JB-1 and problems with its jet powerplant, the USAAF decided to continue with the development of the Northrop design but production and operational priority went to the JB-2. Despite issues with accuracy in the flight tests at Eglin and Wendover, the USAAF leadership pushed for an increased production rate for the JB-2 to at least 3,000 per month. On 14 January 1945, General Arnold ordered another 75,000 JB-2s with the ability to launch 100 per day by September and 500 per day by January 1946 in anticipate of the invasion of Japan. On the next day, the JB-2 program got the same priority that was given to the B-29 Superfortress program. 

Despite the enthusiasm from the USAAF leadership, theater and operational commanders were skeptical of the JB-2. The generally poor European weather that was interfering with the strategic bombing campaign, however, offered perhaps some utility for the JB-2 as it wasn't dependent on clear weather- a view supported by Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the head of the Royal Air Force and commander-in-chief of Allied air forces for the Normandy invasion as well as General Carl Spaatz, head of US Strategic Air Forces Europe. Spaatz, however, was a bit more measured in his support for the employment of the JB-2. He felt that it was more a harassment weapon that could be used when bad weather precluded a strategic bombing mission and outlined his planned use at 300 JB-2s per day only 10 days out of the month. But General Spaatz was very specific that operational employment of the JB-2 could not interfere with heavy bomber operations and he personally expressed concerns to General Arnold regarding the JB-2's cost-effectiveness given its inaccuracy. 

The JB-2 flight test program centered primarily on improving the weapon's accuracy. The first successful flights in the fall of 1944 showed an average error of eight miles at a range of just over 120 miles, not much better than what the Germans were averaging in their own V-1 campaign. The next step by the USAAF was to install radio guidance control in the JB-2. Using a radar beacon and remote control, it was thought the JB-2's accuracy could be improved. However, continued flight tests showed in 20 flight tests with the new guidance system, the JB-2's average error was no better than it was before with preset controls. Things did get better though- by war's end, the JB-2 with preset controls was averaging 5 miles error over a range of 150 miles and 1/4 mile error over a range of 100 miles with radio guidance. 

The biggest stumbling block to the operational deployment of the JB-2 in Europe in 1945, believe it or not, was logistical. The sheer numbers of JB-2s needed competed with other munitions production and it was estimated by some in the War Department that just transporting the JB-2 and its associated equipment to Europe would take up nearly 25% of Allied shipping capacity in the Atlantic. Brief consideration was given to moving JB-2 production to Europe, but there simply wasn't the production capacity anywhere else but the United States to produce the numbers of JB-2s planners envisioned using. 

With the end of the war in Europe, JB-2 production numbers remained in flux as planners debated what was needed for the planned invasion of Japan. By this point, however, the production and logistical concerns for the mass deployment of the JB-2 had exhausted the initial enthusiasm for the weapon. Production was halted initially at the end of January 1945 but then reinstated at a lower rate. By the time of the Japanese surrender, 1,385 JB-2s had been built when production was terminated.

Concurrent with the USAAF testing, the US Navy worked on a navalized version of the JB-2 that would have been launched from specially-modified LSTs and escort carriers during the invasion of Japan. Fifty-one JB-2s were requested by the Navy for its own testing program in September 1944 when production was launched. While airborne launches from B-17 Flying Fortresses were done during testing at Eglin Field, the Navy planned to launch JB-2s from Consolidated PB4Y Privateers as well. Navy planners, however, didn't expect operational capability with the JB-2 (which was called the Loon by the Navy) until August or September 1946. The first Navy Loon launch was on 7 January 1946 with the Secretary of the Navy approving the conversion of two submarines for Loon operations in March 1946. Conversion of the USS Cusk (SS-348) began in January 1947. The Cusk entered the history books on 18 February 1947 as the world's first missile submarine when it made its first Loon launch...which ended in failure after only 3.5 miles of flight. The Cusk finally had its first successful launch on 7 March 1947 after five tries. Submarine launch had become the Navy's focus for the Loon program with the USS Carbonero (SS-337) also modified for the program and by 1949 finally carried out a firing from a surface ship, the test ship USS Norton Sound. In March 1950, the Navy terminated in the Loon in favor of the more promising Regulus cruise missile. 

