Canada's Nuclear Strike Force: 1st Air Division 1964-1972

Canada's CF-104s wore bare metal with white wings in the nuclear strike role.

For eight years, Canada maintained a small, but potent, nuclear strike force in Europe equipped with license-built Lockheed F-104 Starfighters under the auspices of the 1st Air Division. The 1st Air Division was established in 1952 in France as part of Canada's NATO air defense commitment. Four wings made up the 1st Air Division and each wing had three squadrons. For most of the 1950s, the Air Division was flew F-86 Sabres which were then replaced by CF-100 Canucks to provide all-weather/night air defense capability. In the late 1950s, Canada embarked on a search for a supersonic replacement for the CF-100 fleet. At the time, air defense was on Canada's mind but the political winds of the Cold War were such that as one of the charter members of NATO, considerable pressure was brought on Canada to contribute to the nuclear deterrent forces in Europe. With a generous industrial offset, the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter was chosen as the replacement aircraft for the 1st Air Division with the aircraft being license built by Canadair in Montreal as the CF-104. Originally the designation was to be the CF-111, but it was quickly decided to adopt the CF-104 designation to simplify administrative matters as some of Canadair's production would also be for NATO partners to augment European license production of the Starfighter. Coinciding with the selection of the Starfighter, on 2 July 1959, Canadian Defence Minister George Pearkes announced that the 1st Air Division (which became 1 Canadian Air Division in due time) would transition from the air defense role to the strike/reconnaissance role but little mention was made about the adaptation of nuclear strike as one of the Division's primary tasks. 

Reorganization of the Division's assets as part of NATO's 4th Allied Tactical Air Force would put two squadrons assigned to each of 1 Canadian Air Division's four wings- 1 Wing based at Marville AB in France would have 439 and 441 Squadrons, 2 Wing based at Groestenquin AB in France would have 421 and 430 Squadrons, 3 Wing based at Zweibrucken in West Germany would have 427 and 434 Squadron and 4 Wing based at Baden-Soellingen also in West Germany would have 422 and 444 Squadron. Following France's withdrawal from NATO military command in 1967, 1 Canadian Air Division was reorganized again with just three wings all based in West Germany- 1 Wing at Lahr, 3 Wing at Zweibrucken, and 4 Wing at Baden-Soellingen. 

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the 1 Canadian Air Division was part of a broader umbrella agreement signed with the United States by the government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson. Interestingly the acquisition of nuclear-capable platforms like the Starfighter was made by the previous administration, that of Prime Minster John Diefenbaker. Pearson and the Liberal Party had scored political points attacking Diefenbaker for shifting Canada towards a nuclear-capable defense policy, but after defeating the Conservative Party in the 1963 elections, one of Pearson's first acts was to reverse the Liberal Party's course and actually acquire nuclear weapons. His change of heart occurred during the run up to the national elections and as an interesting historical side note, future Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau temporarily left the Liberal Party in disgust during this period of policy upheaval for the Liberal party. On 16 August 1963, an agreement was finalized and signed with the United States that provided for nuclear weapons for four weapons systems- the CF-104 Starfighters in Europe along with Honest John short range ballistic missiles for the Canadian Army in Europe as well as BOMARC missiles and Genie nuclear-tipped rockets for the CF-101 Voodoo force for the air defense of Canada. While a full analysis of the change in position by Prime Minister Pearson and the Cabinet is beyond the scope of this article, it primarily hinged upon improving the bilateral relationship with the United States, raising Canada's military posture within NATO, and a desire for a more effective defense policy. Given that the agreement was signed in the wake of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Canadian government did much to minimize the military's new nuclear role- for the Starfighter force, it wasn't until 1990 that the true extent of the 1 Canadian Air Division's nuclear capability was known. Some military officials went as far as to publicly point out to the Canadian press that the CF-104 was "too small" to carry a "large" nuclear weapon and it was a fighter, not a strike aircraft. 

Canadian officials inspect a CF-104. Note the faired over gunport.

