The Canceled British Aircraft that Cost the UK Industry

I bet you thought you were going to be reading about the BAC TSR.2 when you came across the title of today's post, but while there's no arguing the effects that the TSR.2 cancellation had on the British aerospace industry, there was a canceled aircraft that came before the TSR.2 that some have argued cost British industry far more than could ever have been imagined. In 1951 the government had issued a specification for a new long range strategic transport that would be able to move 120 troops long distances to replace the elderly piston-powered Handley Page Hastings. It was envisioned that this new transport could also move personnel and equipment rapidly around the world and deploy as necessary with the new V-force bombers that were soon to enter service with the Royal Air Force. The main condition of the specification was that it had be based on existing design. 

Five companies submitted proposals, with Bristol submitting a version of the Britannia turboprop transport, Saunders Roe submitting a variant of their Duchess flying boat, and Handley Page, Avro, Vickers, and Short submitting transports based on their bomber designs (Victor, Vulcan, Valiant, and Sperrin, respectively) and powered by the new Rolls-Royce Conway turbofan. De Havilland submitted a stretched version of its Comet 1 jetliner. Bristol's Britannia variant was eliminated early due to it being too slow, along with Saunders Roe's flying boat. The Sperrin was next eliminated as the transport version had a fuselage only 9 feet wide with accommodation for only 50 passengers or personnel. Handley Page and Avro's submissions were judged too risky for the RAF contract, leaving only Vickers and De Havilland as the remaining designs not eliminated.

It was realized early on after Vickers was named the winner of the RAF competition that what the RAF needed was not terribly dissimilar with BOAC's need for a long range jetliner that offered more capacity and range than the De Havilland Comet 1. The original specifications that Vickers won was then amended with the requirement that the jet transport also earn a certificate of airworthiness from the civil aviation authorities. With the new amended specifications in place, an order was placed with Vickers for the V1000 prototype aircraft, serial number XD662, in March 1953. 

The V1000 would be the RAF transport version and the anticipated civilian version was the VC7. With construction of the V1000 prototype underway in the summer of 1954, the RAF ordered six aircraft with an eventual requirement of twelve aircraft. BOAC was regularly consulted through this phase as they wanted to put the VC7 on the North Atlantic routes to Canada and the United States as well as on the longer Empire routes that couldn't be served by the Comet 1 jetliner. Besides BOAC, Trans Canada Airlines (Air Canada's predecessor) and Pan American showed significant interest in the VC7. Even BEA expressed an interest in the VC7 for its longer European services.

To meet BOAC's wishes, the V1000/VC7 was a bit larger than the RAF desired, mainly out of a need for the wing fuel capacity to meet BOAC's range requirements. Four Rolls-Royce Conway engines were mounted in the wing root similarly to the Vickers Valiant only the wing was larger and more swept with Kuchemann wingtips (similar to the 707-320BAdv and 707-320C's wingtips) and low mounted. The fuselage had six-abreast seating with a 12.5 foot diameter. This was significant at the time, as Boeing was wrestling with the cabin diameter on its anticipated Boeing 707 and Douglas at the time was still contemplating five-abreast seating for its coming DC-8. Unfortunately prototype construction at Vickers' Wisley facility showed that the V1000 prototype's weight would be about 18,000 lbs higher than planned.

It would have been a simple matter to have upgraded the Conway turbofans, but for whatever reason, BOAC's enthusiasm for the VC7 cooled as the planned weight with the intended engine would rule out London-New York nonstop services. Ironically, several years later when BOAC ordered the 707-430, it would have Conway turbofan engines that were upgraded that would have worked on the VC7! Government meetings in September 1955 formalized BOAC's disinterest in the VC7 and suggestions were made that De Havilland put forth a stretched version of the Comet as well as refinements to the Bristol Britannia as being suitable for BOAC's needs. In addition, BOAC looked further ahead to the mid-1960s for a possible supersonic transport. Despite BOAC's incomprehensible stance, Vickers anticipated the V1000 prototype's first flight in June 1956 with the first production aircraft flying in 1959 with inaugural airline services in late 1959/early 1960 (not too far off from when the Boeing 707 began its passenger services). In a bid to maintain the competitiveness of the VC7, Vickers explored other engine options and even looked at a version of the VC7 with each of the Conway turbofans in its own podded nacelle under the wing, not unlike that of the 707 and DC-8's layout.

By this point the RAF was entering a period of fiscal austerity and it's most expensive item to date was the V1000/VC7 project. Without mentioning the V1000/VC7, the British government cautioned the RAF to scale back its expenditures. Politics came into the picture with the prospect of the end of Comet production which would have affected one of the Comet's main subcontractors, Shorts in Belfast. A desire to keep Shorts busy shifted the support amongst some MPs in Parliament against the Vickers jetliner. In addition, the Britannia was having teething problems with its turboprop engines and was selling slow. Some ministers in the government felt that support should be given to the Britannia program instead of embarking on the all-new Vickers jetliner. 

Some historical accounts point the finger at BOAC for planning to procure US jets from the start and with the support of some in the government, did what it could to commit formally to the VC7. A spirited debate in Parliament dragged on for weeks with the supporters of the Vickers projects openly declaring that the VC7's cancellation would "give the large jet market to the Americans for the next 20 years". Rather obtusely, several government officials proclaimed that the planned performance of the Boeing 707 and DC-8 would make them cost-prohibitive for many of the world's airlines and the speed advantage over the Comet and Britannia would not matter to most passengers! With the V1000 prototype 75% complete, the project was ordered shut down by the British government on 11 November 1955, and this was despite intensive lobbying by Trans Canada Airlines. 

For many observers, it was the cancellation of the Vickers VC7 and not the TSR.2 where the British aerospace industry lost its way. Sir George Edwards, managing director of Vickers and the chief designer of the V1000/VC7, had lamented that BOAC and the government had simply handed over the lead in jetliner technology to the Americans for "generations to come."

