The Origins and Development of the American Escort Carrier

The USS Long Island as built, the first escort carrier

At the start of the Second World War with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Kriegsmarine had fifty-seven U-boats in its fleet, but of those fifty-seven submarines, only twenty-two of them were suitable enough for carrying out combat patrols in the Atlantic and that small group consisted of the 626-ton Type VII boat and the larger 1,032 ton Type IX boat.  The Type VII was the most common U-boat used in the Battle of the Atlantic and with 703 hulls constructed, was the most widely built submarine class in naval history. The larger Type IX submarine was designed for extended long range patrols but lacked the maneuverability of the Type VII. Approximately 283 hulls of this larger class were built during the Second World War. Prior to the onset of the war, the head of the U-boat force, Rear Admiral Karl Doenitz, had stated that he would need at last ninety operational boats for the Atlantic at the start of hostilities and that eventually 300 would be needed to guarantee that he could choke off Great Britain's Atlantic supply routes. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler didn't believe that the war would take long and dragged his feet on authorizing rapid expansion of the U-boat force for some time. The Atlantic U-boat menace is the context to understand the development of the escort carrier- in fact, as it would turn out, the escort carrier was one of the keys to victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. 

Led by the British construction of the HMS Argus which was commissioned in 1918 as the world's first aircraft carrier with a full-length deck (thereby setting the pattern of the aircraft carrier configuration) after conversion from a partially completed ocean liner, the United States Navy had the collier USS Jupiter converted to the first American aircraft carrier, the USS Langley, which was commissioned in 1922. Compared to the large fleet carriers that would become famous in the Second World War, both the HMS Argus and the USS Langley were much smaller vessels with the Argus coming in at 15,775 tons and the Langley at 11,050 tons. But both navies gained valuable experience in operating the ships, the US Navy in particular using the Langley to fine tune procedures for high tempo flight operations. The interwar period was a time of transition for both the US Navy and the Royal Navy as they transitioned from big gun warships to aircraft carriers- during the First World War, the first aircraft carrier in naval history, the HMS Furious, had started out as a cruiser converted with a partial flight deck before getting upgraded to a the pattern set by the HMS Argus with a full length deck. During it's time with a partial flight deck, though, the Furious did retain its aft gun turret, leading to some discussions in the Royal Navy about hybrid cruisers- vessels that had partial flight decks with cruiser guns. The ideas persisted into the 1920s and with the limits on battleship and aircraft carrier tonnage by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, the ideas of small aircraft carriers arose as a way of making better use of the allowed tonnage. A loophole in the treaty allowed the United States a chance to use up to 25% of its allotted cruiser tonnage for conversion to small aircraft carriers, but this was an idea that many "Big Gun" admirals were reticent to pursue. 

Bruce G. Leighton, early escort carrier advocate

In 1927, USN Lieutenant Commander Bruce G. Leighton wrote an influential paper on light carriers- he had presciently described roles for such carriers to include antisubmarine warfare, supporting larger fleet carriers, scouting and reconnaissance and support of amphibious landings while larger carriers could be freed up to hunt down the enemy's capital ships. He was also motivated by a concern that the loss of a large fleet carrier would be a bigger blow to the Navy's strength than the loss of a smaller carrier based on a cruiser hull. At the time of Leighton's paper, the USS Lexington and the USS Saratoga had just become operational and even though both vessels were much larger and more useful operationally than the USS Langley, they were still just the second and third aircraft carriers in the US fleet. 