In fact, the CF-104s were optimized for the nuclear strike mission- unlike most other nations' Starfighters, the Canadians didn't have the M61 Vulcan cannon installed and added an additional fuel cell in its place to extend its combat radius. The skill set and tactics for nuclear strike in Europe were also applicable to low level reconnaissance, so the CF-104s also could carry a centerline VICON camera pod that had 70mm cameras that photographed targets of interest on each side of the aircraft, straight down, and ahead. In the nuclear strike role, the wingtip fuel tanks were augmented by under wing fuel drop tanks with the nuclear weapon mounted on the centerline station. Three different nuclear stores were used by the CF-104 fleet and each had its own unique Canadian designation. The most common weapon was the B28 which came in two versions- the B28EX (which the Canadians referred to as "Weapon #1) which was a free fall weapon and the B28RE ("Weapon #2) which was a parachute retarded version of the B28EX. The B28 warhead was capable of different yields ranging from 70 kilotons to 1.45 Megatons,  but in practice only the 70 kt and 350 kt yields were used by the 1 Canadian Air Division.  A four digit code was required for the permissive action link (PAL) to arm the weapon. The B28EX was delivered in an over the shoulder toss while the B28RE was delivered at low altitudes, the parachute allowed the CF-104 pilot to make his escape before detonation. 

The B43 nuclear bomb (referred to by the Canadians as "Weapon #3") was only used by 4 Wing and it had a massive 1 Mt warhead and had the option of being parachute retarded and like the B28s, also had a PAL for arming. The fourth nuclear store used by the CF-104 force was the B57 and was a low-yield weapon with an explosive force of 5-20 kilotons. The B57 ("Weapon #4) was much lighter than the other stores as it was developed for the US Navy who wanted a lightweight tactical nuclear weapon. Like the other weapons, the B57 had an option for parachute delivery and also had a four-digit PAL code to arm the warhead. 

Kit box art showing the four tank configuration of the CF-104.

The B28 weapons were delivered first, starting in May 1964. The B57 was next to arrive in 1966 and the B43 was the last to arrive at Canadian bases in 1968. Because the weapons remained in US custody even on Canadian bases, it gave the Pearson government political cover that it wasn't contributing to proliferation. At each base the weapon storage area was manned by USAF personnel and the PAL codes were kept in a safe at the quick-reaction area (QRA) which was accessible only by the USAF alert duty officer. Release of weapons was under dual-key authority in which both US and Canadian command authorities had to provide authorization. Loading of a live weapon took about 30 minutes, so each Canadian base had a QRA area where fully-armed Starfighters stood nuclear alert. Double barrier fencing surrounded each QRA area and no individual could work on the alert aircraft alone- two personnel had to be present for even the most minor of tasks to be done to the QRA Starfighters. 

CF-104 in flight showing the white wings and large roundels.

The targets of the 1 Canadian Air Division consisted primarily of the logistical depots and airfields of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). Major bridges that would be used in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe were also on the Canadians' target list. The exact targets to be hit were provided by Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) HQ, but it was up to each squadron and its pilots to plan the inbound and outbound routes to the targets and any particular tactics to be used during the mission. Each squadron had a target evaluation board which would review each mission plan for acceptance. Once accepted, it was forward to the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebraska, where it was included in the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), which was the US military's nuclear war plan. This way Canadian missions (and any other mission planned by NATO allies or other US military branches) could be deconflicted. This meant a high degree of timing precision was needed, typically inside of a 30 second window to hit each navigational waypoint to avoid flying into someone else's thermonuclear detonation. In practice missions, the Canadian pilots proved to be highly skilled, usually hitting each navigational waypoint within 10 seconds of the plan. Once fully operational in the nuclear strike role, the 1 Canadian Air Division was responsible for 20% of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force's nuclear muscle- 4ATAF covered central and southern West Germany and included two Luftwaffe divisions, the USAF's Seventeenth Air Force, and a large number of Army air defense units. The squadrons of the 1 Canadian Air Division were subject to each and everyone of the nuclear inspection and readiness drills that any nuclear-capable USAF unit had to not just endure, but pass with near perfect scores. 