Source: Stuck on the Drawing Board: Unbuilt British Commercial Aircraft Since 1945 by Richard Payne. Tempus Publishing, 2004, p38-42

Boron-based High Energy Jet Fuels

In 1910, German chemist Alfred Stock began to experiment with taking hydrocarbon-based compounds (all fossil-fuels are hydrocarbon-based) and using boron as a substitute for carbon. Given that boron's nearest neighbor on the periodic table of the elements is carbon, Stock was intrigued by the possibility of using boron-based compounds. While successful in making small quantities of boron-based compounds, the process needed was tremendously expensive and yielded little product which at the time had no practical applications. However, in the 1930s, boron's potential began to emerge when it was found that boron-based materials produced a very high heat than the corresponding carbon-based compounds, making boron-based fuel worth studying. Prior to the Second World War, pentaborane and other boron-based compounds were synthesized, but again, practical applications were still lacking despite the promise as a high-energy fuel. At the end of the war, the U.S. Army organized a pilot program to produce boron hydrides (the boron counterpart to hydrocarbon compounds) in more significant quantities as a possible rocket fuel. The boron hydrides created could produce up to 30,000 BTUs/lb, compared to 18,000 BTUs/lb for comparable hydrocarbon fuel. 

General Electric opened a boron hydride research facility in Malta, New York in the early 1950s to continue the work started by Alfred Stock forty years earlier and managed to several hundred pounds of boron hydride compounds for research use. A plant in Muskogee, Oklahoma, also operated under a government contract to synthesize more boron hydride compounds and managed to produce 300,000 lbs of boron fuel. By the early 1950s the possibilities of boron fuels got the attention of jet engine manufacturers. Various high-energy fuels (HEFs) were studied like liquid hydrogen, for example, but boron fuels offered the most promise as they weighed the same and occupied the same volume as conventional jet fuels. For a given quantity of boron fuel versus conventional jet fuels, as much as 40% more energy could be produced. Because boron HEFs had such similar properties to jet fuels, they could be handled and used similarly, unlike liquid hydrogen fuels. 

GE led the way in boron HEF research in jet engines, operating a modified J79 turbojet engine at NASA's Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory to run on boron HEF. Calculations showed that if boron HEF were used only in the afterburners along with regular JP-class fuels, a range increase of 16% was possible. If the same aircraft were to use boron HEF exclusively, an range increase of 30% was possible. From the viewpoint of the United States Air Force, aircraft using boron HEF would have longer range and be less reliant on air refueling. In addition, 95% of the world's boron oxide was located outside of Soviet-controlled areas, with the vast majority of those boron deposits in the desert regions of California and Utah. Despite the promise it held, by 1955 the USAF had still to set up any organized study of boron HEF. 

Despite official disinterest, the US Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics did fund boron HEF studies starting in 1952 under Project ZIP in which two chemical companies were contracted to produce boron HEFs. As a result of the Navy's funding, boron HEFs began to be known as "zip fuels". One of the contractors produced a 10-boron compound called decaborane which showed the most promise. The Navy's work got the USAF's attention and decaborane would be designated HEF-3 and all research efforts focused on the use of HEF-3 with the USAF taking over direction of GE's boron fuel work. By 1957, GE reported to the USAF that HEF-3 was a feasible, but that significant technical hurdles remained given the high toxic nature of HEF-3 and the fact that boron oxide deposits were left on engine components which accelerated wear and tear of the powerplants. 

About this time both Boeing and North American were working on the WS-110A (Weapons System 110A) project which would ultimately result in the North American XB-70 Valkyrie. The stringent specifications of WS-110A called for Mach 3 speed but intercontinental range for a new supersonic bomber to replace the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. HEF-3 became an attractive fuel option for both companies even though the USAF and the Strategic Air Command never specifically directed the use of HEF-3 as a requirement. In December 1957, North American was selected by the USAF's B-70 Program Office as the winning contractor in the WS-110A competition. The Program Office suggested that use of HEF-3 on the XB-70 would be the most economical means of getting the required 6,500 mile range. While still not requiring HEF-3 for the design, funding was made available for the modification of the intended powerplant of the XB-70 Valkyrie, the GE J93 engine, to run on HEF-3. Design work on the XB-70 at North American proceeded on the assumption that the aircraft be able to operate on both conventional JP-class fuels and HEF-3. 

Requiring the use of HEF-3 on the XB-70, however, was withheld by the Pentagon pending further evaluation of the operational advantages and disadvantages of HEF-3. While the refining of JP-class fuels was relatively simple, the production of HEF-3 required several extra steps beginning with simpler boron compounds. These extra steps added considerable cost to the price per gallon of HEF-3. Estimated of an HEF-3 facility built and operated to support one combat wing of operational B-70As resulted in a $10/gallon of HEF-3; adjusting for inflation, a gallon of HEF-3 today would cost just over $75!

Compared to the JP-4 fuel that was to be used on the XB-70 prototypes, HEF-3 produced 25,000 BTUs/lb compared to 18,000 BTUs/lb for JP-4. The spontaneous ignition temperature for HEF-3 was 2,600 degrees Fahrenheit compared to 4,550 degrees F for JP-4. While HEF-3 presented on issues when in contact with metals, there were considerable concerns about it coming into contact with non-metal parts of the Valkyrie's fuel system. In addition, HEF-3 was more toxic than cyanide, which complicated storage and handling at SAC bases. The lower flashpoint of HEF-3 meant that nitrogen inerting of the fuel tanks was a required necessity and even the smallest leaks were unacceptable. In 1958, NASA, North American, the USAF and several chemical contractors formed an HEF Guidance Committee to provide more direction to research efforts and to keep those efforts in line with the development of the B-70. At this point, the intent at North American was to create a dual-fuel bomber that used JP-4 and HEF-3, but it began to add a significant cost to the unit cost of the Valkyrie, particularly when GE's own work on the HEF-3-powered J93 engine began to fall behind schedule. Despite this, in the summer of 1959 the Strategic Air Command began making its initial budget outlays for FY1960 for HEF-3 production to support the production Valkyrie bomber. 