With the clouds of war looming on the horizon and Japan pursuing an aggressive expansionist foreign policy in the Western Pacific, in 1935 the US Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair had been considering conversion of ten fast passenger liners into light carriers. Conversion of an existing hull was believed to be the most expeditious way to get hulls into the fleet. The plans for light carriers might have died off had it not been for men like John S. McCain, the captain of the fourth US aircraft carrier built, the USS Ranger (the Ranger was first US carrier built from the keel up as an aircraft carrier; McCain was the grandfather of Arizona Senator John McCain). He and others in the fleet had wanted up until 1939 approximately eight "pocket-sized" aircraft carriers based on cruiser hulls that could act as outer defensive screens for the larger fleet carriers. The outbreak of the war in Europe furthered ideas of small aircraft carriers in the US Navy as observers watched the British battle the U-boats that were menacing their trans-Atlantic supply lines. Originally the USN thought that small aircraft carriers might have a dual role in providing air cover to the convoys in the Atlantic as well as delivering much-needed Lend-Lease aircraft to the Royal Air Force. As it would turn out, the cause of what would become the escort carrier got its biggest boost in October 1939 from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was a lifelong enthusiast and student of naval history and served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1918 under President Woodrow Wilson. Well-versed in naval affairs, Roosevelt instructed the US Navy to procure a merchant ship for conversion to an aircraft carrier. The ship was to displace 6,000 to 8,000 tons and have a speed of 15 knots and operate a unique air wing made up of either 12 helicopters or autogyros. The vessel would act as a convoy escort and perform antisubmarine warfare missions- the helicopters or autogyros wouldn't carry weapons, but use smoke bombs to mark U-boat locations for attack by destroyers.

Discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, in the weeks following Pearl Harbor led to the decision to obtain two diesel-powered C3-class merchant vessels from the Maritime Commission. The C3 class was designed by the US Maritime Commission as a 492-foot (150m) general purpose vessel that could be easily modified to a variety of roles. Helicopters and autogyros were ruled out as it was felt fixed-wing aircraft were more flexible and capable compared to the rotary winged aircraft of the day. This dictated the need for a full length flight deck. The Navy told the President that conversion to an escort carrier would take 18 months, but to Roosevelt, this was unacceptable. The speed of conversion was essential. He told Admiral Stark that the conversion should take no more than three months. At end of January 1940 two vessels were secured from the Moore-McCormick Line, the Mormacmail and the Mormacland. One ship after conversion would go to the US Navy and the other ship after conversion would go to the Royal Navy. The only organic air cover the British had at the time for the Atlantic convoys were Hawker Sea Hurricanes installed on CAM ships- catapult aircraft merchant ships. It was a one-way trip for the pilot who had no means of recovery other than ditching alongside a ship. Wholly unsuitable for antisubmarine warfare, the CAM ships were really geared towards going after the long-range Focke Wulf Fw 200 Condor maritime patrol aircraft that scouted the Atlantic for the U-boat fleet.

On 2 June 1940 just a few days before Roosevelt's three month deadline, the Mormacmail's conversion to an escort carrier was completed and she was commissioned as the USS Long Island at Newport News, Virginia and designated APV-1 but was soon changed to AVG-1 (Aircraft Escort Vessel). The designations changed two more times during the war as the value of the escort carrier was proven, to ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier) in August 1942 to CVE (Escort Carrier) in July 1943. As built, the USS Long Island was 492 feet (150m) and displaced 13,500 tons and could make 16.5 knots. The original flight deck was only 362 feet with the bridge below the forward edge of the flight deck. Testing showed the need for a longer flight deck, so in the summer after her commissioning the carrier went back into the yards to have a proper full length flight deck. There was one elevator aft and a single forward catapult on the port side. The opportunity was taken during the extension of the flight deck to make other improvements and when she came out of her refit, the ship now displaced 14,953 tons and was faster with a speed of just over 17 knots.

HMS Archer- note the small island not present on the Long Island

The Mormacland was converted a similar configuration but had a small island on the starboard side. She was transferred to the Royal Navy in November 1941 to become the HMS Archer. Despite the getting the second escort carrier built in the United States, the Royal Navy did set out to build an escort carrier of their own with the conversion of the German merchant vessel Hannover to become the HMS Audacity, commissioned in June 1941 to become the first British escort carrier with the HMS Archer as the second such ship. Compared to the USS Long Island and the HMS Archer, the HMS Audacity was very small escort carrier with a displacement of only 6,000 tons with an air wing of just six aircraft. The two escort carriers were a boon to British convoy operations and the Royal Navy ordered five more escort carriers from the United States based on the C3 class merchant vessel hull and based on the USS Long Island with further improvements. These four ships had a 440-foot flight deck and a small island on the starboard side (which the USS Long Island lacked)- they became the HMS Avenger, HMS Biter, HMS Dasher, and the HMS Charger. The last ship of the group was returned to the US Navy in 1942 and became the USS Charger which remained on the US East Coast as a training carrier.

