Operation Drugstore: The 1982 Air Battles Over the Bekaa Valley

In 1976, the Lebanese Civil War had been raging for a year when the Syrian military poured across the border into the region to ostensibly stabilize the situation. Securing the Bekaa Valley and the main Beirut-Damascus highway that crossed the central part of the country with massive numbers of troops and armor, soon the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its Muslim allies in Lebanon were receiving support from the Syrians. To cover the Syrian left flank facing Israel, the Syrian 10th Armored Divsion was arrayed across the Bekaa Valley with three brigades of surface-to-air missile units to protect them from an Israeli attack. A total of 19 batteries covered the valley consisting of two SA-2 batteries, two SA-3 batteries, and fifteen new SA-6 batteries. During the next several years the Israelis provided support to the Christian factions in the civil war while maintaining a close eye on the strengthening Syrian integrated air defense system (IADS) that stretched across the Bekaa Valley. Overflights to pinpoint the SAM sites required use of Firebee recon drones due to the dense air defense network that the Syrians had established. In the late May to early June of 1982, the PLO conducted a 12-day artillery and rocket attack on northern Israel that resulted in 60 civilian casualties. The last straw for the Israelis came on 3 June when the PLO attempted to assassinate in London the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom.

On 6 June, seven Israeli mechanized divisions with 60,000 troops and 500 tanks crossed into southern Lebanon in three prongs- one up the coastal plain, one through the central mountains, and a third push into the Bekaa Valley to keep the Syrian 10th Armored Division from intervening against the Israeli right flank. On the first three days of the ground invasion, seven Syrian MiG fighters were shot down. By 8 June Israeli forward elements were at the entrance to the Bekaa Valley but weren't able to push any further north as the Syrian forces held steady under the protective umbrella of their IADS, denying close air support to the Israeli ground forces. For several weeks prior to the invasion, though, the IDF/AF had been planning to deal with the Syrian IADS umbrella over the Bekaa Valley. Years of meticulous reconnaissance and eavesdropping gave the IDF/AF the locations, operating frequencies and modes of the SAM batteries in the valley. Operation Drugstore was their plan for not just the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) but what was being called "DEAD"- destruction of enemy air defenses. This is what made Operation Drugstore a landmark operation in air combat- prior to 1982, suppression was the name of the game as it had been practiced in Vietnam by the United States- keep the enemy's heads down while strike packages went in and hit targets. For Israel, nothing less than the complete elimination of the Syrian IADS was acceptable- air superiority against the Syrian fighters was meaningless if the IADS prevented close air support from assisting the ground forces' objectives. 

The opening phase of Operation Drugstore saw large numbers of Delilah ground-launched drones being launched towards the Bekaa Valley, giving the impression of a large Israeli strike force. As the SAM batteries went active to engage what they thought were Israeli aircraft, battlefield surface-to-surface missiles were fired at each SAM battery. One of the missiles used was the Keres, which was an Israeli modification of the AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missile used by Wild Weasel aircraft. The mobile launcher fired three Keres missiles and even a local modification of the smaller AGM-45 Shrike was used that added a second stage booster to allow a ground launch. In the first ten minutes of the operation, ten of the 19 batteries had been knocked out either due to missile hits or because they had run out of missiles engaging the Delilah drones. Four minutes later, the first wave of ground attack aircraft swept into the Bekaa Valley- 26 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantoms and a similar number of IAI Kfir C2s, with the Phantoms using AGM-65 Maverick missiles as well as Shrike and Standard ARMs to hit the remaining SAM sites while the Kfirs targeted the control vans and storage areas of the missile sites. With no losses, a second wave of over forty A-4 Skyhawks and IAI Kfir C2s swept in attacking the SAM sites with cluster bombs while the F-4Es returned using laser-guided bombs against any surviving control vans. In just two hours, 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM sites had been destroyed. 

