Alaska Airlines Selects the MD-80

N936AS in its delivery colors

The 1985 delivery of the first McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft to Seattle-based Alaska Airlines came on the heels of one of the most remarkable coups ever pulled by an airline on an manufacturer to get a good deal. Normally much is made about manufacturers making a crucial sale with an airline, but when it came to Alaska getting the MD-80, the real story was how the airline got a deal that was so good, McDonnell Douglas lost money on the Alaska sale. In 1983, the airline's management formed a team to select a new aircraft that would eventually replace the Boeing 727-100/200 as the flagship of the Alaska fleet. The two candidate aircraft that vied for the contract were the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 and the Boeing 737-300, at the time both new aircraft a generation later in terms of technology and efficiency over the 727s that shouldered the bulk of Alaska's passengers. The scope of the procurement would be the largest order in Alaska's history as prior aircraft purchases were made in small batches, often for used aircraft. The selection process created a tremendous amount of discord in the Seattle headquarters as each aircraft had its proponents for very good reasons. 

Many of Alaska's technical staff and pilot corps were pro-Boeing, understandable given that the airline's long history and experience with not just the Boeing 727-100/200, but also the 737-200 as well. The belly cargo capacity of the 737 with its wider fuselage was much appreciated particularly on the routes between Alaska and the Lower 48 states. But the 737-300 was about twenty seats short of the passenger capacity Alaska desired. The 737 variant that met the airline's capacity requirement was the 737-400, but in 1983-84, that variant had yet to be launched (that would happen with Piedmont's launch order in 1986) which was too far in the future for Alaska's timetable. 

N933AS in the Alaska's livery at time of the first deliveries

The McDonnell Douglas MD-80 did meet Alaska's capacity specification and the marketing department of the airline liked the idea of its five-abreast seating which meant each seat row had only one unpopular middle seat. However, the MD-80's narrower fuselage placed significant constraints on belly cargo space. On the routes between Alaska and the US West Coast, belly cargo revenue was nearly as important as passenger revenue. At the time Alaska began its selection process in 1983, the MD-80 program was having a sales drought and there were even rumors in the industry about the MD-80 production line getting shut down. American Airlines' ground-breaking order that saved the MD-80 program was still about a year and a half in the future. This meant that Alaska's order was potentially the most significant yet for the MD-80 program and many in the leadership at McDonnell Douglas were keen to stick it to Boeing by landing a large order with an airline right in Boeing's backyard. Compared to the 737-300 which was selling very well with a healthy backlog, the slower sales of the MD-80 meant that McDonnell Douglas could guarantee a much earlier delivery than Boeing could offer with the 737-300.

1/400 scale model of an Alaska MD-83.

The three most important factors for Alaska came down to passenger capacity, delivery timeframe, and the deal clincher, price. And this is where Alaska scored its coup. Alaska's team knew that McDonnell Douglas was not only eager for an MD-80 sale, they were also wanting desperately a big order with Alaska to rub it in Boeing's face. There are four variants in the MD-80 family- the MD-81 was the initial production version, the MD-82 was an increased gross weight version of the MD-81, the MD-83 was an extended range version of the MD-82, and the later MD-88 had an EFIS cockpit (Delta launched this variant). Through the negotiation process as the deal swung in favor of McDonnell Douglas, the company based its planned contract with Alaska on the MD-82 variant. Alaska, however, knew McDonnell Douglas was coming out with the MD-83 and that was the variant the airline really wanted thanks to its longer range. When Alaska's team arrived in Long Beach for the final negotiations, the sales team presented Alaska with a letter of intent for an initial order of six MD-82s. That's when Alaska pulled out their ace card and told McDonnell Douglas they'd only sign to finalized the deal if they got the MD-83 and only if the MD-83s were at the same price as the MD-82. Backed into a corner, McDonnell Douglas relented and Alaska Airlines became the launch customer for the MD-83 variant. The initial order would be for nine aircraft- the first two to be delivered (N930AS and N931AS) were financed by a Japanese leasing agency while the other six were paid for out of Alaska's financial reserves. 

In Robert Serling's great book on the history of Alaska Airlines, he relates that once the deal for the MD-83 was signed, the CEO of Alaska, Bruce Kennedy, had to meet with the iconic head of Boeing, Thornton Wilson (or as most people knew him as just "T" given his personality) to break the news. Wilson grumbled to Kennedy "Damn it, Bruce, you know we build better airplanes then they do!" Kennedy responded that McDonnell Douglas was more aggressive on price and that the MD-80's seating capacity more closely matched the 727-200 than the 737-300 did. Serling wrote that Wilson cooled down and replied "Well, Bill Allen (a past CEO of Boeing) told me years ago never to regret a sale on which you would have lost money", something that did happen to McDonnell Douglas with the Alaska deal as they had so deeply discounted the MD-83 to make the sale. 

Alaska's first MD-80, N931AS.

Even though Alaska had signed for the MD-83, the first two aircraft delivered were actually MD-82/83 hybrids- they had the more powerful engines of the MD-83 but had smaller fuselage fuel tanks like the MD-82 get a bit more belly cargo space. The aircraft also had a new heavier landing gear than what the MD-82 had to handle the increased weight. Both aircraft were designated MD-82s, though. The first one delivered was N931AS on 20 February 1985 followed by N930AS on 29 March 1985. The delivery flight from Long Beach of N931AS turned out to be fiasco for Alaska and McDonnell Douglas as technical glitches delayed its departure for Seattle, then the water system on the aircraft failed in flight, preventing any of the toilets from flushing. In addition, to meet Alaska's timetable, the first four aircraft had less powerful engines temporarily fitted than the agreed production standard and that made for a long, slow flight to Seattle.