USS Bogue

Much like how the USS Langley was used primarily for testing and experimentation, so too was the USS Long Island in its early career as the first American escort carrier. With the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941, Admiral Doenitz's U-boat fleet began to prosecute its attacks on the US East Coast with 400 ships sunk just in the first six months following Pearl Harbor. With the utmost urgency, a new class of escort carrier was ordered into production based on the experience with the USS Long Island. These vessels were converted from twenty four C3-class hulls as the Bogue-class. Because the Long Island and the first British escort carriers were diesel powered, they were thought to be too slow based on operational experience and the Bogue-class carriers would have steam turbines to drive them to 18 knots. The new escort carriers had a flight deck 442 feet long by 80 feet wide, bigger than the Long Island's flight deck. A single catapult was fitted on the forward port side but the ships had a larger hangar deck and two elevators instead of the Long Island's single elevator. A small island was located on the starboard side as well.

USS Sangamon

Of the twenty carriers based on C3-class hulls that became to Bogue-class, ten of them went to the Royal Navy. The new ships could carry twice the fuel of the Long Island/Archer-class ships and had an improved compartment layout in the hull. As the ships were four feet lower than the Long Island/Archer, they also had better seakeeping qualities. Since the 1942 escort carrier program called for twenty-four ships and only twenty C3-class hulls were available, four Cimarron-class fleet oilers were converted to escort carriers to become the Sangamon class. As these ships were based on larger hulls, they were longer at 553 feet with 23,250 tons displacement and could carry two squadrons of aircraft. Launched originally with just a single port side catapult, the four ships of the Sangamon class got a second catapult on the starboard side in 1944. Being former fleet oilers, the Sangamon class carried a significant amount of fuel which could also be used to top off the escorting destroyers in the task force. They were more stable at sea than the Bogue-class and could make 19 knots. The four ships of this class were the USS Sangamon (CVE-26), USS Suwanee (CVE-27), USS Chenango (CVE-28) and USS Santee (CVE-29). The Navy wanted more Sangamon-class carriers, but fleet oilers were also in demand for underway replenishment of the carrier battle groups in the Pacific.

Aware of the shortage of hulls for conversion to escort carriers, American shipbuilding magnate Henry J. Kaiser had proposed to President Roosevelt in 1942 the construction of an escort carrier design capable of 20 knots in quantity production from his shipyards which were turning out Liberty cargo ships at an impressive rate. Using prefabricated sections and mass production techniques used on the Liberty ships, the Casablanca-class escort carriers would become the most produced aircraft carrier class in naval history with fifty carriers built between July 1943 to the last Casablanca-class built in July 1944, an astounding achievement for the American wartime shipbuilding industry. The ships were built in Vancouver, Washington, and then delivered to Astoria, Oregon for final fitting-out before commissioning.

Schematic of the USS Casablanca

The Casablanca-class (the lead ship, USS Casablanca, was designated CVE-55) were 498 feet long with a 477-foot long by 80-feet wide flight deck that had two elevators and a single port side catapult. The engines were spaced apart to prevent a hit from taking out the engine room and the hangar deck was quite wide for an escort carrier. They were also the first all-welded carriers which made them lighter at 10,900 tons displacement but this gave the Casablanca-class superb maneuverability. Despite the quantity production and design features, the Casablancas weren't as good as the Sangamon-class carriers and the Navy insisted on something better if not as good as the Sangamon class. This resulted in the ultimate and final escort carrier class of the war, the Commencement Bay class.

USS Commencement Bay, the ultimate escort carrier

Based on all the operational experience of escort carriers so far, the Commencement Bay class ships were based on an improved Sangamon-class layout but longer with a length of 577 feet and a displacement of 24,900 tons. The flight deck was much stronger to operated heavier aircraft and the two elevators also operated faster to speed flight operations. Two forward catapults were standard with a bigger island as well. The ships could make 20 knots and had the heaviest defensive anti-aircraft armament of any escort carrier of the war. The lead ship, the USS Commencement Bay (CVE-105) was commissioned on 27 November 1944. Thirty-three ships were ordered but only nineteen were completed by war's end. Two of the completed carriers went straight into mothballs after completion. While the Commencement Bay-class carriers didn't see as much action as their predecessors, several of the ships did go on in the postwar period to become the first helicopter assault carriers and served until the arrival of the Iwo Jima-class LPH carriers in the 1960s.

