The Birth of the Air Commandos: The Roots of USAF Special Operations

Colonel Orde Wingate, a most unconventional British officer

The fall of Burma in early 1942 threatened to derail the Allies' plans for Asia. The British withdrawal from Burma to India was the biggest, costliest, and longest not to mention most humiliating withdrawals in the military history of the British Empire. Coupled with the loss of Singapore, it left India as the only bulwark against Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. With 12 million acres of rice paddies and an annual rice production of 8 million tons, Burma was an important logistical asset to the Japanese Empire and it also gave them control over the southern end of the Burma Road, a 717-mile supply route that was being used to provide supplies for General Chiang Kai-Shek in central China in his fight against the Japanese. Japanese military planners hoped that cutting off Chiang would mean less troops would be needed in central China to keep him in check. With dark days ahead on the minds of British officials in India, a most unconventional British officer arrived with an audacious plan to take the fight back into Burma. Colonel Orde Wingate had already gained a reputation as an unconventional war specialist leading guerrilla units in Africa and the Middle East against Axis forces. What he lacked in conventionality for a British officer he more than amply made up in his leadership abilities to inspire the men in his command. He created a jungle force made up of Indians and British called the "Chindits", which was a corruption of the Burmese word "chinthe", the fierce dragon that statues that guarded Burmese temples depicted. In February 1943, Wingate led 3,000 Chindits in Operation Longcloth. They penetrated deep into Burma on foot and scored early successes cutting Japanese rail routes. But Wingate lacked heavy guns as the Chindits were on foot and the Royal Air Force proved unable to provide the necessary air support. Wingate also counted on a conventional counter-offensive to keep the Japanese occupied while he harassed their rear supply lines. When that didn't happen, the Japanese were able to focus on defeating the Chindits and in early June, Wingate and only 2/3 of his Chindit force made it back into India. 

Phil Cochran and John Alison, the first leaders of the Air Commandos

Despite the disaster of Operation Longcloth, Wingate gained the support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was a known admirer of the unconventional in military operations. When Churchill headed to Quebec to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt to confer on war plans, Churchill brought Wingate to explain to Roosevelt plans for a second assault on Burma. While Churchill was thinking ahead and wanting a new Burma assault as a means of strengthening the British Empire in Asia, Roosevelt was intrigued with Wingate's plans as it could reopen the Burma Road and strengthen Chiang Kai-Shek's position in China which might provide the Allies bomber bases for which to take the war to the Japanese Home Islands. As Wingate briefed Churchill and Roosevelt, he had in mind a much bigger operation that Operation Longcloth with a much larger Chindit force that had its own air transport and air support, in effect, giving the Chindits their own air force. Roosevelt was captivated by the plan and passed it on to the head of the USAAF, General Hap Arnold, to organize the air assets that Wingate and the Chindits needed. Ordinarily this sort of order would have been a distraction from General Arnold's vision of a massive strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Japan, but he saw a chance to prove the value of air power in supporting a large ground formation deep behind enemy lines. General Arnold needed a USAAF officer who could lead the new unit and interviewed Colonel Phil Cochran who made his name as an aggressive pilot in North Africa. The other was a friend of Colonel Cochran, Colonel John Alison, who had flown hazardous supply missions "over the Hump" from India to China to keep Chiang Kai-Shek supplied. Prior to that, Alison had six kills while flying P-40s with the Flying Tigers in China. Each man recommended the other to General Arnold as they each wanted a fighter combat command in Europe. General Arnold settled the issue by choosing both Cochran and Alison to get Wingate's air force organized with the order "To hell with paperwork; go out and fight!" Figuring that two commanders made no sense, they agreed that Cochran would be the commander and Alison would be his deputy. But their long prior friendship made them highly attuned to each other's thinking as they set out to create the most unique force in the history of the USAAF. 