Dissatisfied with the progress, though, just weeks later the Pentagon canceled the HEF-3-powered J93 engine program and limited the Valkyrie program to the use of JP-4 fuel only. Testimony by USAF scientists before Congressional committees revealed that the technical hurdles and the operating cost of using HEF-3 as a jet fuel were prohibitive given the defense budget of the day. With the winding down of the HEF-3 program, the only research that remained on boron fuels lasted in the early 1960s at Edwards AFB as an additive to rocket propellant. There was, however, small consolation to the engineers and scientists involved that Soviet research efforts proved to be equally frustrating in making boron-based fuels practical. The hazardous nature of boron fuels for the most part proved to the final nail in the coffin of the research work. 

Source: Valkyrie: North American's Mach 3 Superbomber by Dennis R. Jenkins and Tony R. Landis. Specialty Press, 2008, p77-82.

The Martin XB-48

In November 1944 the US Army Air Forces looked ahead to the future of jet technology in issuing a specification for a jet-powered bomber with a range of 3,000 miles, a service ceiling of 45,000 feet and a maximum speed of 550 mph. By January of the following year the requirements were increased with the necessary ability to carry specific types of large bombs in the USAAF inventory. Four companies would eventually come to submit designs that would reach the flying hardware stage- the North American XB-45 Tornado, the Convair XB-46, the Boeing XB-47 Stratojet, and the Martin XB-48. With the XB-45 and XB-46 being four-engined bombers, they were paired up to compete with each other for a production contract and the XB-47 and XB-48 both being six-engined bombers, ended up being paired up to compete as well. By December of 1945, the Glenn L. Martin Company in Baltimore signed a contract with the USAAF for its submission, the Model 223 which received the designation XB-48. A newer contract superseded the original contract which called for two XB-48 prototypes with a first flight date no later than the end of September 1947. 

While the general layout of the Martin XB-48 was conventional (straight wings, for instance), there were many features on the XB-48 that were unique and ground-breaking for aircraft technology of the day. Since the wings were too slender to carry the main undercarriage, the XB-48 featured a bicycle undercarriage with outrigger wheels that retracted into the outer sections of the underwing jet nacelles. This landing gear arrangement was first tested on a modified Martin B-26 Marauder nicknamed the "Middle River Stump Jumper" and designated XB-26H. The other significant unique feature of the XB-48 was that in order to keep the wingspan reasonable, the three engine nacelles on each wing were grouped together to form a lifting surface in which the nacelles top surface was faired into the wing and contributed to the overall wing lift. The General Electric J35 engines had their own sub-nacelles with an air duct passing between each nacelle and exhausting out the back of the nacelle. The jetpipes were also adjustable via flaps that deflected the jet exhaust. 

The first XB-48 made its first flight at the Middle River plant's airfield on 22 June 1947 and flew to NAS Patuxent River 80 miles away for more flight testing. The J35 engines proved to be one of the biggest headaches in the flight test program. The first XB-48 aircraft went through fourteen J35s in only 44 test flights! By this time the USAAF was an independent military branch as the United States Air Force and flight testing of both the XB-48 and the Boeing XB-47 showed that the Stratojet was clearly the superior aircraft thanks to its more powerful J47 engines and highly refined aerodynamics with its thin swept wing. Martin's XB-48 ended up being 50mph slower than its original design speed and as a result, the XB-48 program was canceled by the USAF in September 1948 with an order of the first production B-47A Stratojets. 

However, the USAF did make enough funds available for the completion of the second XB-48 prototype and for its flight testing. The second XB-48 first flew on 16 October 1948, three months behind schedule. But the delay was of little significance since the USAF had already terminated the program. Martin then offered to modify the XB-48 design in 1949 with XT40 turboprops which would have been more capable than the B-50 Superfortress, but by this point the USAF was interested only in pure jet bombers, not to mention that the XT40 was a Navy-funded engine and in those days, intraservice rivalries played a significant role in weapons development. In March of that year, Martin was formally notified of the USAF's lack of interest in the XT40-powered version of the XB-48. 

With the formal end of the flight test program in the summer of 1949, Martin elected to keep flying the XB-48 as test beds. The first aircraft would be used as a spares source to keep the second aircraft flying and test schedules were drawn up to test items like autopilot systems, engine cooling technologies and hydraulic equipment. In the end, though, even those tests got canceled and the second XB-48 ended up only flight testing a thermal de-icing system. In September 1951 the sole remaining XB-48 was flown to the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland and static tested to destruction. 

Source: American X & Y Planes: Volume 2; Experimental Aircraft Since 1945 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Kev Darling. The Crowood Press, 2010, p14-17.

American Airlines Picks the DC-10

American Airlines' involvement in the development of the Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas widebody trijets was extensive. It all goes back to when George Spater took over the reins of the airline from the legendary C.R. Smith.  In the 1960s, Spater was faced with trying to decide between the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. By some accounts, it was probably the most difficult decision Spater had to make while at the helm of American, all while living in the shadow of C.R. Smith.

Back in 1966, American's VP of development engineering, Frank Kolk, was worried about the frenzy surrounding Boeing's launch of the 747 program with order committments from Pan Am. Many airlines besides American began to wonder if they could fill 400 seats and at American, it was Kolk who sounded the alarms to C.R. Smith. "C.R., it's just too damn big for our route network!" he'd exhort every chance he got. But because American's transcontinental 707 services boasted the highest load factors in the airline's network, the 747 order was placed anyway. But, since C.R. Smith found Kolk's arguments compelling, he sent Kolk to talk with the major airframe manufacturers about a smaller widebody jet.

