Operation Drugstore: The 1982 Air Battles Over the Bekaa Valley

In 1976, the Lebanese Civil War had been raging for a year when the Syrian military poured across the border into the region to ostensibly stabilize the situation. Securing the Bekaa Valley and the main Beirut-Damascus highway that crossed the central part of the country with massive numbers of troops and armor, soon the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its Muslim allies in Lebanon were receiving support from the Syrians. To cover the Syrian left flank facing Israel, the Syrian 10th Armored Divsion was arrayed across the Bekaa Valley with three brigades of surface-to-air missile units to protect them from an Israeli attack. A total of 19 batteries covered the valley consisting of two SA-2 batteries, two SA-3 batteries, and fifteen new SA-6 batteries. During the next several years the Israelis provided support to the Christian factions in the civil war while maintaining a close eye on the strengthening Syrian integrated air defense system (IADS) that stretched across the Bekaa Valley. Overflights to pinpoint the SAM sites required use of Firebee recon drones due to the dense air defense network that the Syrians had established. In the late May to early June of 1982, the PLO conducted a 12-day artillery and rocket attack on northern Israel that resulted in 60 civilian casualties. The last straw for the Israelis came on 3 June when the PLO attempted to assassinate in London the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom.

On 6 June, seven Israeli mechanized divisions with 60,000 troops and 500 tanks crossed into southern Lebanon in three prongs- one up the coastal plain, one through the central mountains, and a third push into the Bekaa Valley to keep the Syrian 10th Armored Division from intervening against the Israeli right flank. On the first three days of the ground invasion, seven Syrian MiG fighters were shot down. By 8 June Israeli forward elements were at the entrance to the Bekaa Valley but weren't able to push any further north as the Syrian forces held steady under the protective umbrella of their IADS, denying close air support to the Israeli ground forces. For several weeks prior to the invasion, though, the IDF/AF had been planning to deal with the Syrian IADS umbrella over the Bekaa Valley. Years of meticulous reconnaissance and eavesdropping gave the IDF/AF the locations, operating frequencies and modes of the SAM batteries in the valley. Operation Drugstore was their plan for not just the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) but what was being called "DEAD"- destruction of enemy air defenses. This is what made Operation Drugstore a landmark operation in air combat- prior to 1982, suppression was the name of the game as it had been practiced in Vietnam by the United States- keep the enemy's heads down while strike packages went in and hit targets. For Israel, nothing less than the complete elimination of the Syrian IADS was acceptable- air superiority against the Syrian fighters was meaningless if the IADS prevented close air support from assisting the ground forces' objectives. 

The opening phase of Operation Drugstore saw large numbers of Delilah ground-launched drones being launched towards the Bekaa Valley, giving the impression of a large Israeli strike force. As the SAM batteries went active to engage what they thought were Israeli aircraft, battlefield surface-to-surface missiles were fired at each SAM battery. One of the missiles used was the Keres, which was an Israeli modification of the AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missile used by Wild Weasel aircraft. The mobile launcher fired three Keres missiles and even a local modification of the smaller AGM-45 Shrike was used that added a second stage booster to allow a ground launch. In the first ten minutes of the operation, ten of the 19 batteries had been knocked out either due to missile hits or because they had run out of missiles engaging the Delilah drones. Four minutes later, the first wave of ground attack aircraft swept into the Bekaa Valley- 26 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantoms and a similar number of IAI Kfir C2s, with the Phantoms using AGM-65 Maverick missiles as well as Shrike and Standard ARMs to hit the remaining SAM sites while the Kfirs targeted the control vans and storage areas of the missile sites. With no losses, a second wave of over forty A-4 Skyhawks and IAI Kfir C2s swept in attacking the SAM sites with cluster bombs while the F-4Es returned using laser-guided bombs against any surviving control vans. In just two hours, 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM sites had been destroyed. 

The next phase of Operation Drugstore saw Israeli strike aircraft next hit the Syrian mobile GCI (ground-controlled intercept) sites that provided directions to the Syrian MiG force. With the destruction of the GCI sites and their radars, the Syrian IADS was now blinded as F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons established combat air patrols over the Bekaa Valley. The timing was perfect- as the Syrian commanders realized that their IADS umbrella was being systematically demolished, three squadrons of MiG-21s and MiG-23s were scrambled from their Syrian bases- it's estimated that up to sixty Syrian fighters raced to the Bekaa Valley where the F-15s and F-16s were waiting. They were tasked to hit the Israeli strike forces that were attacking the components of their IADS, but instead found that Israeli Grumman E-2 Hawkeyes orbiting over southern Lebanon had given the combat air patrols ample warning of the inbound MiGs. Because the Syrians relied on GCI controllers to provide them with vectors and targeting information, the loss of the GCI sites meant they were flying into the Bekaa Valley blind while the F-15s and F-16s' longer ranged radars already had them targeted. With communcations and radars being jammed, most of the Syrian MiGs never saw what hit them- ten MiG-21s fell within minutes. At the end of the day, only one F-15 had been hit, and the pilot managed to recover his Eagle safely to Ramat David AB in northern Israel. 