Initially calling their outfit Project 9, they went to London to meet with Wingate and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the supreme Allied commander in Southeast Asia. Cochran and Alison quickly enlarged their force well beyond what Wingate initially requested and one month later, briefed General Arnold and Arnold's own boss, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. The Project 9 force was more than just C-47s and some medium bombers. It would have its own fighters, light aircraft for jungle resupply missions, gliders for insertion of troops and even helicopters. Arnold and Marshall were impressed with the plan and gave them the go-ahead. Instead of the Chindits marching back into Burma, the Project 9 transport force of C-47s and gliders would insert the entire Chindit force deep into Burma and keep them resupplied. Medium bombers and fighters would provide dedicated air support to the Chindits and no one else. All the pilots were volunteers and training began in North Carolina on 1 October 1943 at Raleigh-Durham Airport and Seymour-Johnson Army Air Field. The Project 9 force grew to 346 aircraft with Douglas C-47s and Waco CG-4 gliders for transport. Stinson L-1 Vigilant and L-5 Sentinel light aircraft would be used for air evacuation and resupply given their short field performance. North American B-25 Mitchells and P-51 Mustangs formed the sharp end of the force's spear with a handful of Sikorsky R-4 helicopters which were still in testing at Wright Patterson Field. Even General Arnold was impressed with the resourcefulness of Cochran and Alison in getting what was still an experimental program added to their force. 

Emblem of the 1st Air Commando Group, the first Air Force special operations unit

After arriving in India, the Project 9 force was designated the 5318th Provisional Unit (Air), but General Arnold had always been referring to the group as air commandos, so on 29 March 1944, they were redesignated with his blessing to become the 1st Air Commando Group. For most of early 1944 the air commandos trained with Wingate's Chindits but they weren't sure if the Chindits were comfortable with flying into Burma at night on the C-47s and CG-4 gliders. Wingate sent a message "Please be assured that will go with your boys any place, any time, any where." The gliders even carried pack mules which would be used in moving about the jungle in Burma, hence the mule on the patch of the 1st Air Commando Group. 5 March 1944 was the go-day for Operation Thursday when the air commandos and Wingate's Chindits would take the war back to the Japanese in Burma. But that'll be a subject for a future blog post! The 1st Air Commando Group is now the 1st Special Operations Wing of the USAF Special Operations Command based at Hurlburt Field in Florida. Wingate's assurance "Any place, any time, any where" remains the motto of the air commandos with the emblem of the 1st SOW showing the words "Any Time Any Place".

Source: From a Dark Sky: The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations by Orr Kelly. Pocket Publishing, 1997, pp 21-42. Photos: USAF, Imperial War Museum, Wikipedia.

Discord at the 1944 Chicago Conference and the Formation of ICAO

Adolf Berle, FDR's aviation advisor

Early in the Second World War, the Allied powers were already giving consideration to the commercial importance of aviation in a postwar world. In 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull placed a brilliant diplomat and lawyer under him, Adolf Augustus Berle, in charge of aviation affairs. Berle soon became President Franklin D. Roosevelt's primary advisor on commercial aviation affairs. Berle saw the postwar potential for aviation threatened by two factors- on one hand were what he thought were outdated imperial notions espoused by the British and on the other hand were ruthless commercial interests typified by Juan Trippe, the chairman of Pan American Airways. Given his legal background, Berle sought to construct a legal framework to govern aviation commerce worldwide and keep powerful political interests and business interests in check. By 1943, Berle had Roosevelt's approval to forge ahead with an international conference to be held before war's end to start laying down the ground rules for postwar commercial aviation. His concepts were for what today would be called "open skies". By the 1943 Quebec Conference, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had on their agenda the discussion of postwar aviation policy in addition to the primary discussion of war strategy. At their meeting, Roosevelt established that open skies would be the United States position on postwar commercial aviation and the wheels were set in motion for an international aviation conference to be held the following year in Chicago. 