The USS Cusk fires a JB-2 Loon
(US Navy/Wikipedia)

With the US Air Force becoming independent in 1947, the JB-2 program was reactivated in March 1948 at Holloman AFB in New Mexico as part of a program for the development of missile guidance systems and seeker technology. Work using the JB-2 benefitted the later Matador cruise missile program with the JB-2 program winding down by 1949 with test airframes successfully being flown remotely and skid landed for recovery. A joint effort with Eglin AFB also used the JB-2 as a target drone for the development of gunsights. Interestingly "Flakzielgerät 76" was the German cover name for the V-1 during its development which loosely translates as anti-aircraft target device.

Further reading:

British Defenses Against the Summer 1944 V-1 Bombardment
Regulus: The US Navy's First Operational Nuclear Missile
CHECK SIX: Ships Damaged or Sunk by the Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka

Sources: The Evolution of the Cruise Missile: Comprehensive History from the V-1 and V-2 to the Tomahawk and Snark by Kenneth P. Werrell. Air University Press/USAF, 1983, pp 79-85. V-1 Flying Bomb 1942-1952: Hitler's Infamous Doodlebug (New Vanguard No. 106) by Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2005, pp 39-41.

The First American Covert Overflights of the Soviet Union

1st Lieutenant Bryce Poe II, USAF
(Gathering of Eagles Association)

The introduction of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War had a profound influence in many combat doctrines and none nowhere else as much as that of airborne reconnaissance. In November 1945, General Henry "Hap" Arnold of the US Army Air Forces warned the US government that in the future, American leaders would require "continuous knowledge of potential enemies, including all aspects of their political, social, industrial, scientific and military life" if the United States was to avoid a surprise attack with nuclear weapons. Traditional reconnaissance doctrines had the use of airborne assets in support of ongoing combat operations. General Arnold and many of his contemporaries at the dawn of the Cold War recognized that airborne reconnaissance was needed to provide an assessment and early warning of potential enemies, namely the Soviet Union that was rapidly tightening its grip on Eastern Europe. The start of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948 pressed the issue further that up-to-date reconnaissance was needed of the Soviet Union should tensions escalate to an all-out conflict. Interestingly while the highest levels of the US government tried to determine the best way to make such an assessment, the United States Far East Air Forces (FEAF) based in Japan took the initiative to begin its own assessment of Soviet forces in their region in response to the rising tensions during the Berlin Blockade. The commander in chief of the US FEAF, Major General George Stratemeyer, ordered the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and its Lockheed RF-80 Shooting Stars to begin a series of covert overflights of the Soviet Far East. Based at Yokota Air Base, Stratemeyer ordered the 8th TRS to deploy to Misawa AB on the northern Japanese home island of Hokkaido. Two pilots were selected with 1st Lieutenant Bryce Poe as the primary pilot for the secret missions to assess Soviet air strength in the region. The RF-80s were modified with larger wingtip tanks for longer range. Poe was instructed that if the coastline was free of clouds, dash into Soviet airspace, photograph the targets and dash back out and head back to Misawa as fast as possible. 

The first reconnaissance overflight (and USAF jet reconnaissance mission) of the Soviet Union took place on 10 May 1948 with 1Lt. Poe departing Misawa AB to overfly targets on Kuril Islands. Missions were flown to photograph targets on Sakhalin Island as well further to the north. The first overflight of the Soviet mainland took place on 10 March 1950 to photograph bases around the port of Vladivostok. Most of the airfields Poe had photographed were full of not just only Lend-Lease Bell -39 Airacobras and P-63 Kingcobras, but also late model Lavochkin piston fighters like the La-9 and La-11. Although jet powered, the RF-80s had increased drag and lower speeds with the larger external tanks needed for the recon missions which cut down on the performance margin over the Lavochkin fighters which often tried to give chase to the missions. 