The next phase of Operation Drugstore saw Israeli strike aircraft next hit the Syrian mobile GCI (ground-controlled intercept) sites that provided directions to the Syrian MiG force. With the destruction of the GCI sites and their radars, the Syrian IADS was now blinded as F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons established combat air patrols over the Bekaa Valley. The timing was perfect- as the Syrian commanders realized that their IADS umbrella was being systematically demolished, three squadrons of MiG-21s and MiG-23s were scrambled from their Syrian bases- it's estimated that up to sixty Syrian fighters raced to the Bekaa Valley where the F-15s and F-16s were waiting. They were tasked to hit the Israeli strike forces that were attacking the components of their IADS, but instead found that Israeli Grumman E-2 Hawkeyes orbiting over southern Lebanon had given the combat air patrols ample warning of the inbound MiGs. Because the Syrians relied on GCI controllers to provide them with vectors and targeting information, the loss of the GCI sites meant they were flying into the Bekaa Valley blind while the F-15s and F-16s' longer ranged radars already had them targeted. With communcations and radars being jammed, most of the Syrian MiGs never saw what hit them- ten MiG-21s fell within minutes. At the end of the day, only one F-15 had been hit, and the pilot managed to recover his Eagle safely to Ramat David AB in northern Israel. 

The following morning the last two Syrian SAM batteries were destroyed while the Syrians scrambled more MiG-21s and MiG-23s to make up for the previous day's losses. Since the MiG-23 Floggers were the most capable of the Syrian fighters, the F-15s were tasked with eliminating them and six were shot down in short order. As Israeli armored units engaged Syrian armor in the valley, two waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22 fighter bombers were sent into to attack the Israeli units, escorted by a squadron of MiG-21s. It was a turkey shoot as over 20 Syrian aircraft were shot down by the Israeli fighters patrolling the skies of the Bekaa Valley. The Syrians then tried to send in anti-tank Gazelle helicopters to go after the Israeli armor and those were shot down as well. 

11 June was the last day of continuous fighting as a cease fire was to go into effect later than day. Hoping to stave off defeat and entering the ceasefire at a disadvantage, the Syrians poured their MiG-23 Floggers into the battle against the F-15s and F-16s, leaving the MiG-21s to escort the strike version of the Flogger, the MiG-23BN. Several Syrian MiG-25 Foxbats made high altitude runs over the Bekaa Valley, hoping to distract the Israeli fighters into looking "upward", distracted from the inbound MiG-23s. At lower altitudes, two waves of Syrian MiG-23BNs would attempt to hit the Israeli armored units once again where the Sukhois had failed the previous day. The Syrian fighter sweep failed as their presence was once again known thanks to the E-2 Hawkeyes. Six Floggers were shot down in their first pass over the valley. Another six MiG-21s were shot down as well and the MiG-23BN attacks had little effect on the Israeli positions. 

By the time of the ceasefire took effect, the Syrians lost 30% of their air force in just one week of fighting for a total of 88 aircraft shot down. Of those 88 kills, 44 belonged to F-15 Eagles and 33 belonged to F-16s. Israeli losses have never been fully admitted, but it's believed to include one F-16, one F-4E, one Kfir C2, two A-4s and several helicopters. Following the battle in the skies over the Bekaa Valley, the Israeli Defense Forces Air Force (IDF/AF) was secretly debriefed by US military experts from the US Air Force and other branches of the military. The lessons gleaned from Operation Drugstore would strongly influence Coalition tactics on the opening night of Operation Desert Storm. In what was called "Poobah's Party" (from the callsign of Brigadier General Larry Henry, a leading USAF tactician and expert on air defenses), approximately one-hundred drones were fired from ground sites in Saudi Arabia to trigger the Iraqi IADS into action to they could be targeted for destruction by Coalition air assets. With the stealthy Lockheed F-117A Nighthawks going "downtown" to Baghdad to take out the command and control centers of the IADS, individual radar and SAM sites then were left on their own to find their own targets in the midst of some intense jamming. Iraqi radar sites could burn through the jamming, and when they did, they detected the drones of Poobah's Party. Sites that hadn't expended their missiles on the drones found themselves targeted by F-4G Wild Weasels. 