Boeing wasn't interested as it was immersed with the 747 and the 727/737 production lines were running at maximum capacity. The manpower just couldn't be spared. Douglas was also not interested as it had its own financial problems that would result in its merger with McDonnell the following year- the DC-8 line hadn't recouped its costs yet and the company was scrambling to pacify its DC-9 customers who were upset with production problems and delays (at one point Eastern even filed suit).

Lockheed, however was very receptive and went to work immediately on a design based on Kolk's specifications for a twin-aisle twinjet that carried 250 passengers and could operate out of New York La Guardia. But other airlines, once briefed on Lockheed's work, didn't like two engines. United, in particular, wanted four but could live with three engines. Eastern would accept no less than three engines as the overwater flight rules of the day dictated that a twin jet could not fly further than 60 minutes from a diversion airport. With many of its destinations in the Caribbean, a three or four engined jet could fly direct over the Atlantic from the Northeastern United States. As other potential customers like TWA provided their opinions, the consensus over-ruled American Airlines and the Lockheed widebody jet would be a trijet.

With Douglas financially invigorated after the merger with McDonnell, in-house studies to Kolk's initial brief would become the DC-10 to compete with what would become the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar. American now faced a choice between two very similar widebody trijets. But there was a hitch- American preferred the new Rolls-Royce RB.211 engine, but the RB.211, being a more compact design thanks to its three-spool system, was too short for the DC-10 tail nacelle. As advanced as the Tristar was, Spater and the American engineering staff preferred the DC-10. Though C.R. Smith himself expressed a strong preference for the Tristar, it was Spater's call to make. Some accounts on this period in American's history point to the experience with the Lockheed Electra having biased the airline against Lockheed despite the more advanced features of the L-1011 Tristar.

Spater even talked with the head of Rolls Royce about modifying the RB.211 for the DC-10, but given that American was the only airline making the request, no guarantees could be offered to American.

There was even consensus among the various US airlines that there wasn't a sufficient market to justify two competing widebody trijet designs and there were even discussions between Spater and other airline presidents about settling on a single type. Many analysts crunching the numbers for the airlines pointed out that both aircraft being produced would eventually (and prophetically) be detrimental to the future of the commercial aircraft manufacturing at both Douglas and Lockheed. When Delta, Eastern, and TWA ordered the L-1011, the assumption was that American and United would follow suit. But United refused to accept a British engine and ordered the the DC-10 with the General Electric CF6 engine. With what was thought to be a unified front shattered by United's surprise decision to break ranks, Spater felt more comfortable and went ahead and sign a launch order for  25 DC-10s along with United Air Lines with ordered 30 aircraft. On 29 July 1971 at a joint delivery ceremony at Long Beach, the first DC-10s for United and American were handed over together.

Source: Eagle- The Story of American Airlines by Robert Serling. St. Martin's Press, 1987.

The U-2's Antecedent: The Martin RB-57D Canberra

In the early 1950s the Strategic Air Command asked Martin, the American license builder of the English Electric Canberra as the B-57, if a modified version of the B-57 could be built that would operate at altitudes in excess of 60,000 as a reconnaissance aircraft. Though not as radically modified as the better-known RB-57F (which were stock B-57s modified by General Dynamics), the RB-57D was unique in its own right and set the stage for high-altitude reconnaissance operations by its successor, the Lockheed U-2. To operate in the rarefied air of the stratosphere, the most noticeable change in the RB-57D was its enlarged wing which resulted in an increase in wingspan from 64 feet in the standard B-57 Canberra to 106 feet. Special lightening measures were taken from skinning over the bomb bay doors to reduce weight and the bomb bay was used to house the reconnaissance equipment. In addition, enlarged nacelles replaced the B-57's Wright J65 engines with Pratt & Whitney J57s (as were used on the KC-135) which offered a 6,000 lb thrust increase and better high altitude performance. 

Despite the massively enlarged wing, an empty RB-57D weight not much more than an empty B-57 due to the lightening measures taken. The most extreme measures were taken with the wings which were thin metal honeycomb sections that formed a full wet wing (even in the leading edges). To avoid the weight of rivets, the wings were assembled with a special glue and the wing skin was waxed for aerodynamic smoothness. With a surface skin of only 0.010 inch thick, even dropping a small tool on the wing could damage the skin. Even deicing fluid used on the aircraft could potentially cause the glue used to lose strength!

Only twenty RB-57Ds were built, but they were built in four groups, each group had a unique set of mission equipment and capabilities that were practically custom-made for missions in specific parts of the world. The first group of RB-57Ds were called "Group A" and "Group B" and only differed in the Group A aircraft being capable of inflight refueling. Four optical cameras were carried in the forward fuselage and a large optical viewfinder was installed in the cockpit for the pilot to use for both navigation and as a viewsight for the cameras. Thirteen aircraft (seven and six respectively) were built to Group A and Group B standards.

The next version was the single Group D RB-57D built which was also single seat and designed for electronic reconnaissance with a nose mounted radar and SLAR built into the lower sides of the fuselage. Capable of inflight refueling, the sole Group C aircraft flew most of its missions over Europe, using its powerful SLAR to peek deep into the Soviet bloc. 

The final variant were the six Group C RB-57Ds which were two seaters with a pilot and electronic warfare officer. These RB-57D were designed as electronic ferrets to collect enemy radar emissions for later analysis in the development of electronic countermeasures. These aircraft were also capable of inflight refueling. 

In 1956 the newly-formed 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing to operate the unique RB-57Ds. In the space of a year the 4028th SRS would be moved from Lockbourne AFB in Ohio, to Turner AFB in Georgia, and finally settled down at Laughlin AFB in Del Rio, Texas. Despite being moved three times, the squadron would become fully operational with its first six RB-57Ds only 120 days from the delivery of its first RB-57D. Those first six aircraft, all Group A RB-57Ds, deployed to Japan in late 1956 for reconnaissance missions over what is presumed to be China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. A year after the Japan deployment, three of the Group A RB-57Ds were sent to Taiwan wearing Republic of China markings for further missions over China during the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Flown by USAF pilots, two Taiwanese pilots were preparing to fly RB-57D missions after only 30 days of training, but the plans came to end when both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan began dogfighting each other over the Taiwan Straits. 