Lockheed RF-80 with the enlarged camera nose section
(Wikipedia)

What was impressive about these first overflights is that they were done at the initiative and discretion of General Stratemeyer without any prior clearance from Washington and they were done in the face of significant technical and logistical obstacles. The reconnaissance cameras used on the RF-80 were designed for piston-engined aircraft and lacked the capability to do stereo images in a high speed aircraft like the RF-80. Spare parts were in constant short supply and given that Misawa at the time was on the far northern part of a still rebuilding Japan, insuring even basic food rations for the 8th TRS personnel deployed north proved challenging. Many F-80 units based in Japan at the time found themselves the subject of "moonlight parts acquisitions" so the secret overflights could continue. 

Despite the failure of the Berlin Blockade which was finally lifted on 11 May 1949 and the formation of NATO, tensions remained high with the first detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb on 29 August 1949 followed by Mao Tse-Tung's Communist victory in China on 1 October 1949 over the Nationalists. With Stalin feeling more confident about the Soviet posture on the world stage, on 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army smashed across the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, igniting the Korean War. In order to prevent further escalation the conflict, American reconnaissance pilots were instructed to avoid Chinese and Russian air space, however, the advance of North Korean forces meant that 1st Lt. Bryce Poe was called upon again by General Stratemeyer to begin a new set of secret overflights. In August 1950, he was called to FEAF HQ to again deploy out of Misawa and fly a series of missions against Soviet airfields in the region. While Soviet fighters tried more aggressively to intercept the RF-80s, none came close to getting shot down. By this point, the intelligence from Poe's flights was deemed critical by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and on 28 July 1950, the JCS requested official permission from the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, for overflights of Chinese bases on the coasts adjacent to the Korea. Just four days later, President Truman gave his approval and again, because of his prior expertise, 1st Lt. Bryce Poe flew the missions against Chinese coastal targets and additional missions by other pilots were flown against Chinese ports opposite of Taiwan to make sure no amphibious assault preparations were underway to move against Taiwan. 

By the summer of 1950 discussions had been taking place at the Pentagon about using the more-capable North American RB-45 Tornado for overflight missions of Chinese and Soviet targets, but the aircraft being a bomber, it was felt at the time to be too politically risky, particularly as the Pentagon was seeking authority for overflights of Soviet targets in Europe as well as in the Far East. By this point Allied fortunes in the Korean War had improved following the landings at Inchon. Poe was once again called to FEAF HQ for a third set of covert overflights but the other pilot that he had been working with on the prior sets of overflights had been killed in action, so for this next set of missions, Bryce Poe would be the only pilot flying. Due to the secrecy of the missions, Poe did all his own flight planning. He was told by General Douglas MacArthur and General Stratemeyer what information they needed and Poe himself figured out the targets, routes, photographic equipment, times and altitudes. Despite the ongoing war in Korea, Poe found that the defensive posture of the Soviet airfields had only modestly increased, but as a precaution, F-80 Shooting Star fighters would meet Poe on his outbound leg to make sure no Soviet fighters were trying to tail him. 

Major General Bryce Poe II before retirement
(USAF)

Once he landed, the film was developed by one warrant officer and Poe himself did all the photo interpretation work and then hand carried the imagery to brief General MacArthur as well as General Stratemeyer and his FEAF deputy. It was a remarkable degree of authority given to a 1st lieutenant! Stratemeyer felt only barest minimum of individuals needed to be involved in the secret overflights. Bryce Poe rotated back to the United States in January 1951 after making nineteen secret overflights of Chinese and Soviet territory as well as 90 unclassified tactical reconnaissance missions in support of operations in Korea. After Korea, Poe flew as an exchange pilot with several NATO nations before serving as the executive officer to General Bernard Schriever at the Western Development Division where ICBM development was taking place. He then served as an Atlas ICBM missile officer with the Strategic Air Command before returning to reconnaissance in time for Vietnam. As vice-commander of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, he flew 213 recon missions in the RF-4C Phantom in Vietnam. He later commanded the 26th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing with the United States Air Forces Europe. Following his USAFE assignments, he assumed command positions with the Ogden Air Logistics Center in Utah and at Wright Patterson AFB in Ohio. He retired in 1981 as a very decorated four-star general and veteran of two wars, flying west on 20 November 2000. 

Sources: Shadow Flights: America's Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union by Curtis Peebles. Presidio Press, 2000, pp 4-39.