A total of 48 MD-80s would be operated by Alaska Airlines until the type's retirement in 2008. The most operated at any single time was 44 with one write-off, the tragic crash of Alaska 261 due to a tailplane jackscrew failure in 2000.

Related reading:

How American Airlines Saved the MD-80
Alaska's First Jet: "Seventy-Seven Hotel"
How the Lockheed Hercules Helped Open Alaska to Oil Exploration

Source: Character & Characters: The Spirit of Alaska Airlines by Robert J. Serling. Epicenter Press, 2008, pp 207-212. Fleet information from Planespotters.net. Photos: Wikipedia, JPSantiago, Joe Walker Collection/Flickr.

Flying High This Past Week: 30 March-5 April

A day late on posting the latest edition of Flying High This Past Week, but no worries, here's what's been getting a lot of hits lately here at TAILS THROUGH TIME:

• The Early History of the Air Line Pilots Association, ALPA: Quite obviously the latest article on TAILS THROUGH TIME is going to be getting the most hits in the past week! The early history of Northwest Airlines is weaved into the early history of ALPA as the founder of the union, Dave Behncke, was Northwest's first pilot and flew its first passengers in 1927. The early history of ALPA gives us a good look at the state of the airline industry in the 1920s which was just on the cusp of making the leap into greater technologies led off by the Boeing 247 and Douglas DC-3. Despite the landmark in aviation history those aircraft were, flying for many professional pilots was still a hazardous profession in the years prior and many airline heads of the day tried to do what they could to stamp out ALPA in its early days. Fortunately a strike at a small airline that ran between St. Louis and Chicago thrust ALPA into the national spotlight and won it friends in high places. 
• Francis Gary Powers: After the Return: Best known as the Lockheed U-2 pilot that was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960 that ended US overflights of the USSR, his return to the United States was less than hospitable as the Director of Central Intelligence sought to blame Powers for any number of error that resulted in his shoot down despite being cleared by a CIA damage assessment team, the USAF, and a formal board of inquiry. Recognition of Powers' integrity and bravery were finally acknowledged posthumously in 2000 on the 40th anniversary of his shoot down. Note the comment at the bottom of my article by Powers' son, Francis Gary Powers Jr, who is the founder of the Cold War Museum! 
• The First Steps to a Turboprop Transport, Part Two: The Boeing YC-97J was a Stratofreighter that was modified with Pratt & Whitney T34 turboprops so the USAF could gain operating experience with the new class of engines before the Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Douglas C-133 Cargomaster become operational. Two KC-97Gs were converted to use the same engines and propellers as what would be used on the upcoming C-133. 
• Soviet Wild Weasels, Part One: Doctrine/Tactics: This was the first part of a three article series I did back in 2010 on the differences between American and Soviet SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) doctrines. The second part looked at the aircraft that functioned as the Soviet equivalent of the Wild Weasels and the third part looked at the missiles used by those aircraft. 
• Frontier Airlines and the Boeing 737-200: In the 1970s, Denver-based Frontier Airlines (the first incarnation, not the current one flying) became one of the most significant operators of the Boeing 737-200. Originally investing in the Boeing 727-100/200, the switch to the 737-200 and its better operating economics for Frontier's route system undoubtedly helped the airline weather the economic roller coaster that buffeted the US economy in the 1970s.

The next article will be posted tomorrow night and it will cover the development of the Boeing flying boom used in air refueling. Remember, every five days a new article is posted here at TAILS THROUGH TIME and you'll never be quite sure until then where in aviation history we'll be flying!

Flying High This Past Week: 23 March-29 March

Don't forget that the new URL for TAILS THROUGH TIME is now www.tailsthroughtime.com. The old blogspot URL will still work, though. Consider it a quick NOTAM! I suppose a sign you've moved up in the blogosphere is when a Wikipedia article lists one of your articles as a source! It was an Wikipedia entry on the Pratt & Whitney J58 engine that powered the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird and my blog article on the Mach 3 Phantom proposal is listed as a reference in the sources. This past week was one of the unusual weeks that two articles get posted in a week, so obviously we'll lead off with those two articles on this week's edition of Flying High This Past Week: 

• The Rise and Fall of Mohawk Airlines and Opening the Door for Frank Lorenzo: Mohawk Airlines began operations in 1944 as Robinson Air Lines, connecting Ithaca, New York, with Teterboro Airport in New Jersey. By 1952 one of the pilots at Robinson eventually took over the airline and renamed it Mohawk following an employee contest for a new name. Mohawk and its new president, Bob Peach, were legendary among local service carriers as they were the first of the second tier of airlines to operate pure jet equipment and it was Peach's determination to operate pure jets that gained him the respect of his peers in the industry. Unfortunately circumstances would doom Mohawk to the point that it had to choose between joining its long time rival, Allegheny Airlines, or a young smooth talking New York businessman whose name became infamous in the US airline industry- Frank Lorenzo. 
• Proving the Harrier Carrier: The idea of a V/STOL equipped light carrier that is sort of like the modern day equivalent of the light escort carriers of the Second World War had its genesis in the austere budgetary environment that came at the end of the Vietnam War. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, championed a cheaper alternative to the supercarrier called the Sea Control Ship that would use the new AV-8A Harrier as the sharp point of its spear. While the Navy never went forward with the SCS concept, many of our allies paid close attention and the US Marine Corps in particular would use the experience to base the Harrier and now Harrier II aboard the big deck amphibs of the "Gator Navy".
• Two's Company and Three's A Crowd: The Boeing 737-200 Flight Crew Controversy: This article from the week before last is still getting plenty of hits. I suppose that we are all looking at the number of crew in the flight deck with a different eye these days in light of the Germanwings tragedy. 
• Operation Teaball: Network-Centric Real-Time Intelligence in Vietnam: While the tools the US military used to restore the fighting effectiveness of its combat pilots are varied, one of the more interesting tools in the renaissance of the fighter pilot in the skies over Vietnam was the use of real-time intelligence to increase the situational awareness of pilots who were operating in the skies over North Vietnam.
• The Early Days of Airbus Industrie and How the A300 Got Its Name: I don't know what interests me more- the political machinations of 1960s Europe that led to the formation of Airbus or the fact that the A300 designation sprang out of a light hearted joke. Given the juggernaut that Airbus has become in the world commercial aircraft market, it's beginnings were much less assured and much more tenuous at best. 
• How American Airlines Shaped the A300: Related to the prior linked article on the early days of Airbus Industrie, even though American Airlines didn't operate the Airbus A300 until April 1988 as the launch customer for the A300-600R variant, one of its VPs, Frank Kolk, back in the 1960s had a tremendous influence in shaping the final design of the A300. The A300 was much closer to Kolk's specification for a widebody twin that he authored in 1967 than the eventual aircraft that sprang from Kolk's requirements, the Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar. 
• The Ryan FR-1 Fireball and F2R Dark Shark: An Evolutionary Dead End: Probably the pinnacle of mixed-propulsion fighter aircraft, these two Ryan fighter designs of the Navy represented a rather simple but effective remedy to the shortfalls of jet engines in the immediate postwar era.

