Proving the Harrier Carrier

Admiral Zumwalt, CNO 1970-74

When Admiral Elmo Zumwalt become the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in April 1970, it was a time of looming fiscal austerity as the Vietnam War commanded the resources of the Department of Defense. In the background of the attention Southeast Asia required of the US armed forces also came a significant build up of the Soviet Navy's submarine fleet. In the event of any outbreak of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, the North Atlantic sea lanes would be a vital logistical link between the United States and its forward deployed forces in Europe. Lacking a significant blue water projection force like the American carrier battle groups, the Soviet Navy embarked on a massive submarine build up to not only counter the carriers but also provide a stealthy means of cutting the North Atlantic sea lanes to disrupt the supply of NATO forces in Europe. When Admiral Zumwalt become the CNO, he was juggling both the Soviet submarine threat as well as the Vietnam War. The election of President Nixon meant that an eventual draw down in Vietnam was coming and that Navy needs needed to focus on future threats like the Soviet submarine force. There was a considerable debate on how to do this in light of the massive budgetary drain Southeast Asia had been on the nation. The three previous officers to hold the CNO position were naval aviators- Zumwalt was a surface combatant officer who saw antisubmarine warfare as the key to offsetting the Soviet submarine threat. Some wanted expansion of the super carrier fleet, others like Admiral Hyman Rickover pushed for expansion of the American nuclear submarine fleet. The problem was that all those options were expensive. 

Zumwalt championed what was called the Sea Control Ship (SCS) which was a modern equivalent of the escort carriers of the Second World War. Initial naval studies had looked at destroyer-sized vessels with small flight decks, but by 1972 the SCS concept had evolved into 17,000 ton vessel just under 700 feet in length that could embark sixteen ASW helicopters and five Harriers for self-defense. The SCS would not have catapults or arresting gear as these would drive up the expense as well as the size of the SCS concept. Like an aircraft carrier, there would be a spacious hangar deck but the cost of the SCS would be capped at $100 million which in those days was about a tenth the cost of the new Nimitz class super carriers. The lower cost meant a class of eight could easily be built and quickly to take up ASW patrols in the North Atlantic. 

The USS Guam under way with her Harriers

With the support of the Secretary of Defense, Zumwalt had the helicopter assault ship USS Guam (LPH-9) transformed into an interim Sea Control Ship to demonstrate the concept in 1972. The USMC's recent acquisition of the AV-8A Harrier for close air support dovetailed perfectly into Zumwalt's SCS concept. Given that one of the major reasons the Marines wanted the Harrier was for its flexible basing away from air base runways, the deck of an amphibious assault ship was just as good as any dispersed basing scheme for Marine Harriers. VMA-513, the first Marine Corps Harrier squadron, became operational with the AV-8A the year prior and were selected to form a detachment to deploy on the USS Guam. The pilots working with naval engineers working on the SCS program created a Frensel lens landing aid that floated in oil for self-stabilization and projected a glideslope from the deck of the Guam. The Harrier detachment operated off the Guam for a total of over 170 sorties in day and night with the initial workups taking place off the coast of South Carolina near VMA-513's base at MCAS Beaufort. After this first phase, the Guam then deployed to the rough sea conditions of the North Atlantic and the AV-8As performed flawlessly. Despite being primarily close-air support tasked, VMA-513 worked on air combat tactics including the use of vectoring the nozzles in forward flight (VIFFing) to increase the maneuverability of the AV-8A in a dogfight. Wired to also carry AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, the AV-8As during the Guam deployment to the North Atlantic even made intercepts of Soviet Tu-95 Bear and Tu-16 Badger maritime reconnaissance aircraft. 

Though the deployment aboard the USS Guam was successful in proving the SCS concept, it was Admiral Zumwalt's retirement in 1974 that ended the SCS program despite preliminary contracts being issued to shipyards for SCS vessels. Zumwalt's replacement, Admiral James Holloway, was a naval aviator and Rickover student. Given Admiral Rickover's tremendous influence in the Navy, his opposition to the SCS concept ended the program in 1974. Despite the end of the SCS, the Marines continued to send Harrier detachment to sea to gain shipboard operating experience. In 1976, for example, Harriers embarked with the air wing of the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt to develop ways of integrating V/STOL operations during launch and recovery operations. 