Source: Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic by William T. Y'Blood. Bluejacket Books/Naval Institute Press, 1983, pp 11-26. Photos: US Navy, National Archives, Wikipedia.

The Birth of the Air Commandos: The Roots of USAF Special Operations

Colonel Orde Wingate, a most unconventional British officer

The fall of Burma in early 1942 threatened to derail the Allies' plans for Asia. The British withdrawal from Burma to India was the biggest, costliest, and longest not to mention most humiliating withdrawals in the military history of the British Empire. Coupled with the loss of Singapore, it left India as the only bulwark against Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. With 12 million acres of rice paddies and an annual rice production of 8 million tons, Burma was an important logistical asset to the Japanese Empire and it also gave them control over the southern end of the Burma Road, a 717-mile supply route that was being used to provide supplies for General Chiang Kai-Shek in central China in his fight against the Japanese. Japanese military planners hoped that cutting off Chiang would mean less troops would be needed in central China to keep him in check. With dark days ahead on the minds of British officials in India, a most unconventional British officer arrived with an audacious plan to take the fight back into Burma. Colonel Orde Wingate had already gained a reputation as an unconventional war specialist leading guerrilla units in Africa and the Middle East against Axis forces. What he lacked in conventionality for a British officer he more than amply made up in his leadership abilities to inspire the men in his command. He created a jungle force made up of Indians and British called the "Chindits", which was a corruption of the Burmese word "chinthe", the fierce dragon that statues that guarded Burmese temples depicted. In February 1943, Wingate led 3,000 Chindits in Operation Longcloth. They penetrated deep into Burma on foot and scored early successes cutting Japanese rail routes. But Wingate lacked heavy guns as the Chindits were on foot and the Royal Air Force proved unable to provide the necessary air support. Wingate also counted on a conventional counter-offensive to keep the Japanese occupied while he harassed their rear supply lines. When that didn't happen, the Japanese were able to focus on defeating the Chindits and in early June, Wingate and only 2/3 of his Chindit force made it back into India. 

Phil Cochran and John Alison, the first leaders of the Air Commandos

Despite the disaster of Operation Longcloth, Wingate gained the support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was a known admirer of the unconventional in military operations. When Churchill headed to Quebec to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt to confer on war plans, Churchill brought Wingate to explain to Roosevelt plans for a second assault on Burma. While Churchill was thinking ahead and wanting a new Burma assault as a means of strengthening the British Empire in Asia, Roosevelt was intrigued with Wingate's plans as it could reopen the Burma Road and strengthen Chiang Kai-Shek's position in China which might provide the Allies bomber bases for which to take the war to the Japanese Home Islands. As Wingate briefed Churchill and Roosevelt, he had in mind a much bigger operation that Operation Longcloth with a much larger Chindit force that had its own air transport and air support, in effect, giving the Chindits their own air force. Roosevelt was captivated by the plan and passed it on to the head of the USAAF, General Hap Arnold, to organize the air assets that Wingate and the Chindits needed. Ordinarily this sort of order would have been a distraction from General Arnold's vision of a massive strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Japan, but he saw a chance to prove the value of air power in supporting a large ground formation deep behind enemy lines. General Arnold needed a USAAF officer who could lead the new unit and interviewed Colonel Phil Cochran who made his name as an aggressive pilot in North Africa. The other was a friend of Colonel Cochran, Colonel John Alison, who had flown hazardous supply missions "over the Hump" from India to China to keep Chiang Kai-Shek supplied. Prior to that, Alison had six kills while flying P-40s with the Flying Tigers in China. Each man recommended the other to General Arnold as they each wanted a fighter combat command in Europe. General Arnold settled the issue by choosing both Cochran and Alison to get Wingate's air force organized with the order "To hell with paperwork; go out and fight!" Figuring that two commanders made no sense, they agreed that Cochran would be the commander and Alison would be his deputy. But their long prior friendship made them highly attuned to each other's thinking as they set out to create the most unique force in the history of the USAAF. 