British aviation interests were forwarded by Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook. During the war as Minister of Aircraft Production he was instrumental in streamlining and increasing the efficiency of British aircraft production to meet wartime needs. Britain saw aviation as the key to retaining its Empire with far flung bases in its many dependencies and Commonwealth nations that would rival the American network of bases. However, many in the British government saw that despite wartime production demands, the American aviation industry still managed to design and build civilian aircraft as well as hold the technological lead in bomber designs that would undoubtedly influence postwar airliner designs. Combined with the already legendary ruthlessness of Juan Trippe at Pan American Airways, the development of postwar British aviation policy became one of protectionism- safeguard the economic livelihood of the British aircraft industry, maintain the British Empire and use British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) as the primary means of maintaining the aviation links of Britain's far flung empire. 

With the Americans and the British certain to dominate the upcoming 1944 Chicago Conference, a third party emerged that would have great influence as well, and that was the Canadians. During the Second World War, Canada was of strategic importance in that it sat astride not just the North Atlantic sea lanes to support the war effort in Europe, but it also had key landing fields that formed the western terminus of the North Atlantic air routes to Europe. As long as aircraft were unable to cross the Atlantic non-stop, Canada was a necessity in the any postwar discussion. Led by the chairman of Trans-Canada Airlines (TCA, which later became Air Canada), Herbert Symington, the Canadians not only presciently saw the North Atlantic air routes as lucrative in the postwar period, but they also saw themselves as conciliators between the American and British viewpoints. Lacking Britain's extensive aviation industry and far flung empire, in general the Canadians tended to lean towards the United States' position of open skies. In the run up to the 1944 Chicago Conference, Canadian diplomats were already playing the part of honest broker between the Americans and the British. 

Given the time, it's obvious the Axis powers weren't invited. The Soviets were invited but early on they made it clear they were dead set against any internationalization of commercial aviation. As far as Josef Stalin was concerned, any air traffic within their vast nation would be their sole domain only and would only connect with other airlines at specific points. 

With the formation of the United Nations in October 1945, the Americans formally invited all the signatories to the UN charter to the Chicago Conference in November to discuss postwar aviation policy. Initially the Soviet Union agreed to send a delegation but backed out of the conference the day before it opened. The only nation not present in Chicago besides the Soviet Union was Saudi Arabia. 

Lord Swinton, head of the UK delegation

Adolf Berle led the American delegation at Chicago and Herbert Symington led the Canadian delegation. Curiously, Lord Beaverbrook didn't attend and instead sent one of his deputies, Philip Cunlife-Lister, the First Lord of Swinton, as head of the British delegation. He had just been appointed as the new Minister of Aviation though his prior experience in aviation paled in comparison to his superior, Lord Beaverbrook. Unfortunately for the British, they didn't place the priority on the Chicago Conference that the Americans and Canadians did. Even some of the British delegation present failed to attend any of the sessions where more specific discussions took place. 

At the opening of the conference, Berle outlined the five freedoms of the air: 

1. Freedom to fly over a nation (today we'd call this overflight rights).

2. Freedom to land in a nation but without picking up passengers or freight (today we'd call this a technical stop).

3. Freedom to fly passengers and freight from the home nation to another nation.

4. Freedom to fly passengers and freight from another nation back to the home nation. 

5. Freedom to fly passengers or freight of a another nation between any two intermediate points (today we refer this as Fifth Freedom rights or cabotage, a contentious issue in commercial aviation).

The first two freedoms weren't too contentious and for obvious reasons- there was no economic benefit or harm to the involved parties. But invoking its protectionist stand, Swinton pushed for a system of quotas in relation to the third and fourth freedoms to prevent what he thought would be postwar flood of American airlines starting services to British cities. France, Australia, and New Zealand supported Swinton's quota system where service frequencies and the number of passengers would be tightly controlled to prevent domination by the Americans. Key to the quota system was "escalation" which was supported by the British aircraft industry- as they were able to recover from wartime production and shift to production of airliners to rival American designs, the quotas would be gradually relaxed as the British (and any of their supporters) got onto a more competitive footing. 