Source: F-15 Eagle Engaged: The World's Most Successful Fighter by Steve Davies and Doug Dildy. Osprey, 2007, p146-147. Photos: Wikipedia, USAF Featured Art Gallery

The Experimental STOL Demonstrator That Fooled NATO

Impressed with the performance of the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II that had just been introduced into service with the US Navy, the Soviet Air Force asked the Mikoyan design bureau (OKB Mikoyan) for a successor to the MiG-21 "Fishbed" that could counter the F-4 on equal terms. The first attempt by the OKB was the experimental Ye-8 demonstrator that was based on the MiG-21. However, the Ye-8 suffered from numerous technical problems that led to the loss of the first prototype and before the second Ye-8 could be flown, priorities with the Soviet Air Force command staff had changed on the characteristics of the replacement design and now emphasized STOL performance as it was felt that the long runways needed by most Soviet fighters were vulnerable to attack by NATO's intermediate-range ballistic missiles. STOL performance would allow the fighter to be deployed to remote areas away from the main air bases in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Mikoyan's studies of STOL configurations were subsequently narrowed down to two configurations- one using variable-geometry "swing wings" and one using lift engines. Although using lift engines would be simpler in theory, swing wings allowed for more space in the fuselage for fuel and weapons. Although Artyom Mikoyan himself favored swing wings, a 1961 report by the prestigious Russian aerodynamic institute, TsAGI, concluded that there were considerable aerodynamic issues as well as construction issues with variable geometry wings. 

While there had not yet been any flight testing of swing wing designs in the 1960s in the Soviet Union, Mikoyan already had experience with STOL jet lift fighter technology, having flown in 1966 the Ye-7 (also referred to as izdeliye 23-01, izdeliye meaning "article", usually in reference to demonstrator or prototype) which was a MiG-21 modified with two lift jets in the center fuselage. Mikoyan divided his team into two groups- one group did further studies of the swing-wing design and the other group studied the same design, but with delta wings and lift jets instead of the swing wing. Mikoyan's nephew, Vano Mikoyan, was placed in charge of both teams. As jet lift had already been flight tested, it was agreed to fly that version first while the other team refined its work on the swing-wing version. The jet lift version was designated in-house as izdeliye 23-01 (a reuse of the Ye-7's designation) and had a single Khachaturov R-27F afterburning turbojet as the main cruise engine with 11,400 lbs of thrust and two Kolesov RD36 lift engines mounted in the mid-fuselage and angled 5 degrees forward from vertical to provide a slight forward thrust vector. A dorsal aft-hinged door opened up during flight along with auxillary inlet doors to provide air for the lift engines which exhausted through a belly-mounted grid of vectorable deflector vanes that could also direct lift engine thrust forward for braking on landing. 

 

Because the new Sapfir radar system was larger than any radar system used previously, a nose inlet was impossible and the 23-01 had half circle lateral intakes with a central shock cone similar to that fitted to the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and the Dassault Mirage series of fighters. To augment the lift from the delta wing of the 23-01, the flaps were blown with engine bleed air when lowered. The delta wing resembled that of the MiG-21, but was scaled up for the increased size and weight of the 23-01 design. While there was no radar system aboard the 23-01 nor were there any fire control avionics, a 23mm cannon was fitted under the fuselage just aft of the cockpit and dummy K-23 missiles were fitted under the wings (the K-23 had the NATO designation AA-7 Apex and in operational Russian service was designated R-23). The 23-01 prototype was even painted in the light gray color used by the air defense units of the Soviet Air Force and it made its first flight on 3 April 1967. 