Remember that new blog articles are posted every five days. The next article will be going up on April 2nd, so stay tuned. And for those who missed it, this is last week's edition of Flying High This Past Week. 

Flying High This Past Week 16 March-22 March

First a bit of housekeeping. This week I switched this blog over to have its own domain name at www.tailsthroughtime.com. The previous address of aviationtrivia.blogspot.com still works and you'll get a redirect notice if you use the old link that will take you to the new URL. Now, without further ado, here's what's been getting a lot of page views this past week here at TAILS THROUGH TIME:

• Two's Company and Three's a Crowd: The Boeing 737-200 Flight Crew Controversy: Quite naturally the latest post to the blog would be the most popular in the past week! The question of whether the 737-200 required two flight crew or three created quite a bit of acrimony in the late 1960s when the aircraft was introduced. Nowhere else was the dispute more pronounced than at United Air Lines, one of Boeing's key customers for the new jet.
• The Crazy Cats: The Lockheed Neptunes of the US Army: Yes, you read that right. The *Army*. In Vietnam, the Army found that it needed a bigger and longer ranged aircraft for the SIGINT/COMINT role that today's Guardrail aircraft perform. Intraservice rivalries being what they were then, the Navy stepped up to help the Army and offered some P-2 Neptunes from stateside Reserve squadrons for modification so the Army wouldn't have to deal with what was then a very prickly USAF. The AP-2Es (a spurious designation to avoid antagonizing the USAF) were the heaviest and most complex Neptune variant to take to the skies. Many of the SIGINT/COMINT equipment used on the Army Neptunes would influence the development of the Guardrail system used today by the Army. 
• The N-20 Program: Switzerland's First Indigenous Jet Aircraft: The Federal Aircraft Factory (FAF) N-20 Aiguillon was an attractive flying wing fighter design that only got as far as taxi tests and some very short hops short of a true first flight before being canceled. The Aiguillon had two flying forebears, though, that contributed to the flight test program and development of this aborted fighter design.
• Tupolev's Own Tristar Design: It's not unusual for the Russian design bureaus (called OKBs) to reuse designations. The Tu-204 that flies today is actually the third use of that designation. The first use was for an enlarged T-tailed jet development of the Tu-134/Tu-154 and the second use of the designation was for a widebody trijet that looked very much like the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar. 
• The Rocket-Boosted P-51 Mustang: In 1945 the USAAF's Mustangs were besting the Messerschmitt Me 262 jets over their German bases where the jets were most vulnerable. As a result of augmented airfield defenses, work turned to a rocket-boosted P-51 that would have the speed to catch the Me 262 at altitude and not have to run the gauntlet of airfield defenses.
• The Legend of Half-Moon Bay: In this day and age when most of us are jaded to air travel and complaints about airlines are the norm, from the 1962 Christmas season is a unparalleled story of ingenuity and a can-do spirit by airline employees to go the extra mile. I won't spoil it here, but let's just say we'd all be hard pressed to come up with anything that equals what a small California airline pulled off that year, creating the "Legend of Half Moon Bay"!

The next TAILS THROUGH TIME article goes up tomorrow night, 23 March. Stay tuned! 

Two's Company and Three's A Crowd: The Boeing 737-200 Flight Crew Controversy

In the late 1950s and early 1960s propliners still served a lot of the shorter routes in the US domestic market as jets were becoming the fashionable on the longer routes where the time savings of the jets over propliners was most apparent. However, the travelling public was irreversibly enamored with jet aircraft for travel and soon shorter domestic routes would be singing with jet noise- the first designs for the medium-range domestic routes, the Convair 880 and the Boeing 720, were too large and uneconomical to operate on short-range routes. Boeing responded with the 727 which would prove to be one of its outstanding commercial successes, but airlines were looking for an even smaller jet. By the early 1960s the Douglas DC-9, BAC 1-11, and the Sud-Aviation Caravelle were established in the market and Boeing's smallest offering, the 727-100, was too big for most short-range routes. When long-time Boeing customer American Airlines turned to Great Britain for the BAC 1-11 for a short-range jet to complement its 727 services, the engineers at Renton got yet another kick in the pants to produce an offering to compete with the twin-jets. 

With the first generation of twin-jets disproving the skeptics that thought short-range routes would too uneconomical for jets, Boeing designers aimed for a small twin jet that was more flexible than the existing competition that could not only fly into smaller communities and smaller airports, but would blend seamlessly with larger jet operations at major airports. Key in making this possible was the decision by 737 lead engineer John Steiner to make the new 737 the same cross-section as the 707 and the 727. This would give the 737 the lead in comfort by offering 3-3 seating whereas the competition could only offer 3-2 seating. For the first time, big jet comfort was possible on shorter sectors. 