In  1958 the first atmospheric samplings missions were flown by RB-57Ds in support of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, the high flying capability of the RB-57Ds allowed them to get particle samples from high in the atmosphere as part of the post-detonation analysis. At the same time, Several Group B and the sole Group D aircraft were deployed to Europe for missions over Eastern Europe. 

The pace of missions put a strain on the delicate wings of the RB-57D and the first aircraft were put into storage by SAC following two incidents when the wings outboard of the engine nacelles cracked and fell off during landing. Martin had designed the wings for only 500 flight hours and many of them had already exceeded that limit but strategic necessity resulted in the RB-57Ds still flying missions. At this point the USAF was planning for the arrival of the Lockheed U-2 and the Air Defense Command took over the remaining RB-57Ds to act as high altitude targets for the supersonic interceptor force. Fitted out with electronic countermeasures, the 4677th Defense Systems Evaluation Squadron at Hill AFB, Utah, was formed to operate 12 of the 20 RB-57Ds. Martin modified the wings to extend their surface life. However, the high flying capabilities of the RB-57Ds meant that the 4677th DSES was always asked to send aircraft in support of nuclear testing. 

By 1963 wing structural problems cropped up again when one of the RB-57Ds lost its wing at 50,000 feet. But the ADC still needed a high altitude target aircraft and since the last US atmospheric nuclear test had taken place in 1962, Martin agreed to modify the remaining RB-57Ds for another 3,000 flight hours. Upgrades to the electronic countermeasures to challenge the ADC interceptor crews resulted in these aircraft being designated EB-57Ds and they served in this role along with other testing roles until the mid-1970s. 

The big wing and engine power of the RB-57Ds in many ways prepared pilots for what it would be like to fly the Lockheed U-2. On takeoff, only 50% engine power was necessary for takeoff which only needed a ground roll of about 2,000 feet. Climbing at 25-30 degrees, the RB-57Ds could reach 50,000 feet in only 15 minutes. Maximum cruise altitude was 65,000 feet and the pilots wore full pressure suits that were improved for the U-2 and SR-71 programs. With over 200 gallons less than a stock B-57, the RB-57D could fly twice the duration, approximately seven hours compared to four hours for a B-57. Landing was challenging as the big wing didn't lose lift easily. Even with the engines at idle, it was still too much power for landing. Even with the spoilers out and landing gear extended, the plane still had a very low sink rate and pilots resorted to actually holding the RB-57Ds into a series of slight stalls to get the aircraft down to the runway!

Source: Martin B-57 Canberra: The Complete Record by Robert C. Mikesh. Schiffer Military History Press, 1995, p132-141.

 

Frontier and the Boeing 737-200

There was a time in the 1970s when Frontier Airlines was the one of the most significant operators of the Boeing 737 and it was on the dependable 737-200 that the airline rose to prominence to challenge the established major carriers of the day. To go from humble beginnings flying second-hand Douglas DC-3s to having the second largest route network in the United States when the first 737-200s arrived at the airline is a story that for the most part has remained hidden to history, overshadowed by the storied legacies of larger airlines like American, Delta, or United.

Frontier's first jets were actually 727-100s styled as "Arrow Jets" which first entered service with Frontier in 1966, becoming the first local service carrier to fly the 727. Route expansions (aided by the acquisition of Fort Worth-based Central Airlines in 1967) and further route authorities granted by the Civil Aeronautics Board brought about the move in 1968 to larger 727-200s. Only a year later in 1969 Lewis Dymond, president of Frontier, retired- at the helm of the airline since 1962, Dymond did much to restore the airline to profitability through the latter half of 1960s that allowed the acquisition of jet equipment. Replacing Dymond was E. Paul Burke. Burke only served at the helm of the airline for a short two years, but his legacy to the airline was his realization in 1969 that the 737-200 was far more suited to Frontier's network than the 727s. The first five 737-200s were ordered as one of his first acts as president of the airline and the 727-100s were traded in to Boeing as part of the payment for the first 737s.

The 737-200s could serve even smaller airports than the larger 727s and this allowed Frontier a more flexible aircraft for its route network- the new jets were at home flying to smaller cities like Scottsbluff, Nebraska or Grand Junction, Colorado just as easily as larger cities like Dallas or Denver. By the time the first 737-200s were delivered, in terms of cities served, Frontier had the second-largest route network in the United States.

The first 737-191s arrived in April 1969 and by 1970 had 10 737-200s on strength with the airline. By the time of Burke's departure from the executive suite in 1971, the 727s were being phased out, with the last of the 727-191s sold in 1972 and as well as the sale of the larger 727-291s to Braniff International. Succeeding Burke would be Frontier's greatest president, Al Feldman. Under Feldman's tenure from 1971 to 1979, Frontier standardized its jet equipment on the 737-200 and entered a period of impressive expansion, profitability and rise to prominence as one of the largest regional carriers in the United States. By the time of the introduction of the final Saul Bass colors in April 1978, Frontier had 32 737-200s on strength with 10 more on order. Frontier's western route network stretched into both Canada and Mexico, from California and Washington in the West to as far east as Michigan and Georgia. Denver Stapleton became one of the few three-airline major hubs of its day, with Frontier ably holding its own against incumbents Continental and United. Undoubtedly it was the flexible operating economics of the 737-200 that allowed Frontier to weather the economic turmoil that hit the industry in the early 1970s.

One item of interest was the introduction of first-class legroom in coach class on Frontier's 737-200s. The aircraft were configured for 106 passengers in a single-class layout and it proved to be immensely popular with passengers. It was just one of the many changes Al Feldman implemented in Frontier's service image that formed the foundation for its impressively profitable growth during the turbulent 1970s.