Prime Minister Lester Pearson's 1968 announcement that he planned to step down (and would be succeeded by Pierre Trudeau) coincided with a drawdown of Canada's NATO nuclear commitment. The social changes going in both Canada and the United States in the late 1960s required more focus on domestic issues in Canada and nuclear alert duty in Europe was quite expensive. Despite some of 1 Canadian Air Division's squadrons being operational with nuclear weapons for a short period of time (1 Wing only started nuclear alert duties in 1969), the drawdown began in 1970 with the last nuclear alert being stood on 31 December 1971 by 4 Wing. The last of the weapons were removed from the Canadian bases in 1972 as the Starfighter force was re-tasked with tactical air support- not only did the CF-104's get the M61 Vulcan cannon installed, they also were given a two tone dark gray/dark green camouflage as part of their new conventional tasking. 

The following message was sent from Canadian Forces HQ in Canada to the head of the 1st Canadian Air Division on 17 January 1972: 

"Final phase out of special weapons on 12 January marked the end of an era which started in 1964. Thank you for the great credit which you have brought to the Canadian Armed Forces in Europe."

Sources: Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal by John Clearwater. Dandurn Press, 1998, pp38-61, 130-219. Additional information from Starfighter CF-104 by Anthony L. Stachiw and Andrew Tattersall. In Canadian Service Aircraft Series #4, Vanwell Publishing, 2007. Photos: Wikipedia, Aircraft Resource Center forums, RCAF Starfighter Association.

The Lockheed C-5M Super Galaxy

The first production group of Lockheed C-5 Galaxy transports, designated the C-5A, were built in the 1970s and even then, there were issues with the jet's reliability. When the production line was reopened during the Reagan-era defense buildup in the 1980s, the C-5B was produced to introduce a variety of systems improvements aimed at boosting the jet's reliability. But the mission capable rate of the Galaxy continued to decline. In the mid-1990s, of the 126 C-5A/Bs in service at the time, up to 32 percent of them were down for maintenance at any one time. Of all the aircraft operated by the Air Mobility Command of the US Air Force, the C-5's mission capable rate was the worst, even worse than the 1950s-1960s vintage KC-135 Stratotankers! In 1998 the USAF initiated the AMP (Avionics Modernization Program) which improved many of the cockpit and traffic management systems of the aircraft. Despite this, the mission capable rates continued to deteriorate. By 2001, only 60% of the Galaxy fleet was operational at any one time. The airlift buildup for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan initially turned things around as increased funding for C-5 maintenance to operate the logistics air bridge to Afghanistan raised the mission capable rate to 75%. But the pace of airlift missions eventually took their tool on the Galaxy- there are reports of one operating location that was allotted ramp space for eight C-5s to be present and the unspecified base had twenty-two C-5 aircraft present, down for maintenance issues! The 2009 troop surge into Afghanistan further strained Galaxy operations with aircraft down for maintenance a fixture on the ramps at Ramstein AB in Germany and NAS Rota in Spain. Personnel joked that AMC stood for "Airplane Might Come".

Two overlapping upgrade programs took place to improve the C-5's abysmal reliability. The first one was the aforementioned AMP (Avionics Modernization Program) that started in 1998 with the last Galaxy coming out of the program in August 2009, with 55 C-5s (50 C-5Bs, 2 C-5Cs, and 3 C-5As) having went through AMP. The second program was the bigger one and addressed the weak link the Galaxy today- it's elderly TF39 engines. The Galaxy's TF39 turbofan engines are the world's first production high-bypass turbofan engine. GE began development of the TF39 in 1965 and on today's unmodernized C-5 Galaxy, represents 40+ year old technology that has long been surpassed by modern commercial turbofan engines. To address this capability gap, Lockheed and the USAF began the RERP program (Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program) which began in 2006.

With the announcement that the USAF was to end procurement of the C-17A Globemaster III after 223 aircraft, the modernization of the Galaxy took on added importance. RERP is costly- it's estimated that what is spent on each C-5 going through RERP is equal to buying two C-17A Globemaster IIIs. When each C-5 is delivered to Lockheed's facility in Marietta, Georgia, the first task is to remove the elderly TF39 engines and any last remaining amount of fuel from the aircraft, after which it is moved into a special modification bay for 18 months where nearly 11,000 feet of wiring is pulled out of the aircraft and replaced with modern systems. The most challenging part and part of what makes RERP so costly is the re-engining with the modern GE CF6-80C2 engines. Because of the 30+ years of wear and tear on each Galaxy, a special laser system is used to determine the optimum location for the pylon fittings- in effect, each C-5 going through RERP gets custom-made engine pylons.