A United Boeing 737-200 in its delivery livery, the Mainliner scheme.

But the design decision had an unforeseen consequence that would result in considerable controversy between the pilots, the airlines, and the FAA who would be certifying the aircraft. At the time, the FAA had imposed a limit on the size of aircraft that could be operated by a two-man flight crew- it was set at 80,000 pounds maximum takeoff weight (MTOW). This limit dictated the size of the first DC-9s and as the BAC 1-11s were below the limit, Braniff and American who had ordered One-Elevens operated them with two-man crews. Aircraft over the 80,000 pound limit required three crew in the cockpit. Boeing's original 737 proposals weighed in at 79,000 pounds, but potential customers found the design too small. Eastern and United in particular wanted a larger aircraft. Even despite a rule change by the FAA raising the two-man crew limit to 90,000 pounds, the revised 737 design needed a three-man crew as it tipped the scales at 93,000 pounds. 

In April 1965 the FAA announced that it was abolishing the weight limit criteria and from then on, aircraft would be certified for two-crew operation on an individual basis. This followed two years of deliberation and consultations with the pilots' unions, airline managers, airframe manufacturers and human factors studies. 

Of the four major airlines in the US at the time ("The Big Four"), three had already made their choices in the short-range jet category. Eastern and TWA ordered the DC-9 and American ordered the BAC 1-11. That left United as the only major interested in the 737. Of the early orders for the 737, only United's order was sizable (40 -200s ordered in 1965). Lufthansa also had a significant order, but they weren't encumbered by the FAA-mandated weight restrictions on two-man crew operations. However, United's managers found the 737 to have a political disadvantage since the pilots' unions at the time felt that as the largest of the twin jets available, it should be operated with a crew of three. While expensive for the airlines in terms of labor costs, the 737 design from the outset was intended for a two-man crew. Only a small jumpseat was available on the flight deck.

Now the third crew issue had already been visited previously before the introduction of aircraft like the 737. In the late 1950s the Lockheed Electra sparked considerable debate among its customer airlines. However, in each of the three cases, the issue was deferred- Eastern's dispute revolved around whether or not the third crew should be a pilot or a flight engineer. In the cases involving National and Western, ALPA used the two-crew issue as a test case to set a precedent (even though the Electra was never intended to be used by two pilots). National put the issue in arbitration that deferred the issue. Western's management was more inflexible and for four months a pilots' strike nearly grounded Western until it was agreed by both parties to defer the issue. So from a precedent standpoint, the impending dispute over the 737 flight deck had no prior rulings or standards to build upon for either side involved. 

In late 1965 Boeing showed a mockup of the 737 cockpit to representatives from United's ALPA union, the FAA, and airline managers. While the FAA felt that the mockup was inconclusive from a certification standpoint, the pilots' union disapproved of the two-man cockpit. A year later, a working mockup that was "functional" and more detailed to test workloads was presented and again the United pilots balked at the layout for two-crew. Not long afterward, ALPA's leadership made it the union's official recommendation that the 737 be operated with a three-man crew at all times. During this same time, the pilots' contract at United was up for negotiation and the 737 crew issue became a major stumbling block in the discussions for a new contract. To further complicate the picture, the FAA at the same time also tentatively approved two-man operation of the 737 pending the start of flight testing in 1967. 

By 1967 the dispute at United still had not been settled and a presidential mediation board was convened to help in reaching a compromise between ALPA and United's management. That summer the board failed in reconciling both sides and a strike vote taken showed 92% of United's pilots in favor of striking if the 737 couldn't be operated by a three-man crew. As an effort to reach out for a compromise, ALPA proposed to the FAA that the 737 as well as the BAC 1-11 and DC-9 be operated with a three-man crew. This proposal provoked the ire of the airlines that already had the One-Eleven and the DC-9 in service and the proposal was quietly shelved with the assent of ALPA members at those other airlines. By this point the dispute was discouraging further US sales of the 737 and indirectly helped Douglas with it's DC-9 which now offered increased capacity versions to regional airlines since it had already set the precedent for two crew operations with the first DC-9 Series 10 models. 

N9013U "Mainliner City of Charlotte"

The 737 made its maiden flight in April 1967 and over the Thanksgiving holiday week of that year, the FAA decided to run a series of tests to put the crew number issue to rest. One of the 737s was borrowed from Boeing and two-crew operations would be tested in the busy Boston-New York-Washington corridor. One pilot was from Boeing, the other pilot from the FAA. Two round-trips were made each day that week in both day and night conditions, both VFR and IFR weather conditions, as well as operations below minimum landing conditions, diversion operations, simulated instrument failures and even simulated crew incapacitation (could one pilot fly the 737 to safety). As a result of these tests, the FAA issued the following statement:

"The far-reaching evaluation of the Boeing 737 was started in September 1965, with the evaluation of the cockpit mock-up. Continuous evaluations over the past two years included regular operations of the aircraft in a high-density air traffic environment to determine workload, complexity, and safety of operations in a fail-safe concept. These flights were part of a very extensive flight-testing programme accomplished by the FAA and Boeing personnel. The technical findings coming out of these evaluations are that the aircraft can be safely flown with a minimum of two pilots."

Certification by the FAA of both the 737-100 and 737-200 followed in December 1967 for full airline operations. 