The following morning the last two Syrian SAM batteries were destroyed while the Syrians scrambled more MiG-21s and MiG-23s to make up for the previous day's losses. Since the MiG-23 Floggers were the most capable of the Syrian fighters, the F-15s were tasked with eliminating them and six were shot down in short order. As Israeli armored units engaged Syrian armor in the valley, two waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22 fighter bombers were sent into to attack the Israeli units, escorted by a squadron of MiG-21s. It was a turkey shoot as over 20 Syrian aircraft were shot down by the Israeli fighters patrolling the skies of the Bekaa Valley. The Syrians then tried to send in anti-tank Gazelle helicopters to go after the Israeli armor and those were shot down as well. 

11 June was the last day of continuous fighting as a cease fire was to go into effect later than day. Hoping to stave off defeat and entering the ceasefire at a disadvantage, the Syrians poured their MiG-23 Floggers into the battle against the F-15s and F-16s, leaving the MiG-21s to escort the strike version of the Flogger, the MiG-23BN. Several Syrian MiG-25 Foxbats made high altitude runs over the Bekaa Valley, hoping to distract the Israeli fighters into looking "upward", distracted from the inbound MiG-23s. At lower altitudes, two waves of Syrian MiG-23BNs would attempt to hit the Israeli armored units once again where the Sukhois had failed the previous day. The Syrian fighter sweep failed as their presence was once again known thanks to the E-2 Hawkeyes. Six Floggers were shot down in their first pass over the valley. Another six MiG-21s were shot down as well and the MiG-23BN attacks had little effect on the Israeli positions. 

By the time of the ceasefire took effect, the Syrians lost 30% of their air force in just one week of fighting for a total of 88 aircraft shot down. Of those 88 kills, 44 belonged to F-15 Eagles and 33 belonged to F-16s. Israeli losses have never been fully admitted, but it's believed to include one F-16, one F-4E, one Kfir C2, two A-4s and several helicopters. Following the battle in the skies over the Bekaa Valley, the Israeli Defense Forces Air Force (IDF/AF) was secretly debriefed by US military experts from the US Air Force and other branches of the military. The lessons gleaned from Operation Drugstore would strongly influence Coalition tactics on the opening night of Operation Desert Storm. In what was called "Poobah's Party" (from the callsign of Brigadier General Larry Henry, a leading USAF tactician and expert on air defenses), approximately one-hundred drones were fired from ground sites in Saudi Arabia to trigger the Iraqi IADS into action to they could be targeted for destruction by Coalition air assets. With the stealthy Lockheed F-117A Nighthawks going "downtown" to Baghdad to take out the command and control centers of the IADS, individual radar and SAM sites then were left on their own to find their own targets in the midst of some intense jamming. Iraqi radar sites could burn through the jamming, and when they did, they detected the drones of Poobah's Party. Sites that hadn't expended their missiles on the drones found themselves targeted by F-4G Wild Weasels. 

Source: F-15 Eagle Engaged: The World's Most Successful Fighter by Steve Davies and Doug Dildy. Osprey, 2007, p146-147. Photos: Wikipedia, USAF Featured Art Gallery

Birth of the Lion: The Development of the IAI Kfir

Mirage IIICJ Shahak (Sky Blazer)

In the early 1950s, the most advanced jet aircraft in the IDF/AF was the Gloster Meteor, the first examples being delivered from Great Britain in 1953 which marked the IDF/AF's first combat jet equipment. Although the Meteors gave good service to the Israelis, the supply of more advanced MiG fighters to its Arab neighbors meant that Israel needed to something more capable than the Meteor- their first choice was the North American F-86 Sabre, but its purchase was thwarted by American government. Israel then turned to France and formed a remarkably close relationship with Dassault in particular. The first Dassault Ouragan jet fighters were delivered in October 1955 as a stopgap measure until the arrival of the supersonic-capable Dassault Mystere IVA in April 1956, becoming the first Israeli combat aircraft capable of breaking the sound barrier. The improved Dassault Super Mystere became operational with the IDF/AF in December 1958 along with the Sud Aviation Vatour strike fighter. Israeli Aircraft Industries, started in 1952 as Bedek Aviation in Tel Aviv by American Al Schwimmer, had begun license production of the French jet trainer Fouga Magister in 1957 with the first wholly IAI-built example rolling out in 1960. The IDF/AF's relationship with Dassault as one of its best customers continued with the arrival of the Mirage III series. Israel had a custom variant based on the Mirage IIIC interceptor designated the IIICJ which was first delivered to the IDF/AF on 7 April 1962. IAI's skill set expanded as it modified the Mirage IIICJs as needed for Israeli needs, one of which was a removable nose that contained cameras for reconnaissance missions. It would be an Israeli Mirage IIICJ that scored the first aerial victory for the entire Mirage series worldwide against a Syrian MiG-21 on 14 July 1966. Known as the Shahak (Sky Blazer) in IDF/AF service, the Mirage IIICJs were an integral part of the IDF/AF until their retirement in 1982.