The 23-01's flight test program revealed that it flew just as poorly as the MiG-21 STOL demonstrator that proceded it, the Ye-7. Test pilots noted a considerable amount of instability bordering on loss of control on takeoff due to interactions between the lift jets and the wings. On landing, it was found that the exhaust of the lift jets was getting ingested into the main engine, robbing it of power. The only solution was to increase the landing speed, but then this negated any STOL benefit of having lift engines! Pilots expressed concern at what to do in case of the loss of one of the lift engines on takeoff or landing before the wing had generated sufficient lift. At altitude the lift engines were deadweight and it compromised the maneuverability of the 23-01. The short flight test program confirmed Artyom Mikoyan's favoring of the swing wing configuration, but the aircraft continued flying until the 23-01 could be demonstrated to the public at the Moscow Domodedovo air show in July 1967. With its operational color scheme and weapons loadout, the Soviet Air Force announced its designation as the MiG-23PD, giving Western analysts the impression it was a possible production type. In fact, NATO even went as far to assign the 23-01 the code name "Faithless" as a result, believing that jet lift would be a feature of the MiG-23! After the air show, the 23-01 was retired and donated to the Moscow Aviation Institute for maintenance training and subsequently got scrapped. 

The first flight of the world's first production variable-geometry aircraft, the General Dynamics F-111, in December 1964 showed TsAGI's original 1961 report in error and work on the swing wing version of the 23-01, designated in-house by Mikoyan as the 23-11, was increased. In fact, the Mikoyan designers scrutinized every photograph and inflight footage of the F-111 to determine how the Americans had solved problems that TsAGI only 3 years earlier deemed too difficult to overcome with present technology. The 23-11 made its first flight on 10 June 1967 only one month before the STOL 23-01 was unveiled to the public at Domodedovo. The 23-11 became the first production version of the MiG-23, the MiG-23S (S referring to the Sapfir radar) which used most of the fuselage of the 23-01 and the empennage but added lateral box inlets and a new swing wing. NATO would assign the MiG-23 the code name "Flogger".

The flight test program of the MiG-23/23-11 showed that swing wings very closely approached the field performance of the jet lift STOL 23-01. While the 23-01 at a takeoff run of 1,500 feet, the MiG-23 had a takeoff run of 1,800 feet. Landing the 23-01 required 1,100 feet and the MiG-23 could do it in 1,400 feet. In addition, the MiG-23 proved to be a far more versatile design on account of the performance accorded by its variable geometry wings. Nevertheless, the jet lift 23-01 remains an unusual historical aviation curiosity that fooled NATO into thinking it was the production configuration of the MiG-23!

Source: OKB Mikoyan: A History of the Design Bureau and its Aircraft by Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov. Midland Publishing, 2009, p255-257. 

One of the unique features of the Mikoyan MiG-23/27 Flogger fighter aircraft is that compressed air for the pneumatic systems is stored inside the main undercarriage legs and axles. The main pneumatic system fed off a 12.1 liter "bottle" inside the right undercarriage leg to operate the cabin pressurization, canopy operation, moving the sliding panels that cover the gaps on the variable-geometry wings, the main wheel brakes, main fuel valve, braking parachute deployment, activating the emergency drive for hydraulic system and closing the air vents in the avionics bays. A smaller 1.75 liter "bottle" inside the right wheel axle supplied compressed air to the radar bay and avionics heat exchanger which used fuel as coolant.

A 12.1 liter "bottle" in the left main undercarriage leg supplied compressed air for emergency lowering of the landing gear, folding of the ventral fin and operation of the brakes. A smaller 1.75 liter "bottle" in the left wheel axle supplemented the emergency systems on the Flogger. The main valve to fill the compressed air circuits in both main landing gears was located in the left main wheel well.

Source: MiG-23/27 Flogger- Soviet Swing Wing Fighter/Strike Aircraft by Yefim Gordon and Keith Dexter. Midland Publishing/Aerofax, 2005, p52.