AV-8A Harriers on the aft of the flight deck of the USS Nassau

But that wasn't quite the end of the Sea Control Ship concept in the United States even though the Royal Navy commissioned the Invincible class V/STOL carriers, with the lead ship HMS Invincible launching in 1977. In early 1981, the NATO allies had pointed out that US wasn't honoring its defense commitment to have two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. Tensions in the Middle East at that time meant one of the Mediterranean carriers was in the Indian Ocean, leaving on a single carrier in the Mediterranean. At a meeting on an unrelated matter in Washington, the Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Marine Corps and the CNO came to discuss issue and the question arose if the defense commitment could be met if some Harrier squadrons were deployed on one of the new Tarawa-class amphibious assault carriers. VMA-231 had just returned from a shipboard deployment during a NATO exercise when they got word they'd be heading back out on the USS Nassau (LHA-4). They were paired up with another Marine Harrier squadron, VMA-542, that was recalled in short order from training at Twentynine Palms in California. With VMA-231 having recent shipboard experience, they took the lead in transforming the USS Nassau into a big Harrier carrier. Since no previous vessel since the USS Guam SCS trials in 1972 had operated so many Harriers as an air wing, the Navy augmented the deck crew of the Nassau with those with experience on the super carrier fleet. The notice for the two squadrons to deploy was short (the commander of VMA-231 told his superior that they could go to sea in 48 hours or as soon as an amphibious assault ship was available) that the whole concept was worked on at sea as the USS Nassau transited the Atlantic for the Mediterranean. By the time the reached their operational patrol area, the crew could launch eight Harriers in only 100 seconds and recover the same number of Harriers in just over two minutes. Because the Harrier wasn't as dependent upon the wind over the deck as conventional aircraft on a large super carrier, the Nassau's battle group had a great deal of tactical flexibility for maneuver during the flight operations than what would normally be the case for a conventional carrier battle group. The Sixth Fleet that was in charge of Mediterranean operations was impressed with the Marines' work and the ad hoc air wing spent 103 days on patrol before being relieved by a conventional carrier battle group. During the patrol, the Nassau's air wing screened for the USS Saratoga off the coast of Libya and participated in exercises to demonstrate the Harrier's ability to surge sorties against land targets. Using a bombing range in Tunisia, the two Marine Harrier squadrons surged sixty sorties in eight hours. The Nassau deployment had a great influence on two NATO allies that would eventually get their own Harrier carriers- Spain and Italy. Today, Marine AV-8B Harrier IIs routinely deploy as part of the Aviation Combat Element (the air wing of an amphibious assault ship) at sea. 

Source: Harrier II: Validating V/STOL by Lon O. Nordeen. Naval Institute Press, 2006, pp 33-38. Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events 1946-2000 by Norman Palomar. Potomac Books, 2008, pp 294-295. Photos: Wikipedia, Rolls Royce, USMC.

The Marine Corps Bet on the Harrier

Hawker P.1172 Kestrel in KES markings

For a large part of the postwar history of American military aviation, the procurement of non-American aircraft was an unusual exception. I had written back in 2011 about the efforts that led to the selection of the Dassault Falcon 20 jet as the basis of the US Coast Guard's HU-25 Guardian medium range search-and-rescue aircraft.  The two most significant prior examples of non-American aircraft procurement were the Martin B-57 Canberra selected by the USAF as its new interdiction bomber in 1951 and the selection of the Hawker AV-8A Harrier which entered service with the Marine Corps in 1971. The story of the Marine Corps' evaluation and procurement of the Harrier is one that readily demonstrates the Marines' political savvy in navigating the treacherous waters of Congressional funding as well as a single-minded commitment to efficient close air support to the Marines on the ground. The predecessor of the Harrier was the Hawker-funded P.1127 Kestrel demonstrator. Two prototypes and four development aircraft were built and then followed by nine more developed P.1127 airframes which in 1963 were to be part of what was called the Kestrel Evaluation Squadron (KES). The aircraft were designated Kestrel FGA Mk1 and the KES was staffed with test pilots from the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, the US Navy, US Army, US Air Force, and the German Luftwaffe. Because there were three nations in the Kestrel Evaluation Squadron, it was also referred to as the Tripartite Evaluation Squadron (TES). The unit was formed in 1965 for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of a V/STOL combat aircraft. 