When Charles de Gaulle was elected president of France in December 1958, there was nothing to indicate that the long standing relationship between France and Israel would change for the worse. On 7 April 1966, Israel signed an agreement with Dassault for a custom variant of the Mirage 5 optimized for ground attack and designated Mirage 5J. Named Ra'am (Thunder), the Mirage 5J was a quantum leap in capability over the Mirage IIICJ. Since the weather was generally good in the Middle East, the Mirage 5J (as well as the rest of the Mirage 5 series) traded the all-weather radar capability for an increase in fuel and weapons load (32% more fuel in fact) and small radar ranging unit in a slimmed down nose. Dispensing with many of the electronics of the Mirage IIICJ, the Mirage 5J was not only more capable, but cheaper, with the initial contract for 50 Mirage 5Js and two dual-seat trainer versions of the 5J. Many IDF/AF pilots like the legendary Danny Shapira completed the Mirage 5J flight test program after its first flight on 19 May 1967. But the winds of change were coming to the Middle East despite the rapid progress on the Mirage 5J program by Dassault. With France losing Algeria in 1962 and de Gaulle's desire to be a player in Middle East politics beyond the United States and the Soviet Union, relations between France and Israel were cooling and came to a head in June 1967 during the Six-Day War. The Mirage 5J's first flight was less than a month prior when de Gaulle announced an arms embargo on Israel just three days prior to the start of the Six-Day War. At first the embargo was partial and hope held out that the IDF/AF would still get the Mirage 5J aircraft. But de Gaulle insisted on Israel withdrawing to its pre-1967 lines as a prerequisite for lifting the embargo, something the Israelis obviously refused to do. When the PLO launched a terrorist attack against El Al at the Athens airport on 26 December 1968, the Israelis responded with reprisal attacks against the PLO stronghold in Beirut two days later. In response, France imposed a total embargo on Israel. 

Armee de l'Air Mirage 5F (an embargoed Mirage 5J in French service)

Despite the embargo, Dassault completed the Mirage 5J production run on 19 June 1969, but the completed fighters were put into storage. The Mirage 5J would become the basis for a new family of Mirage 5 variants that would prove popular with other air forces. The Israeli Mirage 5Js in storage were put into service with the French Air Force (AdA) as the Mirage 5F. Some of these airframes ultimately ended up with Chile years later. Israel would eventually get a refund of its money for the first variant of the Mirage 5 series, but in 1969 with tensions running high in the wake of the 1967 war, the only option was for Israel to build its own fighter aircraft. Despite the initial partial embargo, Israeli Aircraft Industries had negotiated for license production of the Mirage 5J in Israel and at the end of 1967 an agreement was signed between IAI and Dassault. Dassault felt that since they were a private company, they weren't bound by the embargo, but the maker of the Atar 9C turbojet of the Mirage 5J, SNECMA, was government owned. Time was of the essence and it would have been time consuming to find a replacement engine for the Atar 9C. At the time, the Swiss company Sulzer was license building the Atar 9C for Switzerland's Mirage order and an engineer with Sulzer, Alfred Fraunknecht, was approached by the Mossad with a deal- supply the engineering data and blueprints for the 9C for $250,000. Approximately 200,000 drawings were transferred before Swiss authorities arrested Fraunknecht and sentenced him to four and a half years of prison. 

Neshers on the flightline. Note the nose painted black to appear like a IIICJ.

Keeping the name Ra'am (Thunder) that was intended for the Dassault-built Mirage 5Js, a highly classified program got underway at IAI to essentially build the 5J with a reverse-engineered Atar 9C. Despite the embargo, the Israelis found many sympathetic supporters in the French aerospace industry to assist with the production of what was called the Nesher (Vulture). Dassault supplied manufacturing jigs and tooling and even whole airframe subassemblies despite the total embargo. Oddly enough, spare parts for the Mirage IIICJ fleet were exempt from the embargo and with the Nesher being a derivative of the 5J which was a derivative of the IIICJ, many spare parts ended up on Nesher aircraft. The first Nesher aircraft made its maiden flight on 21 March 1971 and became operational with the IDF/AF the following October. When the Nesher program ended in 1974, 50 Nesher A single seat fighters were built as well as 10 Nesher B combat trainers. 