Just to think that there was a time in the 1970s when Frontier flew their 737s into cities in Colorado like Durango and Grand Junction and cities in Nebraska like Scottsbluff and Grand Island- cities that today rate only small regional prop service if at all! A lot of Frontier's 737 destinations in those days today have only small regional prop service. Quite a change from just 30 years ago for these communities!

Source: Boeing 737 (Crowood Aviation Series) by Malcolm L. Hill. Crowood Press Ltd, 2002.

The Beriev A-150

During the 1960s a strategic shift was taking place in nuclear deterrent doctrines as the United States Navy began putting to sea increasing numbers of Polaris sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) aboard nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines beginning in 1960 with the first deterrent patrols of the George Washington-class. With improvements in the Polaris missile coming rapidly that bestowed even greater range, the Soviet Union, lacking a blue-water navy in the 1960s looked to unique if not creative answers to seek out and destroy the American SSBNs which no longer needed to lurk close to Soviet shores to reach remote ocean areas not normally patrolled by the Soviet Navy.

In 1965 the Beriev OKB was tasked with developing one of the most impressive unbuilt flying boat designs that had as its core mission to seek out and destroy the SSBNs in remote ocean areas. The Beriev A-150 built on the design bureau's already extensive expertise in flying boats that included the jet powered Be-10 that saw limited service with the AV-MF (naval air force) in the 1950s. The A-150 was to have been a multi-role amphibian with a large delta wing that bestowed on it a large internal volume for missions that not only included long range anti-submarine warfare, but also anti-suface vessel warfare, maritime reconnaissance, search and rescue and an inflight tanker. In addition, Beriev developed transport variants that not only had military roles, but could also have been used for resource development in the Soviet Far East where ground networks of roads and rails were near non-existent.

The A-150 would have been 163 feet long with a wingspan of 137 feet. Paired nacelles above the wings would have housed Kuznetsov NK-8 turbofans (used on the Il-62 and Tu-154 jetliners). In addition, twelve Kolesov RD36 lift engines would have been installed in the leading edge roots to help shorten the takeoff run of the A-150. Inside the wing center section on each side of the fuselage were equipment bays that could accommodate interchangeable mission pods depending upon the mission tasking. Each bay and mission pods had standardized connections allowing the A-150 to be retasked in minimal time. Each pod had a volume of just over a thousand cubic feet. Some pods were weapons bays, others included ASW equipment like dunking sonar, sonobuoys and torpedoes. With a crew of 5 and a range of nearly 11,000 miles, the A-150 would have been an impressive machine.

Beriev also developed the A-150DT version which had a larger fuselage and a clamshell "tailgate" that allowed heavy loads to be driven directly into the fuselage cargo deck. The total cargo capacity of the A-150DT was nearly 70,000 lbs and it had 16 instead of 12 RD36 lift engines to handle the increased weight. There was even exploration of a VTOL version with 32 lift engines! The A-150DT was intended as an assault transport but its capabilities also made it useful in Siberian resource development and supporting the Soviet fishing fleet at sea. The assault transport version also had two twin-cannon turrets, one for the tail and one in the nose section.

Ultimately Beriev's ambitious A-150 proved to be too much aircraft for the prevailing technology of the day and the Soviet answer to the American SSBN fleet was to increase its own fleet of nuclear-powered hunter killer subs (SSNs).

Source: Beriev's Jet Flying Boats (Red Star Volume 28) by Yefim Gordon, Andrey Sal'nikov, and Alexandr Zoblotskiy. Ian Allan/Midland Publishing, 2006, p96-97.

The Dismal Career of the Chinese Mosquito

During the Second World War, a second De Havilland Mosquito production line was set up at the De Havilland Canada facility at Downsview Airport in Toronto. A total of 1,133 Mosquito aircraft were built at the Canadian production line but when the war ended in 1945, there were 100 aircraft completed at Downsview that had not yet been accepted by the Royal Canadian Air Force. These aircraft were put into flyable storage and joining them were another 110 surplus Mosquito bombers that were part of a larger group that were excess to the end of the war effort and were divided up amongst several storage sites across Canada. The Globe and Mail newspaper ran a story on 20 May 1947 about the stored aircraft at Downsview that were worth approximately $30 million and would be sold to the highest bidder or scrapped.

In the late summer of that year, a delegation arrived in Toronto wanting to purchase the Mosquito aircraft. They were the Chinese Nationalist,s dispatched by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, that were in the midst of a civil war against the Communists led by Mao Tse-Tung. Interestingly Chiang had sent a group to Downsview in 1944 to evaluate the Mosquito but no sale resulted. Now fighting a bitter conflict for control of China, the Mosquito bombers represented an irresistible deal that would give Chiang the most modern and still in those days, fast bombers available. Though the details of the transaction have been lost to history, the estimate is that for $5 million the Chinese Nationalists got approximately 300 aircraft, though most were to be obtained to act as spare parts for the flying aircraft. Four hundred spare Merlin engines were also included in the deal which included disassembly of the aircraft for transfer to China and then reassembly there for the Chiang's forces. De Havilland Canada would also provide training for the first cadre of pilots at Downsview. 

By October, an assembly bay at the plant was turned over to a "disassembly" line as the aircraft were taken apart and crated for transport to China. Given the political sensitivities of the time, the sale was noted by the Canadian government as a "commercial sale" and all publicity of the transfer was discouraged. The first group of fifteen Chinese pilots to be trained at Downsview started their conversion in February 1948 with former RCAF Mosquito pilots as instructors. Having previously flown B-25 Mitchells, the Mosquito was quite a handful for the Chinese pilots and in short order seven had to be written off. To avoid any publicity, the training program was quickly shifted to China and that first group of pilots ended up writing off another nine aircraft, resulting in the Mosquito being nicknamed "Lin Tai Yu" by the Chinese, after an empress who was beautiful but wicked. 