At the time of the KES flight program, Lt. Col. Thomas Miller was assigned to the US Marine Corps' Air Weapons Systems Requirements Branch at the headquarters. It was the job of the staff of this department to review all the latest research and development to see what sort of equipment would be useful to the Marines. Miller and a fellow officer, Lt. Col. John Metzko, had gotten hold of film footage from the British Embassy in Washington DC of the Kestrels in action. By this point, the RAF had committed to getting the Kestrel operational with a more developed aircraft called the Harrier. They had monitored the P.1127 Kestrel program despite not having any Marine pilots in the evaluation squadron and when it became clear the RAF was going to go forward with the Harrier, they immediately briefed the USMC Deputy Chief of Aviation who was none other than General Keith McCutcheon. I had written about him recently as the "Father of Modern Close Air Support" and needless to say, given General McCutcheon's background as a passionate advocate for the Marines' own close air support, he was readily on board to find out more about the Harrier. The next step was the brief the Commandant of the Corps, General Leonard F. Chapman. With the enthusiastic support of the Commandant, the Marines then set about on getting flight time on the new Harrier. The British were adamant that anyone who would be evaluating the Harrier be a qualified test pilot and working through the defense liasons at the British Embassy and Hawker Siddeley, Miller and Marine test pilot Lt. Col. Bud Baker were chosen to head to the UK. Miller's test flying experience was getting the A-4 Skyhawk and F-4 Phantom into Marine service, so he was well versed in what an aircraft had to be able to do to support the Marines on the ground. At the request of the British, the two Marines would clandestinely make 10 flights each in the Harrier and would wear civilian clothing during their stay in Britain during their evaluation. Test pilot John Farley of the Royal Aircraft Establishment worked with Miller and Baker to prepare them for their Harrier flights. It was Farley who made the first flight of the P.1127 Kestrel prototypes in 1964 and he would come to amass 19 years of experience as a Harrier test pilot. 

Gen. McCutcheon, USMC Deputy Chief of Aviation

Miller and Baker realized very quickly during their flights that the Harrier was a new breed of combat aircraft that Marines had to have. To them, it could do everything the A-4 Skyhawk could do but not need a 6,000 foot runway to do it. All it needed was a 1,000 foot strip for rolling STOL takeoffs with an increased weapon load or the deck of an amphibious assault carrier. It was clearly close air support that could not only go where the Marines were, but be readily based close to where the Marines were in action. To get their hands on the Harrier, the Marines needed funding. Not only did the Marines have to deal with the US Navy since the Marine Corps is a department of the Navy, but they weren't sure how the US aircraft industry would react to the Corps wanting a British aircraft. After briefing Commandant Chapman, they met with the Presidential Scientific Advisory Board to get their support.

Fortunately the Navy was receptive and sent over their own team to fly the Harrier as well which allowed them to compare with their earlier Kestrel flights as part of the KES. Also fortuitous for the Marines was that a Marine was in charge of the Navy's A-4 Skyhawk program, Col. Edwin Harper, and he got to fly the Harrier as well, giving him the unique perspective of comparing the Skyhawk with the Harrier. With the ready support of the Navy in 1969, the Marines now had to lobby Congress for the funding. The FY1970 budget didn't have any money for Harrier procurement, but Harper, Miller, Baker and General McCutcheon briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee anyway. McCutcheon made his pitch to the chairman, Senator Barry Goldwater, that he didn't want just a handful of Harriers and do an evaluation. That'd been done already. "We want to buy a whole slug of them and get started and have a meaningful program!" 

Rep. Mendel Rivers (D-South Carolina) crucial to the Harrier program

Though the FY1970 Department of Defense budget was set at their time of their briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the support of the Presidential Scientific Advisory Board insured that supplemental funding was secured as an amendment to the FY1970 budget bill. The supplemental funding was enough to procure 12 Harrier jets at a cost of $57.6 million. But there was a catch- the money was secured via the Marines canceling procurement of 17 McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs. It would be necessary to win over McDonnell Douglas. As part of getting Congressional support, the House Armed Services Committee was also briefed on the Harrier plans and the chairman of the House committee, Representative Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, would support the procurement of the 12 Harriers as long as future Harrier buys were aircraft built in the United States. Realizing that the Marines was a significant ground breaking sale into the US defense market, Hawker Siddeley immediately sent representatives to the United States to canvas the aircraft industry and find an American partner for the AV-8A Harrier program. Hawker's team met with eight aircraft manufacturers and narrowed the list down to three- Ling-Temco-Vought, Grumman, and McDonnell Douglas. Hawker felt McDonnell Douglas was the best fit given their naval aircraft experience and at the time, the A-4 Skyhawk program was starting to wind down and the AV-8A Harrier would be good transition for McDD. On 29 September, Hawker Siddeley and McDonnell Douglas signed a 15-year agreement to cooperate on the AV-8A Harrier program. In tandem with this agreement came one from Rolls Royce to team up with Pratt and Whitney on the Pegasus engine. The teams developed a plan to transition production of the Marine's AV-8A Harrier flight as well as the Pegasus engine from UK production to US production over a span of five years. With a planned buy of 114 AV-8A Harriers, it was found by Representative Mendel Rivers' staff that it was cheaper to stick with UK manufacture instead of phasing in production in the United States. During the FY1971 budget debate, discussions centered on the pros and cons of moving production to the United States and eventually Congress agreed with Mendel Rivers' analysis that there was no need to phase in production of the AV-8A in the United States. Though the agreement never resulted in US production, it did lay down the foundations for the later AV-8B Harrier II program. 