The third flight deck crew sat on the jumpseat on United 737-200s

Despite the issue being settled by the FAA, several airline pilot unions continued the crew issue as a bargaining chip in labor negotiations with airline management. Anxious to avert a strike in 1967, United reached an agreement with ALPA as part of a broader contract agreement to crew the 737-200 with a crew of three. Western Airlines, Frontier Airlines, and Wien Air Alaska were the only other US airlines bound by contract agreements with the pilots' union to use three crew in the flight deck. Frontier and Wien switched to a two-crew flight deck in 1976 and 1979 respectively. It wasn't until 1981 (ostensibly due to the impending introduction of the 737-300) that United finally went to a two-crew operation on the 737-200. At United, the third crewman sat in the jumpseat which is sited immediately in front of the cockpit door. Duties of the third crewman included preflight, performing the checklists, performance calculations (weight, balance, takeoff and landing distances, etc.) and company communications. All the relevant controls such as radio, electrical, hydraulic and other functions necessary were reachable from the jumpseat. Once United reverted to a two-crew flight deck in 1981, no modifications were necessary to the -200 cockpits.

Source: Boeing 737 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Malcolm L. Hill. Crowood Publishing, 2002, pp 23-31. Photos: Bob Garrard Collection/Flickr, JP Santiago

How Jack Steiner and Joe Sutter Defined the Boeing 737 Configuration

The Boeing 737-100 prototype

Reading aviation history books is one thing but to read about aviation history from one of the view point of someone who played a vital role can sometimes be more enjoyable. One of those books is Joe Sutter's book 747: Creating the World's First Jumbo Jet and Other Adventures from a Life in Aviation from Smithsonian Books. Long employed by Boeing, Sutter led the team of engineers that developed the Boeing 747. But before the 747 came along, Sutter was tapped by his boss, Jack Steiner, to assist with the development of the Boeing 737. The 707 was well on to insuring its place in aviation history and Steiner was flush with success with the creation and introduction of the Boeing 727. It was Steiner who realized that Boeing could create a family of airliners across sizes that could span different market segments in the growing airline industry. By 1964 many of Boeing's competitors were well ahead in the short-haul jet market with the Sud Aviation Caravelle in France having been in service since 1959, the BAC One-Eleven was in flight test in the UK and Boeing's main US rival Douglas was two years head on the development of the DC-9. At a heated and divisive 1964 meeting, half of those present wanted to proceed with the 737 and the other half felt that Boeing's energies were better focused elsewhere given the state of progress of the competition in the short haul market. According to Sutter, the decision was deferred and Jack Steiner was told to keep refining the concept in the interim. 

But that wasn't enough to Steiner. He felt that Boeing should build the 737 and he went around Boeing CEO Bill Allen and personally lobbied each of the members of the corporate board of directors. Bill Allen supported the 737 project but Steiner's determination to get the 737 built didn't win him any points with Bill Allen. But the 737 project was given the go-ahead for launch in 1965. But getting a refined project to launch wasn't easy. Conventional wisdom pointed to a rear-engined T-tail design with five abreast seating which was what the competition used as their respective configurations (though to be fair, the Caravelle's tailplane was mounted halfway down the vertical fin). With Joe Sutter assisting him, the 737's initial designs had a very similar layout. But Steiner's ideas of a family of Boeing jetliners led to divergence- the first of which was the fuselage cross-section. By using a 707 fuselage cross section, they could cut development time, but give airlines six-abreast seating which offered more capacity and operating efficiencies not possible with similarly-sized aircraft with five-abreast seating. 

But going with the 707's fuselage cross section and nose meant the 737 got a bit portly in shape and this led Steiner and Sutter to abandon rear-mounted engines for the 737. Because of the short wide fuselage, aft mounted engines would have to mounted further way from the fuselage to allow for smooth airflow into the planned Pratt and Whitney JT8D engines. This resulted in the need for more structure and more weight, which ended up offsetting the efficiencies of six-abreast seating. Sutter recalled in his book taking drawings of the 737 up to his office and cutting the engines out with scissors and moving them around to see if there was a better place for them. The most obvious alternative to Sutter was to mount them on the wings, but to use a 707-style engine pylon meant that the 737 would need a tall landing gear to sit higher off the ground. Sutter's dealing with airlines indicated that ease of loading/unloading and servicing meant that having the 737 low to the ground would be a major selling point for the planned short haul market. Having the jet lower to ground meant it could be loaded, unloaded, and serviced faster without specialized vehicles, platforms or even ladders for engine work. 

Sutter was stumped. Aft mounted engines were out. Pylon mounted wing engines were out. It donned on him there was a third solution as he moved the engine drawing cut outs around on his desk. Why not snuggle up the engines right under the wings? The key concern was safety and this was solved by putting the hot section of the JT8D behind the aft spar of the wings which meant it was behind the main wing fuel tanks in the event of an uncontained turbine failure. Sutter recalled presenting his solution to the intrigued Steiner, so they decided to do a paper "fly off"- Steiner and an assistant would work up a series of numbers on the performance and costs of a rear-mounted 737 design as the "Red Team" and Sutter and an assistant did the same with his 737 configuration as the "Blue Team". Although they gave themselves two months for the study, the answer was obvious after two weeks- mounting the JT8Ds right under the wings meant six more passengers could be carried for the given configuration. With six-abreast seating, this meant Sutter's configuration for the 737 was the clear choice and the design was locked in late 1964 in preparation for the eventual go-ahead given a few months later by the Boeing board and CEO Bill Allen. This was the design Steiner passionately believed in so much that he was willing do end runs around Bill Allen!

Both Jack Steiner and Joe Sutter shared the patent for the layout of the 737 and the design has gone on to be not just the best-selling jetliner in Boeing's product line, but as the most-produced jet airliner in history- as of April of this year, 7,147 Boeing 737s have rolled off the Renton, Washington, production line since 1967 when the prototype 737-100 rolled out.

More pictures that show the unique engine mounting of the Boeing 737-100/200 family:

On Flickr someone has posted an NAC 737-200 undergoing maintenance with an interesting shot of a "naked" JT8D still mounted on the wing. 

On JetPhotos there is a similar shot of a Malev 737-200's JT8D engine.