Chinese flight training began with the second group in April 1948 and very quickly another 13 accidents occurred, this time with fatalities. Despite the presence of numerous De Havilland Canada technical specialists and ex-RCAF pilots in China, the accident rate continued. A second training unit set up by Chiang's forces resulted in the write off of five aircraft in only five days. Many of the accidents were in ground handling, so De Havillland's technical staff built a taxi trainer that had struts on the rear fuselage to prevent ground looping. The Chinese even managed to wreck that trainer! The Mosquito force that Chiang Kai-Shek wanted spent more time in training than in actual combat missions. Some of this was the quality of his pilots, but a lot of it was that the Mosquito was simply too much airplane for what was a Communist guerrilla insurgency. With the Communists advancing and gaining control of more of China, the Canadians noted the deteriorating situation as the local currency was falling and non-Chinese citizens were leaving the country in droves. 

On 10 December 1948 the capital, Peking (now Beijing) fell to Mao's forces and the De Havilland team was ordered to depart immediately. Most of the team managed to escape via Hong Kong, but some of the lead engineers found themselves "retained" by the Nationalists to help keep their aircraft flying. De Havilland Canada's management arranged for a special DC-6 flight to get this last group out of China. Nationalist soldiers refused to allow the Canadians to depart, but gunfire on the airfield perimeter from advancing Communist forces provided a distraction for the Canadians who managed to successfully depart as the airfield came under attack. 

Needless to say, much like the less-than-salutory operational career of the Martin B-57 by the South Vietnamese Air Force in 1965, the career of the otherwise brilliant De Havilland Mosquito in China was very much a failure and an unusual footnote to the history of the Mosquito. 

Source: De Havilland in Canada by Fred W. Hotson. CANAV Books, 1999, p120-121. 

The Australian Canberra in Vietnam

Monday I'd posted about the South Vietnamese Air Force's brief, if not flawed, operation of the Martin B-57 Canberra during the Vietnam War. They weren't the only nation outside of the United States to operate the Canberra in Southeast Asia. In 1967, the English Electric Canberra Mk.20s of the Royal Australian Air Force's No. 2 Squadron arrived at Phan Rang AB, which at the time was home to the USAF Martin B-57 operation under the aegis of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (an F-100 Super Sabre outfit). At the start of combat operations, the eight Canberras were assigned to night attack missions where they made bomb drops from 20,000 feet under direction of the Combat Sky Spot ground radars that would direct the bombers when to make their drop. While the strikes were very accurate and effective, a better role was soon found for the Australians. 

By mutual agreement with the Seventh Air Force and No. 2 Squadron, the RAAF Canberras would mount eight sorties a day against up to 16 targets, seven days a week. All the targets were within South Vietnam to minimize the anti-air threat and make best use of the Canberra's visual bombing equipment. Their radio call sign in Vietnam was "MAGPIE" from the squadron's crest. As the Australians were trained exhaustively on visual bombing, most of the targets assigned to No. 2 Squadron were in the Mekong Delta region. Often the targets were shifted to targets of opportunity spotted by airborne forward air controllers and with the Canberras at altitude, little to no warning proceeded the bombing runs as the bombardiers used Second World War-vintage precision visual bomb sights to hit targets from 20,000 feet that were normally hit at lower altitudes by USAF crews. The Australian crews quickly developed a reputation for pinpoint bombing and were the only combat aircraft in the entire Vietnam theater for the entire duration of the war that employed level bombing with visual bombsights from altitude. 

By 1969 approximately 70% of No. 2 Squadron's targets were in the Mekong Delta where the level visual bombing technique was best suited. With most of the Delta region flat and at sea level, it made the job on the Canberra's bombardier easier. Since the English Electric Canberra Mk.20 didn't have underwing hardpoints like the USAF B-57s, the wing tip tanks were removed and replaced with bomb racks to supplement the bomb bay load. Since most of the targets weren't far from Phan Rang AB, the extra fuel in the tip tanks wasn't needed. 

On 3 November 1970, after three and a half years of combat operations without a single loss, the first RAAF Canberra was lost on a Combat Sky Spot radar bombing mission near Da Nang. MAGPIE 91, flown by Flight Officer Michael Herbert with Pilot Officer Robert Carver as bombardier, executed a near perfect bomb drop from 22,000 feet at night and were lost without a trace after their run. On 14 March 1971 another RAAF Canberra was lost to a SAM missile while on a mission to the northwest corner of South Vietnam. Although the crew were rescued the following day, the Seventh Air Force directed that no aircraft should operate near known SAM zones without adequate electronic countermeasures equipment. By 1971 nearly all of the northern quarter of South Vietnam had been infiltrated by NVA units with portable surface-to-air missiles. By this point in the war, the USAF B-57 operation was winding down and with the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing leaving Phan Rang as part of the "Vietnamization" of the war, there was no point in No. 2 Squadron remaining behind. 

No. 2 Squadron flew its last combat mission in Vietnam on 31 May 1971, making it the 11,963 mission flown by the Australian Canberras in Southeast Asia. Within a week the Canberras were refitted with their wing tip tanks and returned to RAAF Amberly via Darwin to become a reconnaissance and target towing squadron that would eventually be disbanded in 1982. In 2000, the RAAF reformed No. 2 Squadron to operate the Boeing 737 AEW&C Wedgetail. 

Source: Martin B-57 Canberra: The Complete Record by Robert C. Mikesh. Schiffer Military History Press, 1995, p116-119.