IAI Kfirs (from the DML/Dragon 1/144 scale kit box art)

While the Nesher was becoming operational, IAI then turned its attention to rectifying the deficiencies of the aircraft, the biggest of which was the Atar 9C engine. Focus then turned on a re-engined Nesher as the next follow on aircraft. The General Electric J79 was selected as it already powered the F-4E Phantoms that had already been in IDF/AF service for several years. On 21 September 1970 (before the Nesher's maiden flight), IAI conducted the maiden flight of a demonstrator to prove the J79 could be integrated into the Mirage airframe. This demonstrator was a two seat Mirage IIIBJ called the Technolog. The flight test program of the Technolog was used to uncover any issues with using the J79 on the Mirage airframe. The new production aircraft that would use the J79 in a Nesher airframe was named Kfir (Young Lion) and the prototype Kfir that first flew on 4 June 1973 was in fact a Nesher modified to accept the J79 and be representative of the production standard Kfir. The deliveries of the first Kfirs was interrupted by the October Yom Kippur War that year, but it was apparent that the Kfir wasn't the leap in improvement over the Nesher that IAI had hoped. The fix was aerodynamic and would applied to subsequent Kfirs- first, a saw tooth was added to the outboard wing which increased wing chord and the saw tooth created a vortex that energized the wing air flow and acted as a wing fence to stop drag-inducing spanwise flow. Next, canards were added above and behind the intakes which helped control the air flow over the wing and made destabilized the Kfir to make it more agile. Lastly, a pair of strakes was added to the extreme tip of the nose which helped smooth the airflow over the wings and canards. This configuration became known as the Kfir C2 and was the definitive production model that also had extra hardpoints for more weapons. The first production Kfir was delivered on 14 April 1975. One of the Israeli guests of honor was Alfred Fraunknecht, the Swiss engineer who had passed on the Atar 9C turbojet engineering information years earlier for the Nesher program.

Source: Aviation Classics: Dassault Mirage III/5, Issue 17. "Vultures and Young Lions" by David G. Powers, pp 70-81. Photos: Wings Palette, Wikipedia, DML/Dragon Models

When Israeli Aircraft Industries created the Kfir fighter-bomber by replacing the SNECMA Atar turbojet with a more powerful GE J79 engine, the additional modifications required to accommodate the American engine (which was shorter but heavier) along with the avionics needed for the strike role and the heavier undercarriage to increased takeoff weights with heavy bombloads degraded the performance and maneuverability of the the first generation Kfirs. Rather than try increasing the thrust of the J79 engine, IAI engineers decided the solution would have to be an aerodynamic one.

The addition of canards was favored early on and Dassault cautioned IAI about adding canards to the aircraft based on the French experience with the Mirage Milan canard test aircraft. Despite the warnings, no other solution was seen as being viable, so flight testing of the canard proceeded on the Technolog, a two-seat Mirage III that first tested the installation of the J79 engine.

Nose strakes near the tip of the nose were also found (even before the canard solution was reached) to improve high AoA performance but this came at the cost of buffeting at high AoAs, something that would have been unacceptable in air combat. The buffeting was cured on the suggestion of one of the IAI test pilots to add a wing leading edge saw-tooth which helped smooth the local airflow.

These modifications improved the Kfir's performance with the addition of wing area in the form of the canards that shifted the aircraft center of gravity forward, reduced the stability margin enough that the aircraft would be more responsive. The vortices that came off the canard smoothed the airflow over the delta wings which enhanced their lift and performance particularly at high angles of attack. The saw-tooth leading edges also slightly increased wing area and the vortices created by the saw tooth augmented the canard-produced vortices.

The combination of these modifications only added 187 lbs of weight to the new Kfir version designated C2. The side benefit of the structural strengthening of the fuselage for the canards (fuselage Section 10) is that that area was able to also accommodate an additional pair of weapons pylons under the intakes, giving the Kfir a total of five underfuselage pylon stations.

The Kfir C2 entered service with the IDF in 1977. The earlier Kfir C1s only got the nose strakes and a much reduced canard as the structural strengthening and modification to full C2 standards was deemed not worth the effort. Many of those earlier-variant Kfir C1s flew with US Navy and US Marine Corps adversary units in the 1980s as the F-21A Lion.

Source: International Air Power Review, Volume 15. AIRtime Publishing, 2005, "Warplane Classic: IAI Kfir- Israel's Lion Cub" by Shlomo Aloni, p137-139.