Ironically the GE CF6-80C2 engine that replaces the TF39s was derived from the TF39. Designed originally for the Douglas DC-10 and the Airbus A300, the current version of the CF6 is the CF6-80C2 which entered commercial service in 1985. The -80C2 engine powers the two latest versions of the A300 (the -600 version), the two versions of the A310, four versions of the 767 family, three versions of the Boeing 747-400, and the McDonnell Douglas MD-11. Although the basic engine architecture is the same, the CF6-80C2 is much more efficient and modern engine than it was over thirty years ago when it first came to market. What this does to the Galaxy is nothing short of impressive. The addition of modern engines gives the C-5M Super Galaxy 22% more thrust, a one-third shorter takeoff roll, twice the climb rate, and for a given payload, just over 1000 miles more range. And this is before getting into areas like meeting strict noise standards at many of the world's airports when the C-5M has to fly into and out of those locations.

The first Super Galaxy, tail number 86-0013, a C-5B, was rolled out on 16 May 2006 and made its maiden flight on its new engines the following month on 19 June 2006. Following a successful flight test program, the first two examples were delivered to the 436th Airlift Wing at Dover AFB, Delaware. This past summer two C-5Ms joined eight C-5A/Bs on a marathon airlift effort to delivery Army helicopters from NAS Rota (where they had been delivered by ship) to Afghanistan. The eight older Galaxy transports accounted for 23 missions altogether, while the C-5Ms by themselves accounted for 22 missions! Despite having flown one less mission, the two C-5Ms accounted for 55% of the cargo delivered during that operation and boasted a mission capable rate of 96%, something that the Galaxy has never attained in its operational history previously.


Source: Combat Aircraft Monthly, November 2010, Volume 11, Number 11. "New Life in the Galaxy: Deep surgery renders cheaper, more powerful C-5M" by David Axe, p30-35.

How Rolls-Royce Scuttled British Participation in Airbus

In the late 1960s as the nascent Airbus Industrie was formalizing the design of the A300, the original intent of the consortium was to use a new 47,500 lb-thrust turbofan in development by Rolls-Royce, the RB.207. Great Britain at the time was actively involved in the early days of Airbus as a full partner, riding on the heels of the Anglo-French Concorde program. The two main British companies involved with Airbus at the time were Rolls-Royce to provide the engines for the A300 and Hawker Siddeley to provide the wing design for the airliner. However, all was not well for the commercial airframe start up as development costs in Toulouse were rising and worse yet, RB.207 development was falling behind at Rolls-Royce. I had posted earlier on the A300 that the original design for the aircraft, the HBN100, was a much larger aircraft than what resulted, seating over 300 passengers compared to the 250 of A300 as built. As result of the HBN100 being a twin jet the size of the rival Lockheed L-1011 and McDonnell Douglas DC-10, it would need more powerful engines than the Rolls-Royce RB.211 used on the Tristar and the General Electric CF6 used on the DC-10 and this responsibility was assigned to Rolls-Royce to develop the RB.207. 

With the development of the RB.207 behind schedule, timing could not have been worse in 1968 when European financial houses made a run on the French gold reserves that depleted the reserves by 30% in a short period of time and caused not just the collapse of the French franc, but the collapse of President Charles De Gaulle's government amidst political unrest in the country. As economic malaise spread through Europe, airlines began to have doubts about the viability of the A300 and its original 300+ seating capacity. Airbus partners Sud-Aviation and Hawker Siddeley even began to prepare fall back designs based around a smaller aircraft. 