The Very Brief Career of the B-57 with the VNAF

In April 1964 the 8th Bomb Squadron and the 13th Bomb Squadron arrived at Clark AB in the Philippines as tensions in Indochina began to escalate. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was still four months away when the Martin B-57 Canberra jet bombers of the two squadrons took up residence at Clark. In the following month, it was decided that a select group of three South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) officers led by Major N. N. Bien would begin introductory training on the B-57 with the two USAF squadrons at Clark. At the time there was a great deal of hesitation on the part of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson on supplying the B-57 to the VNAF as it was thought that it would unnecessarily escalate tensions in the area. Despite the prejudicial stereotypes of many USAF personnel of the day on the quality of the pilots of the VNAF, this first group of three pilots turned out to be remarkably proficient and experienced in combat operations as they had all flown combat missions in A-1 Skyraiders and had jet experience from their flight training in France. 

As this first group of VNAF pilots were winding up their training at Clark AB, the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place in August 1964 that would bring American combat forces into direct confrontation with the North Vietnamese for the first time. The 8th BS and 13th BS alternated rotations to Bien Hoa AB outside of Saigon and the presence of the B-57s was thought might offset the presumed presence of North Vietnamese Ilyushin Il-28 light jet bombers. The next group of three VNAF pilots were then slated to take "Familiarization Training" with whichever USAF B-57 unit was on rotation at Bien Hoa who would fly their B-57s to Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon. Unlike the first three VNAF officers who were proved to be highly competent, this next group of three pilots were more for show than anything else as they were the flamboyant General Nguyen Cao Ky, head of the VNAF (and later Premier of South Vietnam), and two officers that were subordinates of General Ky, one in charge of Ky's security and the other in charge of the VNAF command post in Saigon. Their training was considerably abbreviated and consisted of only three days of ground school, a day and a half of aircraft familiarization on the ramp at Tan Son Nhut, and another three to four days of flying with an American pilot in the back seat of the B-57. As as typical for General Ky, on the the completion of their "training" he took the USAF instructors tiger hunting on elephants in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam!

It wasn't until August 1965 that the formal announcement was made that the B-57 was going to be operated by the VNAF. At a formal ceremony on 9 August 1965 at Tan Son Nhut, a USAF B-57 was flown in and repainted with VNAF insignia and a prominent South Vietnamese flag on the tail. The "U.S. Air Force" titles were removed but were obvious from the shiny areas left behind where the lettering had been buffed off. This B-57 was displayed with all the various armament stores it could carry, including one inadvertently armed 500-lb bomb! Before the ceremony, three dual trainer B-57Cs were flown in from Clark AB in the Philippines and repainted with VNAF markings. General Ky, who by now was the Premier of South Vietnam, and the previously trained pilots were given quick familiarization training to perform a fly-by during the ceremony. Having taken off before the ceremony, each pilot had an American instructor in the back seat. During the formation fly-by, Ky himself had to relinquish control of "his" B-57 to his instructor as he had not been present during all of the previous day's familiarization training. After a spirited fly by and landing, once the B-57Cs landed and were at the far end of the runway and out of sight of the assembled guests, the USAF instructor pilots climbed out of their back seats and the three jets were taxied to the ceremony area by their VNAF pilots and Premier Ky, which of course had the desired propaganda effect. As soon as the ceremony ended, the three B-57s had their USAF markings reapplied and were flown back to Clark AB. 

Major Bien of the VNAF, officially in charge of the VNAF portion of the B-57 training, brought another group of 12 pilots and 12 navigators to Clark to begin actual bona fide training in the B-57. Of historical interest, there were also two Philippine Air Force navigators in the group as well as a "gesture of thanks" to the Philippine government for allowing their country to serve as a vital rear logistics area for the war effort. As each VNAF pilot and navigator completed their training at Clark, they were then sent to Bien Hoa with either the USAF 8th Bomb Squardon or the 13th Bomb Squadron (whoever was on rotation at the time) and were paired up with either experienced USAF pilots or navigators to fly combat missions. There were VNAF-marked B-57s based at Bien Hoa AB, but they were few in number and always flown under USAF command.

At this point Premier Ky felt that the VNAF B-57 program was not getting the visibility he desired and wanted in order to boost the morale of the South Vietnamese military. On 29 October 1965, the Armed Forces Day for South Vietnam, five B-57s were flown in from Clark and repainted in VNAF markings. Fully armed and fueled and crewed entirely by USAF personnel, the five Canberras took off from Da Nang, struck a suspected Viet Cong base and then flew 300 feet at nearly 300 knots up the main boulevard in Saigon and over the Presidential residence. This gave Premier Ky his propaganda coup even though not one crewman on that mission was a VNAF officer!

Despite this, morale amongst the VNAF contingent in the Philippines was low and USAF instructors were constantly being frustrated by the lack of discipline of the second group which included frequent claims of illness and even complaints about the extreme maneuvers needed in exploiting the B-57's strengths. Matters came to a head when one VNAF pilot crash landed his B-57 at NAS Cubi Point while doing touch-and-gos. But before the issue of morale and discipline could be sorted out, the charismatic leader of the VNAF contingent, Major Bien, was killed in a freak accident when his B-57 diverted to Pleiku AB. Unable to restart his engines due to the inexperienced VNAF ground crew installing the engine starter cartridges incorrectly, the ground crew elected to manually push his B-57 to another area of the ramp for further attention. Unfortunately, the engines powered the hydraulic system and the brakes were inoperable. The ground crew lost control of the B-57 and in an effort to avoid getting injured, Major Bien jumped from the open cockpit only to be run over by one of the main wheels. 

With Major Bien's death, the rest of the VNAF contingent at Clark refused to continue with the B-57 program and the USAF closed down the VNAF B-57 program on 20 April 1966, only seven months after the program was publicly announced. The remaining VNAF B-57s were repainted in USAF markings and returned to service with the 8th and 13th Bomb Squadrons in USAF markings and American crews. The most potent aircraft that the VNAF had been given had been an utter failure, a victim of political grandstanding by the South Vietnamese government. 

Source: Martin B-57 Canberra: The Complete Record by Robert C. Mikesh. Schiffer Military History Press, 1995, p99-104.