AV-8A Harriers of VMA-513, the first USMC Harrier unit

With Mendel Rivers' support now behind them, McDonnell Douglas agreed to become the engineering group responsible for product support of the AV-8A Harrier which was more than adequate compensation for the 17 canceled Phantoms. The AV-8A Harrier first entered service in 1971 at the Navy's Flight Test Center at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland while the first Harrier squadrons prepared for the transition to the AV-8A. The first operational Marine Corps squadron was VMA-513 "Flying Nightmares" which had been flying the F-4 Phantom since 1963. VMA-513 become operational with the AV-8A Harrier in May 1971 at MCAS Beaufort in Representative Mendel Rivers' home state of South Carolina. 

Source: Harrier II: Validating V/STOL by Lon O. Nordeen. Naval Institute Press, 2006, pp 23-30. Photos: Wikipedia, USMC.

Major General Keith B. McCutcheon, Father of Modern Close Air Support

Major General Keith "Frank" McCutcheon, USMC

Here's another face virtually unknown to aviation history but very important- this is Marine Corps Major General Keith B. McCutcheon, the architect of modern close air support as we know it. During World War II, most air strikes against targets on the battlefield were called "direct air support" or DAS against preplanned targets with no guidance from the boots on the ground. Even the air strikes in support of the island hopping campaign in the Pacific were DAS-type missions.

In 1942 the Marine Corps began experimenting with ALPs- Air Liason Parties, who were specially trained Marines who used radios and smoke markers to direct pilots to targets. In 1943, they made their combat debut on the island of Bougainville during the Solomon Islands campaign. But their use was limited and faced strong operational opposition from the Army. In fact, the Army's operational manual at the time recommended against close air support for fear of friendly fire casualties. 

Army resistance to CAS doctrine eased in 1944, when Lieutenant Colonel Keith McCutcheon formalized the training of the Marine Corps ALPs. He pulled together all that had been written about the use of the ALPs in at Bougainville and developed a formal curriculum and training plan. Any Marine aviator that was performing CAS missions had to prove their abilities through intensive training under McCutcheon's close eye. At the time, the Marines were working with the Army's 1st Cavalry Division clearing Luzon of Japanese forces. His commanding officer, Colonel Clayton Jerome, asked him to come up with a way of using close air support to cover the 1st Cavalry Division's left flank. His operational experience at that point was flying combat missions in the Dauntless dive bomber in support of Marines during the liberation of the Philippines. Despite what appeared to be limited experience, McCutcheon had a keen sense of the needs of the infantryman, he considered the pilots in his charge Marines first and aviators second. In a short period of time, McCutcheon and his staff wrote five training manuals and eleven supplements for pilots on close air support doctrine and the training even applied to ground personnel attached to the ALPs. McCutcheon wanted everyone from the pilot in the cockpit to the radioman on the ground to thoroughly understand each other's jobs and abilities before going to combat. Over 500 men from Marine Air Group 24 and the Army's 37th Division were trained in just two months in the midst of the Philippine campaign from October to December 1944. The improved ALPs went into operational use for the first time during Marine Corps action on the main Philippine island of Luzon in February 1945.  

McCutcheon himself as head of Marine Air Group 24 flew combat missions in the Douglas SBD Dauntless who had their targets called in by ALPs in radio-equipped Jeeps moving with ground units. As a result, during the battles on Luzon, McCutcheon's SBD pilots quickly gained a reputation for lethal accuracy in the battlefield.