The USAAF Looks for Something Better than a C-47

Loading a Jeep into this RAAF C-47 shows it wasn't ideal for large or bulky loads.

During the interwar period of the 1920s, US military air transport was modest at best and consisted primarily of "off the shelf" civilian designs that were modestly modified with things like reinforced cabin floors and wider doors but were essentially airliners without seats. Until 1934, for example, the US Navy and Marine Corps relied on Ford Trimotors for transport! The arrival of the Douglas DC-2 offered a big improvement in capability for the US military. With war clouds looming in Europe and Asia in the 1930s, the US Army Air Corps went about looking for something better than adapted DC-2s. Bids were requested and Douglas offered an attractive proposal for upgraded DC-2 aircraft better tailored to military transport operations. Not long after, General Henry "Hap" Arnold became head of the USAAC (which later became the USAAF) and being a personal friend of Donald Douglas, was well aware of a DC-2 upgrade in the works that was the result of a marathon telephone conversation between Donald Douglas and the head of American Airlines, C.R. Smith. That aircraft was a leap in performance and capability over the DC-2 and at the time was called the Douglas Sleeper Transport (DST). In due time, of course, the DST became the DC-3 but General Arnold saw the DST's design and performance as an ideal basis for a transport. Army officials met with the designer of the DST, Arthur Raymond, and the C-47 was born. When the war finally broke out with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the C-47 wasn't yet in production and suddenly the branches of the US military needed air transport aircraft. The C-47 Skytrain (Dakota in RAF service) made its first flight on 23 December 1941 as Douglas embarked on a major facility expansion to meet the demand for the C-47. At production peak in May 1944, the company was building just under 19 C-47 aircraft each day! Despite the massive expansion and number of C-47s needed, the Army did have several issues with the C-47 but it was the best aircraft available at the time. There were three main issues the Army had- the first was that the tailwheel configuration and side cargo door made it difficult to load large items. Secondly, the maximum payload was too light as it was based on the maximum civilian load for the DC-3, and thirdly, the Army felt that as it was a DC-1/DC-2 derivative, it was old technology. With the United States now in the war, the Army thought that aluminum production was best used for armed combat aircraft and that cargo aircraft which operated in support roles ought to use non-strategic materials. While there was never a formal competition for a C-47 replacement but rather a series of issued requirements, quite a bit of money was spent over the course of the war to develop a transport that was better than the C-47. 

Budd C-93/RB-1 Conestoga

At the outbreak of war, several aircraft made out of the non-strategic materials made the first attempt at replacing the C-47. The first came from the E.G. Budd Company of Philadelphia- they had developed the shotweld technique for joining two pieces of metal- it used a short burst of electrical current to bond two pieces of metal. Invented in 1932 by a Budd engineer, shotwelding was used on the products Budd was known for- railroad cars and road vehicle bodies made of stainless steel. In discussions with the US Navy, Budd hired an aeronautical engineering staff to design a shotwelded (therefore no rivets) transport that would be made of readily available stainless steel. The Navy ordered 300 to be designated the RB-1 and the Army ordered 600 to be designated the C-93. Though made primarily of thin-gauge stainless steel, the wing aft of the spar and the moving surfaces of the tail were fabric covered to offset the weight of the steel. 

The design of the Conestoga was radical for the day and set the pattern for an efficient military transport even to this day. A high mounted wing allowed for an unobstructed main deck with a tricycle landing gear to keep the main deck level and low to the ground to ease loading. An aft loading ramp/door allowed rolling stock to be driven on/off of the aircraft. The flight deck sat up above the main cargo deck to maximize the cargo volume of the fuselage. In addition, there was an integrated hoist in the cargo deck to ease loading an locations that lacked ground equipment. The first flight was on 31 October 1943 and three prototypes conducted the flight test program. Using the same engines as the C-47, the Conestoga was underpowered and possessed sluggish handling- pilots joked that for a plane made by a railroad car company, it sure handled like one! By time time cost overruns and construction delays were resolved at the Budd factory, aluminum production had vastly increased in the United States and the need for an aircraft made of non-strategic materials diminished. The Army canceled its order for the C-93 and the Navy reduced its order from 300 to just 25. Just 17 RB-1s were delivered to the Navy by March 1944 and that small number served primarily as hacks for naval air stations. With such a small number in the fleet, the Navy found the RB-1s uneconomical and sold them off as surplus in early 1945 before the war even ended. Twelve Conestogas were purchased by a new cargo operation, National Skyways, that was founded by a group of pilots that had once served with the American Volunteer Group in China. National Skyways would later change their name to Flying Tigers- but that's a story for future blog article!