The American delegation led by Adolf Berle wouldn't have any of it. It was clearly apparent to the attendees that Adolf Berle and Lord Swinton had a genuine dislike of each other and it was up to Herbert Symington and the Canadians to try to bridge the divide. The Canadians proposed a less stringent system that tried to take into account both American and British positions. It was at this point with both the Americans and British unwilling to give ground that a series of errors in communication would harm British interests. Lord Swinton contacted Lord Beaverbrook for further instructions but he was unavailable. When Beaverbrook called back, Swinton blew him off due to the hour with the classic quote "Max, go to hell, it's three o'clock in the morning here!" Beaverbrook then sent a telegram stating "You may abandon escalation." To the relief of the attendees, the British announced their concession to go with the Canadian proposal on regulating the third and fourth freedoms. After their announcement, a second telegram from Beaverbrook arrived "Before 'abandon', insert 'not'", but it was too late as Swinton told Beaverbrook "A British delegation does not go back on its word."

With agreement now on the third and fourth freedoms (which today we know as bilateral air agreements), the conference moved on to the hot button topic, that of Fifth Freedom rights. Again, the British refused to budge from their protectionist position and Prime Minister Churchill himself made it known that Fifth Freedom rights were unacceptable. President Roosevelt himself tried to convince Churchill to yield, saying "It has been a cardinal point in American policy throughout that the ultimate judge should be the passenger and shipper."Churchill pushed for an adjournment of the Chicago Conference to a later date, but Roosevelt insisted that it would continue until an agreement was reached. Herbert Symington, leading the Canadian delegation, supported the Americans and they also insisted that the conference would continue until an agreement was reached. Soon the Latin American nations joined the American resolution. The crucial swing came when the Dutch, keenly aware the British restrictions threatened KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, joined the Americans along with other European nations. Only New Zealand, France, and Australia supported the British. Churchill still refused to budge and Roosevelt continued his own intervention with Churchill, even to the point of assuring him that American airliner designs would be as readily available to British airlines as they would be with American operators. One of the American delegates, Ralph Damon, who was president of American Airlines (and later would be a long time head of TWA) even went as far to offer the British fifty Douglas DC-4s if they would at least compromise. 

The ICAO flag

The Dutch delegation with the support of the Canadians put forth a compromise in which the first two freedoms were explicitly recognized (something that was already the case anyway), the third and fourth freedoms would be subject to individual review between the involved nations, and the fifth freedom was essentially tabled for later discussion. While Adolf Berle was bitter at the failure of his dream of open skies, he did get his legal framework. At the conclusion of the conference, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was set up under the aegis of the United Nations as a means for nations to exchange and maintain aviation regulations. The headquarters would be in Montreal-this was a compromise from the Canadians once again, with Britain and France wanting ICAO based in Europe and the Americans wanting ICAO based in the United States. The first president of ICAO was an respected American aeronautical engineer, Edward Warner, who would serve at the head of ICAO until his retirement in 1957. Today the ICAO has the Edward Warner Award given to for meritorious accomplishment in civil aviation. 

ICAO is the true legacy of the 1944 Chicago Conference. It created a mechanism for not just the exchange of regulations and safety advances in aviation but also a means for the standardization of the protocols and procedures in civil aviation worldwide. The Freedoms of the Air continue to be a contentious issue with open skies agreements coming only after considerable struggle amongst the signatory nations. Most remarkable has been the transformation of the United States from being an advocate for open skies to being protectionist of the domestic airline market with not just restrictions on cabotage but also foreign investment in US airlines. 

Source: Empires of the Sky: The Politics, Contests, and Cartels of the World Airlines by Anthony Sampson. Random House, 1984, pp 62-71. Photos: Wikipedia.