McCutcheon's methods were further refined during the Korean War with not just ALPs but also airborne ALPs we know know as FACs- Forward Air Controllers. In Korea, the FACs were usually North American T-6 Texans. By the time of the arrival of Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawk and F-4 Phantom units in Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1965, the squadrons were organized into Marine Air Groups (MAGs)- a Marine Air Group was made up usually of one type of aircraft and was tasked to fight at least 90 days in support of a Marine brigade. Several MAGs formed a Marine Air Wing (MAW). And in Vietnam in 1965, MAW-1 was headquartered at Da Nang AB and led by none other than Keith McCutcheon himself.

As the commanding general of Marine Air Wing 1, McCutcheon protected his air assets with zeal to keep them from being subordinated to the USAF and US Navy. Despite numerous "official" moves to strip the Marine Corps of their autonomy, in practice, 70% of Marine CAS missions in Vietnam were in support of Marines and controlled by Marines.

In 1970 McCutcheon was to get his fourth star as but was unable to assume his final post as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps due to ill health. In recognition of his distinguished career and what he did for Marine aviation, Congress passed special legislation to have McCutcheon listed as a retired full four star general anyway. He got his fourth star on 1 July 1971 and passed away from cancer less than two weeks later. He was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery.

Source: Frank B. McCutcheon: Crusader for US Marine Corps Close Air Support, Command and Control by Julie M. La Point, USMC Command and Staff College, 2002. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support by B. Franklin Cooling. DIANE Publishing, 1990. Photo: Wikipedia

Operation MARHUK: The Combat Debut of the Marine's AH-1J SeaCobra

Marine SeaCobras took a beating operating at sea

The first US Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra gunships in action were actually AH-1Gs which were ordered by the Marines in 1967- having closely watched the Army development of the Cobra gunship, 72 helicopters were requested for one helicopter attack squadron in each of its three Marine Air Wings. Despite having the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, Defense Secretary McNamara overruled the decision and only allowed the Marines to order 38 of the single-engined AH-1G variant. With the first Marine AH-1Gs going into action in Vietnam in April 1969, reports from the field couldn't have been more salutatory in the effectiveness of the Cobra gunship. Based on that initial experience, the Marines wanted a more powerful Cobra- one with twin engines, Marine avionics, a rotor brake for shipboard operations and a harder-hitting gun in the undernose turret. After overcoming the resistance of an obstinate Secretary McNamara, the AH-1J SeaCobra went into production with the first examples undergoing combat evaluation in South Vietnam in February 1971. With the onset of the Easter invasion by North Vietnam of the south and the American response, Operation Linebacker, the first Marine helicopter attack squadron, HMA-369 based in Okinawa, was called upon shortly after its establishment to conduct offensive operations against North Vietnam. 

The USMC had the AH-1J built from the start to operate from ships

At the time, Army Cobra gunship were operating in South Vietnam against the invasion thrusts of the North Vietnamese Army. Despite having just received its new AH-1J SeaCobras, Admiral John McCain, Jr, head of the US Pacific Command, wanted to make sure that the blockade of North Vietnam was complete. Even though carrier aircraft had sown mines closing Haiphong Harbor, the North's main port, the North Vietnamese had resorted to having Chinese and Soviet cargo ships anchor offshore various locations and cargo would be offloaded into smaller sampans for transfer to the shore. This way the mined sea lanes could be avoided. Because fixed wing carrier aircraft were urgently needed for Operation Linebacker attacks on North Vietnam, it was decided that the AH-1J SeaCobra would be ideal for the role of maritime interdiction off the coast of North Vietnam. In the entire Pacific theatre, only HMA-369 in Okinawa had suitable helicopters for the job and Operation MARHUK (Marine Hunter-Killer) was born. It would be the Bell AH-1J SeaCobra's baptism of fire and off the coast of the heavily defended North Vietnamese coast, no less. 