Curtiss C-76 Caravan

Another aircraft from the Army's concerns in 1941 that was a contemporary of the Budd C-93/RB-1 Conestoga was the Curtiss C-76 Caravan. The company was engaged by the Army that year to build a transport aircraft that like the Conestoga, would not only be made out of non-strategic materials but also exceed the performance and utility of the C-47. The Caravan was designed by the chief designer at Curtiss, George Page, who was also responsible for the C-46 Commando. While the Conestoga would be made of stainless steel, Page elected to use wood for the Caravan but interestingly, the only high performance aircraft at the time in production made from wood, the De Havilland Mosquito, wasn't used as a source of expertise. De Havilland used a layered plywood construction using a lightweight balsa wood core that made the Mosquito strong but light. Curtiss engineers instead favored mahogany in layers- being a much denser wood than what was used on the Mosquito, the Caravan soared in weight. Despite this, the Army helped Curtiss secure large stocks of mahogany and a number of furniture manufacturers were set up as component subcontractors with final assembly at Curtiss's new plant in Louisville, Kentucky. 

Much like the layout of the Conestoga, the C-76 Caravan featured a retractable tricycle landing gear to keep the main deck level. It also had a high wing layout for an unobstructed main deck hold and also put the flight deck above the main deck. Instead of an aft loading door and ramp, the Caravan had a swing nose that opened to the side ahead of the flight deck. The prototypes were built at existing Curtiss facilities in St. Louis as well as the new Louisville plant with the first flight on 3 May 1943. The flight test program was a disaster. The aircraft, using the same engines as the C-47 but made of dense mahogany, was woefully underpowered with a cargo payload not much more than the C-47. On the first flight, the aircraft vibrated so badly the flight test crew made a hasty return to the St. Louis Lambert Field. On the second test flight, the prototype literally shook itself apart with the loss of the pilots. In addition, when empty, the Caravan had to be ballasted to maintain its center of gravity- amusingly, the ballast needed to maintain an empty load CoG was more than the maximum payload! The control surfaces suffered from buffet and even shook while the plane was on the ground if it was windy. The wing spar failed load testing eight times, only holding up to 40% of the predicted maximum load. The Army wasn't pleased and was more than happy to cancel their order for 175 C-76s, particularly as aluminum production had vastly increased as the war progressed. Only 14 aircraft were built and most spent their days as ground instructional airframes. 

Wind tunnel model of the Waco C-62

There was a third aircraft that stemmed from the Army's 1941 call for something better than the C-47, but it never flew. Waco Aircraft had been building both training and assault gliders for the military and they tendered a design that received the designation C-62. Like the Curtiss C-76 Caravan, the Waco design was made out of wood and featured a high wing and rear loading door/ramp. The tadpole-shaped aircraft had the empennage cantilevered over the aft ramp on a boom. The undercarriage was fixed as well. Using the same engines as the C-47, the Army placed orders for 13 pre-production examples and 240 production aircraft. However, again, like the Conestoga and Caravan, the anticipated shortage of aluminum never occurred and the C-62 was canceled. Allegedly the first aircraft was nearing completion at the time of the cancellation, but this hasn't been confirmed. 