Matters worsened through the year for Airbus as the Rolls-Royce was also developing the RB.211 engine for the Tristar as well as the RB.207. Given that three engines were going into the Tristar versus only two engines for the original A300 design, Rolls-Royce began to divert engineering resources from the RB.207 program to the RB.211 program which was facing technical issues of its own as the world's first three-spool engine design. The RB.207 wasn't even Airbus' first choice for the A300. French engine manufacturer SNECMA had partnered with Pratt & Whitney to offer the JT9D engine which was initially favored by Airbus, but Rolls-Royce exercised its considerable political clout and had the UK government push for a "European" engine in the form of the proposed RB.207. Rolls-Royce even went as far as to suggest that it was wrong for an American engine be part of a European aircraft. Due to pressure from Rolls-Royce and the UK government, the RB.207 engine was selected for the original A300 design but in just a few years it was Rolls-Royce itself that was putting more emphasis on the RB.211 for the Tristar than the RB.207 it had pushed for just a few years earlier!

The writing on the wall came when Roger Beteille, the head of Airbus, found out the selling price of the RB.211 engine. He had found out that two RB.207 engines would cost more than three RB.211 engines which put the A300 at a considerable price disadvantage to the Tristar. There was no way the A300 would succeed if Airbus stuck it out with Rolls-Royce and the RB.207 engine. The only way Airbus could find a way out was to change the size of the A300 from a 300+ seat aircraft to a 250 seat maximum aircraft. It was a master stroke that saved the program as it now made existing engines in the form of the RB.211 and the CF6 now appropriate for the A300 and Pratt & Whitney/SNECMA could now offer the JT9D as well. 

In December 1968, the A300 was formally launched as a 250 seater with a wider range of engine options that left out the RB.207 engine. As a smaller aircraft, the airlines of Europe were more interested in the design and ironically, it was the head of Hawker Siddeley, Sir Harry Broadhurst, who announced that the RB.207 engine wasn't needed and that the JT9D was on the table as an option for the new A300 design. At this point things got very complicated for the UK government. Money had been provided for the development of the RB.207 engine for the original A300 design. Money had also been invested in the BAC Three-Eleven, which was now square in competition with new, smaller A300 design. The Three-Eleven would have been powered by two RB.211 engines, the engines that Rolls-Royce had given development priority over the RB.207. In the end, a need for address Great Britain's trade deficit meant that official support was given to the Three-Eleven program. This also increased the market for the RB.211 engine as continual problems at Rolls-Royce eventually resulted in the company going into receivership with the British government to keep it afloat. By the summer of 1970 Great Britain withdrew from the Airbus consortium as continued support for Rolls-Royce put it in conflict with the A300, but Sir Harry Broadhurst felt Hawker's investment was worth keeping and Hawker Siddeley remained with the Airbus consortium as a major subcontractor building the wings for the A300. 

Source: Flight of the Titans: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the Future of Air Travel by Kenny Kemp. Virgin Books, 2006, p71-84.

The last Avro Canada CF-100 Canuck flight took place on 28 June 1982, but it wasn't with an operational role. Since 1967, Pratt & Whitney Canada had operated a CF-100 on loan from the Canadian Armed Forces to serve as an engine testbed for the JT15D small turbofan. PWC needed a two seat aircraft (the rear seat of the CF-100 being occupied by a flight test engineer) and one with sufficient ground clearance for an underslung nacelle for the JT15D engine.

The CF-100's ability to cruise up to Mach 0.8 as high as 48,000 feet made it ideal for testing an engine destined for business jets. The aircraft arrived at PWC's St-Hubert test center in November 1967 for conversion. The first flight took place on 22 July 1968 with the first flight with a JT15D engine on 14 August 1968. The first air start of the JT15D took place less than two weeks later on 22 August 1968.

The loan of the CF-100 got extended several times as PWC tested different versions of the JT15D engine, ultimately making over 400 flights totalling 1,017.6 flying hours with the test engines.

The JT15D engine is unique in that it has a centrifugal high pressure compressor which was common on early generation jet engines. However, in the JT15D it made the engine more compact and simpler in terms of complexity and parts as opposed to what it would have been had it used a traditional axial-flow compressor. The JT15D first went into use on the Cessna Citation 500 (later rebranded Citation I) and has been used on the Hawker Beechjet/T-1A Jayhawk, Aerospatiale Corvette, and the Citation II, Ultra, and Citation V as well as the military T-47 and UC-35 versions of the Citation.

Source: Wings of Fame, Volume 18. AIRtime Publishing, 2000, "Avro Canada CF-100 Variant and Operator Briefing" by Jeff Rankin-Lowe, p114, 133.