Source: 747: Creating the World's First Jumbo Jet and Other Adventures from a Life in Aviation by Joe Sutter with Jay Spenser. Smithsonian Books, 2006, p74-79.

Frontier and the Boeing 737-200

There was a time in the 1970s when Frontier Airlines was the one of the most significant operators of the Boeing 737 and it was on the dependable 737-200 that the airline rose to prominence to challenge the established major carriers of the day. To go from humble beginnings flying second-hand Douglas DC-3s to having the second largest route network in the United States when the first 737-200s arrived at the airline is a story that for the most part has remained hidden to history, overshadowed by the storied legacies of larger airlines like American, Delta, or United.

Frontier's first jets were actually 727-100s styled as "Arrow Jets" which first entered service with Frontier in 1966, becoming the first local service carrier to fly the 727. Route expansions (aided by the acquisition of Fort Worth-based Central Airlines in 1967) and further route authorities granted by the Civil Aeronautics Board brought about the move in 1968 to larger 727-200s. Only a year later in 1969 Lewis Dymond, president of Frontier, retired- at the helm of the airline since 1962, Dymond did much to restore the airline to profitability through the latter half of 1960s that allowed the acquisition of jet equipment. Replacing Dymond was E. Paul Burke. Burke only served at the helm of the airline for a short two years, but his legacy to the airline was his realization in 1969 that the 737-200 was far more suited to Frontier's network than the 727s. The first five 737-200s were ordered as one of his first acts as president of the airline and the 727-100s were traded in to Boeing as part of the payment for the first 737s.

The 737-200s could serve even smaller airports than the larger 727s and this allowed Frontier a more flexible aircraft for its route network- the new jets were at home flying to smaller cities like Scottsbluff, Nebraska or Grand Junction, Colorado just as easily as larger cities like Dallas or Denver. By the time the first 737-200s were delivered, in terms of cities served, Frontier had the second-largest route network in the United States.

The first 737-191s arrived in April 1969 and by 1970 had 10 737-200s on strength with the airline. By the time of Burke's departure from the executive suite in 1971, the 727s were being phased out, with the last of the 727-191s sold in 1972 and as well as the sale of the larger 727-291s to Braniff International. Succeeding Burke would be Frontier's greatest president, Al Feldman. Under Feldman's tenure from 1971 to 1979, Frontier standardized its jet equipment on the 737-200 and entered a period of impressive expansion, profitability and rise to prominence as one of the largest regional carriers in the United States. By the time of the introduction of the final Saul Bass colors in April 1978, Frontier had 32 737-200s on strength with 10 more on order. Frontier's western route network stretched into both Canada and Mexico, from California and Washington in the West to as far east as Michigan and Georgia. Denver Stapleton became one of the few three-airline major hubs of its day, with Frontier ably holding its own against incumbents Continental and United. Undoubtedly it was the flexible operating economics of the 737-200 that allowed Frontier to weather the economic turmoil that hit the industry in the early 1970s.

One item of interest was the introduction of first-class legroom in coach class on Frontier's 737-200s. The aircraft were configured for 106 passengers in a single-class layout and it proved to be immensely popular with passengers. It was just one of the many changes Al Feldman implemented in Frontier's service image that formed the foundation for its impressively profitable growth during the turbulent 1970s.

Just to think that there was a time in the 1970s when Frontier flew their 737s into cities in Colorado like Durango and Grand Junction and cities in Nebraska like Scottsbluff and Grand Island- cities that today rate only small regional prop service if at all! A lot of Frontier's 737 destinations in those days today have only small regional prop service. Quite a change from just 30 years ago for these communities!

Source: Boeing 737 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Malcolm L. Hill. Crowood Press Ltd, 2002.

The Short but Colorful Life of Western Pacific Airlines

Western Pacific Airlines was founded at under-utilized Colorado Springs Municipal Airport by a team led by one of the founders of America West Airlines, Ed Beauvais. His airline background stretched back all the way to Bonanza Airlines before its merger into Air West and ultimately led to him serving as head of America West until 1992. Western Pacific commenced operations out of Colorado Springs in April 1995 using eight 737-300s with flights to Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Oklahoma City. With the new trouble-ridden Denver International Airport 40 miles from the Denver city center to the northeast, residents living in the southern areas of the Denver metropolitan area quickly found the short one hour drive to Colorado Springs to catch a WestPac flight more convenient.

While Western Pacific did have a simple red/blue billboard livery, it was their "LogoJet" program that made the airline well-known amongst travellers and enthusiasts. For the first time, the entire exterior of an airliner was put up for rent as a flying billboard. The first customer to sign up for what WestPac called the "AirLogo Program" was the five-star Colorado Springs hotel, the Broadmoor, which was incidentally owned by one of the major investors in WestPac. But the most famous and most-photographed of the LogoJets was the Simpsons Jet. In May 1995 FOX Television needed an advertising coup for that month's Nielsen ratings sweeps for their long-running animated sitcom, The Simpsons. After a meeting with WestPac's marketing staff, FOX paid the airline $1 million to wear a scheme designed by FOX's ad department to bring attention to the TV show during the sweeps week and beyond.

As more 737-300s became available, more destinations were added to the WestPac network and the LogoJets made up a significant portion of the fleet, with customers ranging from the City of Colorado Springs and insurance companies to ski resorts and casinos. At its peak, WestPac was operating 18 737-300s out of Colorado Springs. The dramatic jump in passenger numbers brought increased attention to Colorado Springs which in 1994 had just completed a modern terminal facility to replace the dated and inadequate terminal building on the west side of the field near the FBO hangars. In no time the established majors were attracted back to the airport, much in the same way that Southwest brought traffic from other airlines back to Houston Hobby and how both Southwest and Midway revitalized Chicago Midway Airport.