Fairchild C-82 Packet at the National Museum of the USAF

The last aircraft that sprang from the 1941 call was the Fairchild C-82 Packet. Designed by Fairchild's chief designer, Armand J. Thieboldt, the original plans were for the C-82 to be made of wood. Like the other three aircraft, the Packet had a high wing and tricycle landing gear to allow for a level main cargo deck that was unobstructed. The flight deck was raised above the cargo deck and a twin boom layout was chosen to leave the tail area completely clear for straight though loading and unloading. With the fortunes of war shifting in favor of the Allies in the summer of 1942 after the Battle of Midway and an expansion of domestic aluminum production eased shortage concerns, the USAAF requested that Fairchild abandon wood for the C-82 and go with aluminum. Of four aircraft designs for a C-47 replacement, the decision to switch to aluminum more than likely contributed to the reasons why the Packet did get to production and service. Being the last submission probably saved the design as it was also redesigned to take a more powerful engine, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp instead of using the same engines as the C-47. As a result, the C-82 had the highest cargo payload of the four designs. 

First flight took place on 10 September 1944 at Fairchild's plant in Hagerstown, Maryland. The first series of flights were so encouraging that the USAAF ordered 100 C-82s just 18 days after the first flight. With an eye towards the coming invasion of Japan, North American's Dallas plant was planned for an additional 1000 C-82s on top of an additional 100 from Fairchild for a total of 200 from the Hagerstown plant. The first C-82s were delivered to the USAAF in June 1945 but the sudden end of the war with the Japanese surrender in September 1945 resulted in the cancelation of the North American production run at Dallas with only just three Dallas-built C-82s being built. Despite the drawdown in US military forces, the C-82 Packet was the C-47 replacement the USAAF wanted and the 200-aircraft order from the Fairchild plant in Maryland stood to fulfill postwar airlift requirements. Five C-82s participated in the Berlin Airlift, bringing in heavy equipment and vehicles that couldn't be accommodated onto the Douglas C-54 Skymasters. Operational use of the C-82 revealed several shortcomings, the most concerning of which was that with a full load, a C-82 with one engine out couldn't maintain level flight. Thieboldt and his team at Fairchild went about improving the C-82 design first by incorporating more powerful engines in the form of the Pratt & Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major as well as a host of other improvements to satisfy the newly-independent US Air Force's concerns. Originally designated XC-82B, the changes were so significant that a new designation was assigned to the upgrade which became the C-119 Flying Boxcar. The first flight was made on 17 December 1947. As C-119s were delivered to USAF units, the C-82s were retired. A total of 220 Packets were built. Quite a few Packets had long civilian careers, but that's a story for future blog article! 

Source: The Legacy of the DC-3 by Henry M. Holden. Wind Canyon Publishing, 1996, pp 141-148. Information also from National Museum of the USAF, Wikipedia and www.c82packet.com. Photos: Wikipedia, Australian War Memorial, National Museum of the USAF. C-62 wind tunnel model from R/C Groups forum.

The Unconventional Genius of Carl Norden

Carl L. Norden

After the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb, the next biggest top secret defense program in the United States at the time was the development and production of the Norden bombsight. The Norden sights were used in all of the United States Army Air Forces heavy bombers (the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, the Consolidated B-24 Liberator, and the Boeing B-29 Superfortress) primarily and it was a Norden sight that bombardiers used to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that brought the Second World War to a close. Despite its crucial role in strategic bombing campaigns in both the European and Pacific Theatres, the Norden bombsight was a Navy program and every Norden sight used by the US Army Air Force had passed through the hands of Navy inspectors. How this state of affairs came to be is the story of how an unconventional but brilliant Dutchman, Carl Norden, came to be employed by the Navy prior to the start of the Second World War. 