HMA-369's "Marhuker" patch

 HMA-369 originally wanted a helicopter carrier to be based on for Operation MARHUK, but the Navy's LPHs were heavily committed else where and the 18 officers, 99 men and seven AH-1J SeaCobras of HMA-369 that were ready to deploy in June 1972 were shoehorned into the amphibious transport ship USS Denver (LPD-9). Marine brass give the squadron officers a blank check to do what ever was necessary to get HMA-369 to the war zone and the nickname "Marhukers" was given to the officers who improvised and bent and possibly broke many rules to make their SeaCobras combat ready. Even 5-inch Zuni rockets were procured, a weapon that had not yet been cleared for use from the AH-1J. The ship and its escorts would be positioned near the Hong La anchorage further south down the coast from Haiphong. Here Chinese and Soviet merchant ships anchored offshore and North Vietnamese sampans offloaded cargo offshore to bring into Hong La. Since the rules of engagement forbade hitting the merchant ships, the SeaCobras stayed at least 500 yards away from the ships and remained overwater the whole time as the North Vietnamese had heavy AAA guns on  the shoreline. The SeaCobras operated in pairs and would sink the sampans with their Zuni rockets and 20mm undernose cannon. The pilots were also trained to call in naval gunfire and air strikes while the gunners in front seats of the AH-1Js focused on the sampans. After several weeks, the shore-based heavy AAA guns learned not to fire on the SeaCobras thanks to the naval fire support and air strikes the pilots would call in. 

In August 1972 HMA-369 moved to the USS Cleveland (LPD 7) and then again to the USS Dubuque (LPD 8). Over the course of Operation MARHUK, the AH-1J SeaCobras were called on to provide air cover for downed aviators in the North as well as functioning as forward air controllers for Navy strike aircraft. Missions ranged from 80 miles north of the DMZ to as far north as 80 miles south of Hanoi inland! When Operation MARHUK ended on 26 January 1973 with the end of Operation Linebacker II, nearly 1,000 sorties had been flown with 123 sampans sunk, further straining the logistics of North Vietnam that eventually drove them to the bargaining table. It was quite a stunning debut for the AH-1J SeaCobra. 

Source: Helicopter Gunships: Deadly Combat Weapon Systems by Wayne Mutza. Specialty Press, 2010, p72-76.

Unlike the Navy's F-4 Phantoms which operated from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Phantoms of the US Marine Corps operated from two land bases in support of Marine troops- Da Nang and Chu Lai. Da Nang housed both USAF and USMC units and in the summer of 1966, Chu Lai was built to relieve the congestion at Da Nang- the first Marine Phantom and Skyhawk units at Chu Lai, though, had to use SATS- short airfield for tactical support- which was pretty much the elements of a carrier deck from the catapults and arresting gear used on a land based. The SATS equipment was used until the main runway at Chu Lai was completed in the following year.

Marine Phantoms sat "hot pad alert" at both Chu Lai and Da Nang. The Phantoms were usually loaded with a combination of Mk.82 Snakeye bombs and napalm. At each end of the runways were revetments for the alert Phantoms that allowed them to start up and head out immediately on the runway.

Marine crews rotated eight hour shifts on hot pad alert. There were at least two crews sitting in a ready room adjacent to the hot pad fully suited up and waiting for the urgent call for air support by a Marine unit in the field. The F-4s were full preflighted at the start of each eight hour period and the same ground crews worked the same eight hour shifts to keep the planes "cocked and ready". Once the alert bell went off, the crews made the short run to their aircraft where the plane captains got them strapped in while the RIO got the information on the target, the forward air controller to contact and the necessary frequencies while the pilot got the big fighter started up. Once cleared by the tower and the chocks were pulled, the two alert Phantoms rolled out and onto the runway for an afterburner takeoff. With practice, the flight and ground crews could get the alert Phantoms airborne within five minutes of the alert bell going off.

Should the alert crews be launched, there were two back up flight crews, one on 15-minute alert and one on one-hour alert. As soon as the alert Phantoms were launched, a new pair of aircraft were rolled onto the hot pad already armed and fueled and preflighted by the ground crews. The flight crew on 15-minute alert then became the new alert crew and the one-hour alert crew moved up to the 15-minute spot. If things in the field were hectic (like it was during the siege of the Marine Corps firebase at Khe Sanh, there would a crew on 30-minute alert as well.

Over the course of a week, both the A-4 Skyhawk and F-4 Phantom USMC squadrons in residence at Chu Lai and Da Nang rotated hot pad alert and at Da Nang, the F-4s of the USAF's 366th Tactical Fighter Wing also shared the hot pad alert.

The Marines also had a hot pad for air-to-air alerts for MiG activity, but this was rarely used as the Navy BARCAP (barrier combat air patrol) shouldered most of the patrols for the occasional MiG activity. It got to the point that the Marines just parked a hangar queen Phantom on the air-to-air pad for appearances!

Source: Gray Ghosts: US Navy and Marine Corps F-4 Phantoms by Peter E. Davies. Schiffer Publishing, 2000, p83-101.