The honeymoon ended after 18 months and at the end of 1996 investors who were impatient for profits ousted the management team including Ed Beauvais and a new team led by Robert Peiser moved in to reorganize the airline. The management shakeup revealed WestPac's financial health was worse than most in the industry realized. While Beauvais remained on the board of directors of WestPac, Peiser took the airline in a different direction in an effort to attract the business (thus higher revenue) passenger rather than the flocks of leisure travellers who were driving south from Denver to fly to vacation destinations in the WestPac network. One of his first moves was to scrap the LogoJet program and secondly, he moved WestPac to Denver International in an effort to attract more passengers. Some would later say that Peiser already had bankruptcy reorganization in mind and moved the airline to Denver to secure more attractive post-bankruptcy financing. After an abortive codeshare and proposed merger with Frontier Airlines, WestPac ceased operations and was eventually liquidated in February 1998.

WestPac's failure, wasn't just due to the move to Denver. The majors at Denver noticed WestPac's growing operation at Colorado Springs and lowered their fares. This, in combination with service improvements at Denver International, slowly eroded WestPac's advantages at Colorado Springs and made a move to Denver almost a necessity. Also, the Valujet crash in 1996 adversely affected customer perceptions of low-fare airlines. In the eight months preceding the shutdown, airline management made frantic moves to shift the airline from its original low-fare focus to business travel which would only deepen the debts- moving the hub to Denver, unveiling a new corporate logo and livery, converting to SABRE for reservations, and dropping several leisure markets. The merger of Frontier figured heavily in the survival plans for the airline, but wisely so as the more financially healthy airline, Frontier not only called off the merger, but also the codeshare as well. Western Pacific's demise couldn't have been prevented by staying at Colorado Springs as many former employees and city residents still believe- it was a simple case of declining yields in the face of stiff competition from the majors at Denver. And that would have been the case whether or not the airline was still at Colorado Springs or at it's final resting place at DEN.

In the end though, it's going to be the LogoJet program that will be Western Pacific's legacy to the airline industry as airlines all over the world have picked up on the idea (such as Ireland's Ryanair, for example). And of all the LogoJets, be they Western Pacific's or anyone elses to this day, the Simpsons Jet will always be the most famous.

Source: Boeing 737 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Malcom L. Hill. Crowood Press Ltd, 2002.

The Rise and Fall of Air Florida under Ed Acker

Aviation history is often a study in technology as well as events but sometimes the really fascinating parts concern the personalities and how personal traits shaped major decisions that impacted the course of history. One of the those personalities was C. Edward Acker, one of the airline industry's CEOs during the chaotic deregulation period in the United States in the 1980s. If there was one quote that summed up the titanic personality of this Texan, it was something he himself once said: "Once you get hooked on the airline business, it's worse than dope."

But to really understand what Ed Acker did to airlines, you have to go back before deregulation to the state of Florida. After twenty-some years of running various businesses ranging from a candy company to a roofing business, Miami businessman Eli Timoner decided in 1972 to start an airline called Air Florida with some second-hand Lockheed Electras. But Timoner himself admitted that his only airline experience was that of "being a frequent flier". But he had seen the rise of Pacific Southwest Airlines as an intrastate carrier in California and probably was aware of the beginnings of Southwest Airlines in Texas. By being in intrastate carrier, he wouldn't have to deal with the Civil Aeronautics Board which in the days before deregulation controlled all aspects of the industry from routes to fares and even to some degree, aircraft acquisition. Timoner felt that the time was right for Florida to have its own intrastate carrier.

But as a Miami newspaper reporter once put it, Timoner was "long on ambition and short on experience". In its first seven years of operation Air Florida scratched out a small niche for itself in the Florida market, but it was hard going and in 1977 the small airline lost $2 million and Timoner pondered whether it was worth continuing.

Back in 1975, a federal investigation was underway at Braniff International that accused officials of the Dallas-based airline of illegally distributing over $1 million in airline tickets to travel agents throughout Latin America, Braniff's traditional international stronghold. Some of the proceeds made their way into Richard Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign and with Watergate still bringing federal scrutiny in every back room and corner of the corridors of power, Ed Acker, the Braniff president and Harding Lawrence, the Braniff chairman, were the two highest ranking Braniff officials named in the settlement with the CAB that resulted in a $300,000 fine against the airline. Acker stepped down but he wasn't going to stay out of the business for long. That was when he found out Eli Timoner and Air Florida needed help.

Using his Dallas business contacts to bring new capital investment into Air Florida, Acker became Air Florida's new president by purchasing controlling interest in the airline for only $1.5 million in July 1977 with Eli Timoner becoming its chairman. At the time Acker came to Air Florida, the shoestring operation flew only three Lockheed Electras. Acker immediately began to pick up jet aircraft second hand all over North America to replace the Electras, first with DC-9 Series 10s, then Boeing 737-100s and 737-200s. Acker had the airline's colors revamped from orange and blue to blue and green. Inflight service was overhauled and ever the marketing wonk, Acker introduced orange juice with champagne called "Sunshine Sparklers" on Air Florida flights. Certain passengers could fly for free on new routes by getting a "Sunshine Kiss" by kissing a designated "Kiss Miss"- an attractive airline employee at the gate. Southwest's style of pricing discounts was introduced with deep price cuts for flying during off-peak hours. Within the first year, passenger numbers doubled. And they kept on growing.

And then came deregulation. Air Florida was no longer constrained to just serving the state of Florida. Acker carried an OAG in his pocket that was dog-eared and well-worn and he'd thumb through it thinking of new cities to connect. Any city that got a service cut back inevitably got Air Florida service. When Pan Am acquired National, Pan Am got National's route authority between Miami and London and Acker got DC-10s to compete with Pan Am to London. First class seats were covered in sheepskin and free limo service in a Rolls-Royce was available in London. No promotion, no level of service escaped Acker's attention.