Carl Norden was born on 23 April 1880 in Semarang, Java, in what was the Dutch East Indies (modern day Indonesia), the middle child of five siblings in a household with absent father. From a young age, his mother considered him the most reliable and responsible of his siblings- in a sense, he became the "man of the family". He had wanted to become an artist, but when his older brother decided to pursue an artistic career, Carl decided to pursue a lucrative career in order provide for his mother and his siblings, enrolling in the Federal Polytechnic Institute in Zurich, Switzerland and graduating in 1904 as a mechanical engineer. Although Dutch by birth, Norden's father was a naturalized Dutch citizen from German and Norden's own wife was from Austria. Norden's German ties dovetailed into his natural engineering and mathematical prowess- it was said that Carl Norden viewed everything in life in mechanical terms governed by mathematical formulas, the universe being nothing more than a great mechanical timepiece. After his graduation in 1904, he emigrated to the United States where he had a wealthy uncle who had made his fortune in the cotton business. Norden worked for a series of companies as a mechanical design engineer, but it was painfully obvious that he was difficult to employ as he was very much a prima donna. But there was no question of Norden's brilliant mind and after a series of employers over six years, he finally came to work for Elmer Sperry Sr. and his sons, Elmer and Lawrence at the Sperry Gyroscope Company. Norden's mechanical aptitude fit well into the work the Sperrys were doing for the Navy in developing gyroscopes to improve the accuracy of naval gunnery from moving ships. Norden's work with Sperry was invaluable for the company and Norden made many contacts within the Navy as a result. Norden tolerated Sperry as the work was interesting, but the relationship soured when, after solving the problem of gyroscopic oscillation, Norden got what he thought was an insulting $25/week raise as a reward. Norden quit and became a consulting engineer to the Navy, but it was the start of a feud between Norden and Sperry for years. Norden often dismissively told people Sperry "would patent gravity if he could" and Sperry for years tried to legally dispute many of Norden's later patents. 

In 1913, Norden set up shop near the Brooklyn Navy Yard and continued to work on the ship stabilization project for the Navy much to Sperry's chagrin. The Navy was enamored with Norden's genius and that relationship in large part protected Norden from Sperry's multiple legal challenges. With the progress on the ship stabilization project slow in coming, the Navy astutely put Norden's mind to work on other projects, starting the aerial gyroscopes for the aerial torpedo project as well as designing catapults and arresting gear for aircraft carriers. The arresting gear of the USS Lexington and USS Saratoga were designed by Norden himself on his dining room table!

At the time, the Navy was pursing a bombsight program as it felt that the best way to sink ships from the air was via high altitude level bombing. General Billy Mitchell's ship-bombing tests in the summer of 1921 against captured German warships convinced the Navy that it had to find a way to sink ships at sea. The Navy's Bureau of Ordinance (BuOrd) was responsible for the bombsight program and many different types, including some from Sperry, were tested. Officers with the Aviation Section of BuOrd came to know Carl Norden from his work on the aerial torpedo project as he had been consulted as an outside expert to evaluate Sperry's work (something which truly irritated Sperry to no end). They were impressed with the comments made in the reports and not knowing who Carl Norden was, found a report signed "Norden". A quick check of the Brooklyn telephone book and a few calls got the officers from BuOrd in touch with Norden who agreed to review the Navy's bombsight program. The gyroscopic stabilization work he had done for the ship and aerial torpedo project dovetailed neatly into the bombsight problem as Norden recommended that the bombsights be not only gyroscopically stabilized, but also connected to either an autopilot or pilot director so that during the bomb run, the bombardier was the one "flying" the aircraft. Eventually modifying existing bombsights turned out to be a failure and the BuOrd and Norden decided to start from scratch and create a whole new bombsight that would launch the Norden bombsight into aviation history. 

That's not to say that Norden's genius resulted in success. For most of the 1920s, many of the literally handcrafted Norden sights had dismal performance. But Norden wasn't one to give up and the Navy was an incredibly accommodating employer. Well aware of Norden's personality- they nicknamed him "Old Man Dynamite", they gave him tremendous latitude as long as he kept delivering results in the form of progressive improvements to his bombsight designs. Unlike most engineers, Norden did his own drafting. He didn't have an extensive engineering library, he preferred to work with his slide rule, a set of engineering tables and a few select references. He often stayed at his mother's home in Zurich, Switzerland, to ponder mechanical problems and develop solutions. His drawings and correspondence were then delivered to the US Navy by diplomatic pouch from US embassy in Switzerland. The State Department wasn't keen on this but high level pressure from the US Navy encouraged diplomatic officials to be as accommodating to "Old Man Dynamite" as possible. Sometimes it was his family he sent to Switzerland so he could be alone to solve some problems back in New York. Also unique to the Navy's relationship with Norden was that any patents were held by the Navy and classified as top secret. In this way, not only was Norden shielded from Sperry's legal challenges, but it also meant that the Navy didn't have to follow the prescribed competitive bidding rules to pay Norden for his work. Many of Norden's patents sponsored by the Navy from the 1920s and 1930s weren't even declassified until 1947! In contrast to the US Army Air Corps (forerunner of the US Army Air Forces) who held open competitive bidding in its own bombsight program and trialled bombsights from several different manufacturers, the Navy only did business with Norden and Norden alone. In fact, the Navy was Norden's only client! 