Soon the press was lauding praise on C. Edward Acker as one of the darlings of deregulation and he got what in retrospect was an ill-conceived reputation as a "turnaround king" for what he was doing with Air Florida. In 1981, two years after the acquisition of National Airlines, Pan Am was still bungling the merger and had to drastically cut back its services between New York and Florida that had been one of National's traditional trademark services. Practically overnight Acker threw half of Air Florida's fleet into that market and snapped up even Boeing 727s to augment the rapid expansion. Only Eastern at the time had a larger market share than Air Florida in 1981.

And all of it was ballooning Air Florida's debt.

Not one mention in Wall Street or amongst industry analysts was made that Air Florida's debt was growing at a time when interest rates were high and the company's bottom line was actually being subsidized by Acker's financial dealings on the foreign currency market as well as the stock market. No, the meteoric rise of Air Florida won it and Acker praise in the financial press- Acker's a genius! Acker and Air Florida are corporate success stories!

In August of 1981, Acker was in New York City to speak to a group of industry analysts for several Wall Street brokerage firms. Expecting an in-depth analysis of Air Florida's operation and finances, Acker rose to the podium and told all of them that he wasn't able to discuss the financial affairs of Air Florida with them. "I talked to Cunard Lines and told them I was interested in a job as captain of the Titanic. They informed me that I was too late. Not having that challenge available, I decided to try to find one comparable to that. And so I am accepting the chairmanship of a company called Pan American World Airways."

With that, he turned over the podium to Eli Timoner and left. On 1 September 1981 he took over from William T. Sewell at Pan Am. One of Acker's first acts as head of Pan Am was to re-institute all of the flight cutbacks Sewell had made on the New York-Florida market- the very same market he threw Air Florida into with gusto. Eli Timoner now found the airline he started saddled with a massive debt and facing a reinvigorated Pan Am juggernaut determined to drive Air Florida out of business.

And then, one snowy January afternoon in 1982, a tower controller at Washington National cleared an Air Florida flight: "Palm 90, taxi into position and hold. Be ready for an immediate. No delay on departure, if you will."

Within days of the Air Florida crash in the icy Potomac River, approximately 100,000 reservations on Air Florida were canceled. Weeks later, Eli Timoner suffered a stroke and Donald Lloyd Jones from American Airlines was brought in. Jones was edged out at American by Robert Crandall to run American. But it was too late for Jones to save the airline. Acker's foreign currency trading was no longer boosting Air Florida's bottom line. Acker's marketing engine was sucking passengers from Air Florida to Pan Am in droves. Within several weeks $14 million in profit evaporated and creditors moved into seize the airline's assets. The airline even got slapped with an IRS tax lien. That year, Air Florida suffered a $78 million loss. Two years of massive downsizing stripped Air Florida to the bone.

On 3 July 1984, an airline that went in five years from an intrastate carrier with three airplanes to one that spanned the eastern United States, Europe, and the Caribbean declared bankruptcy and abruptly grounded all of its aircraft and sent all of its employees home. Thousands of passengers were stranded on the Independence Day holiday weekend. After weeks of deliberations in bankruptcy court, Air Florida failed to come up with a restructuring plan as it lacked flexibility as most of its assets were already encumbered with debt and all it had left that were worth anything were its routes to Europe and its slots at New York La Guardia and Washington National. The airline reached out Midway Airlines for a rescue plan that involved financing with the eventual acquisition of the airline by Midway, but the deadlines set by the bankruptcy court could not be met and Air Florida faded into the history books of aviation enthusiasts.

And Ed Acker? What happened at Pan Am will be story for another day!

Source: Hard Landing: The Epic Contest for Power and Profits That Plunged the Airlines into Chaos by Thomas Petzinger, Jr. Three Rivers Press, 1996, p201-208.

The 34th Air Division of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of China operates 8 Boeing 737-300s and two 737-700s for VIP transport of government and military officials. Delivered between 1988 and 2003, the Boeing twins replaced a mixed fleet of Ilyushin Il-18 turboprops and Hawker Siddeley HS.121 Trident 2B jetliners that had been using in the VIP role since the early 1970s. The fleet operates in a quasi-civil red and blue scheme.

Two of the 737s, however, that were purchased from Garuda Indonesia in 2000, serve in the airborne command post role. The two aircraft were registered as B-4052 (ex PK-GWI, MSN 24701/LN 1957) and B-4053 (ex PK-GWJ, MSN 24702/LN 1994) and were converted by Xian Aircraft Co. with a dorsal-mounted teardrop fairing ahead of the wings (presumably a SATCOM antenna) and two smaller ventral teardrop fairings for and aft of the wings that likely serve the specialized communications suite. The two airborne command posts also wear a gray low-visibility finish with a Chinese flag on the tail.

Some controversy exists as to whether the modification of these aircraft constituted a violation of Sino-American trade agreements and export laws.

Source: Chinese Aircraft: China's Aviation Industry since 1951 by Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov. Hikoki Publications Ltd, 2008, p251.

The windshield frame used on the Boeing 737NG not only traces its lineage back to 1958 and the first widely successful commercial jetliner, the 707, but it is an identical structure- the same windshield frame that fits any of the 6,106 737s (delivered as of July this year) will also fit any of the 1,831 727s built as well as any of the 1,010 707s built.

All that is about to change as Boeing and 737 windshield manufacturer PPG Industries are introducing for certification next year a design change in the windshield that should improve its bird strike resistance. While the actual glass technology has been updated since the first 707 rolled out, the frame and the hole patterns have remained identical through the 707, 727, and the 6000+ 737s so far. The newer design, however, will require a change in the framing structure for the first time.

Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 7, 2009. "Bag That Bird- A slight size change prompts PPG Aerospace to design a new 737 windshield" by Michael Mecham, p48.