Theodore Barth at a circus held for Norden employees

As work on the Norden sights continued in the 1920s, BuOrd recommended that Norden partner up with an engineer to start moving the bombsight project towards mass production. Knowing Norden well, the Navy partnered him up with a former Army colonel and engineer by the name of Theodore Barth and it was the start of a very close relationship between the two men for many years. Norden's own children regarded Barth as a secondary father figure in their lives, so close was Barth to Norden. It was Barth who was tasked by the Navy to take Norden's designs and put them into production. Compared to Norden, Barth was very personable and possessed quite a bit of business acumen as well- Norden may have been the brains of the operation but it was Barth who made everything work and kept everyone happy. During the Second World War, Barth took it as his job to take care of all of the employees that were building bombsights. He often gave away baseball tickets and even rented out Madison Square Garden for a circus just for Norden's employees. 

From the time Norden was contacted by the Aviation Section of the Bureau of Ordinance to the delivery of the first production bombsight to the fleet, the Norden Mark XI, nine years had elapsed. During those nine years Norden progressively refined the design of what was essentially a clocklike analog computer that was gyroscopically stabilized and linked to the autopilot. The Navy, though, did hedge its bets just a bit- during that time it had contracted with General Electric for a back up bombsight design called "Scheme B" or the Mark XIII. After three years, the Navy found the GE bombsight was woefully inferior to Norden's designs and canceled "Scheme B". 

Norden M-1 bombsight

By the early 1930s, the US Army Air Corps became aware of the Norden program and was keen to get its hands on the bombsights for its own testing. The head of the Army Air Corps, General Henry "Hap" Arnold (who would head the USAAF during the Second World War), was shocked to hear of the working arrangement between the Navy's BuOrd and Carl Norden, from Norden not even being a US citizen to the fact that Norden did a lot of his work abroad in Switzerland and then sent drawings back via diplomatic couriers to New York City for Theodore Barth and Navy officials to review. The Navy wasn't about to change the way it did business with Carl Norden to assuage General Arnold's concerns, though. It basically came down to something along the lines "If you want Norden bombsights for Army bombers, this is the arrangement you have to live with!". As a modest concession, though, the Navy had the FBI provide a security detail for Norden and agents were planted in Norden's production facilities in New York City to root out any foreign spies. At all times, at least two armed agents were with Norden at all times. There is an apocryphal story that when Norden wasn't getting his way with the Navy, he'd insinuate he'd leave the United States and go to work for the British. He would later remark it was empty threat "As no self-respecting Dutchman would ever work for the British!"

By 1928, Norden was at work at a massive improvement to the Mark XI sight called the Mark XV. He delivered the Mark XV prototype to BuOrd in 1930 and it was this sight that pretty much ended the GE alternate bombsight program. The bombsights that came from the Mark XV design were known as the Norden M-series sights and those would become standard on American heavy bombers.  By this point, however, the Navy was drifting away from relying on high altitude level bombing at sea as dive bombing was explored by units in the fleet. But the arrangements between the Navy and Carl Norden remained with his New York City factory essentially being a Navy factory! By 1934, Norden's bombsights became the standard for the Army Air Corps, first being installed on Martin B-10s. It's estimated that approximately $1.5 billion was spent on the development and production of Norden bombsights. 

Carl Norden was passed away in 1965 in his beloved Switzerland. His company lived on as Norden Systems to be acquired by Westinghouse which was in turn acquired by Northrop Grumman. Norden and Barth also set up a second company called Barden to manufacture bombsight components- Barden is still  around today, fabricating ball bearings for a variety of industries including aerospace. Carl Norden was inducted into the National Aviation Hall of Fame in 1994. 

Source: America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 by Stephen L. McFarland. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995, pp 45-76. Photos: Norden Systems Division via Stephen L. McFarland's book, Wikipedia