Initially calling their outfit Project 9, they went to London to meet with Wingate and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the supreme Allied commander in Southeast Asia. Cochran and Alison quickly enlarged their force well beyond what Wingate initially requested and one month later, briefed General Arnold and Arnold's own boss, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. The Project 9 force was more than just C-47s and some medium bombers. It would have its own fighters, light aircraft for jungle resupply missions, gliders for insertion of troops and even helicopters. Arnold and Marshall were impressed with the plan and gave them the go-ahead. Instead of the Chindits marching back into Burma, the Project 9 transport force of C-47s and gliders would insert the entire Chindit force deep into Burma and keep them resupplied. Medium bombers and fighters would provide dedicated air support to the Chindits and no one else. All the pilots were volunteers and training began in North Carolina on 1 October 1943 at Raleigh-Durham Airport and Seymour-Johnson Army Air Field. The Project 9 force grew to 346 aircraft with Douglas C-47s and Waco CG-4 gliders for transport. Stinson L-1 Vigilant and L-5 Sentinel light aircraft would be used for air evacuation and resupply given their short field performance. North American B-25 Mitchells and P-51 Mustangs formed the sharp end of the force's spear with a handful of Sikorsky R-4 helicopters which were still in testing at Wright Patterson Field. Even General Arnold was impressed with the resourcefulness of Cochran and Alison in getting what was still an experimental program added to their force. 

Emblem of the 1st Air Commando Group, the first Air Force special operations unit

After arriving in India, the Project 9 force was designated the 5318th Provisional Unit (Air), but General Arnold had always been referring to the group as air commandos, so on 29 March 1944, they were redesignated with his blessing to become the 1st Air Commando Group. For most of early 1944 the air commandos trained with Wingate's Chindits but they weren't sure if the Chindits were comfortable with flying into Burma at night on the C-47s and CG-4 gliders. Wingate sent a message "Please be assured that will go with your boys any place, any time, any where." The gliders even carried pack mules which would be used in moving about the jungle in Burma, hence the mule on the patch of the 1st Air Commando Group. 5 March 1944 was the go-day for Operation Thursday when the air commandos and Wingate's Chindits would take the war back to the Japanese in Burma. But that'll be a subject for a future blog post! The 1st Air Commando Group is now the 1st Special Operations Wing of the USAF Special Operations Command based at Hurlburt Field in Florida. Wingate's assurance "Any place, any time, any where" remains the motto of the air commandos with the emblem of the 1st SOW showing the words "Any Time Any Place".

Source: From a Dark Sky: The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations by Orr Kelly. Pocket Publishing, 1997, pp 21-42. Photos: USAF, Imperial War Museum, Wikipedia.

Discord at the 1944 Chicago Conference and the Formation of ICAO

Adolf Berle, FDR's aviation advisor

Early in the Second World War, the Allied powers were already giving consideration to the commercial importance of aviation in a postwar world. In 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull placed a brilliant diplomat and lawyer under him, Adolf Augustus Berle, in charge of aviation affairs. Berle soon became President Franklin D. Roosevelt's primary advisor on commercial aviation affairs. Berle saw the postwar potential for aviation threatened by two factors- on one hand were what he thought were outdated imperial notions espoused by the British and on the other hand were ruthless commercial interests typified by Juan Trippe, the chairman of Pan American Airways. Given his legal background, Berle sought to construct a legal framework to govern aviation commerce worldwide and keep powerful political interests and business interests in check. By 1943, Berle had Roosevelt's approval to forge ahead with an international conference to be held before war's end to start laying down the ground rules for postwar commercial aviation. His concepts were for what today would be called "open skies". By the 1943 Quebec Conference, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had on their agenda the discussion of postwar aviation policy in addition to the primary discussion of war strategy. At their meeting, Roosevelt established that open skies would be the United States position on postwar commercial aviation and the wheels were set in motion for an international aviation conference to be held the following year in Chicago. 

British aviation interests were forwarded by Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook. During the war as Minister of Aircraft Production he was instrumental in streamlining and increasing the efficiency of British aircraft production to meet wartime needs. Britain saw aviation as the key to retaining its Empire with far flung bases in its many dependencies and Commonwealth nations that would rival the American network of bases. However, many in the British government saw that despite wartime production demands, the American aviation industry still managed to design and build civilian aircraft as well as hold the technological lead in bomber designs that would undoubtedly influence postwar airliner designs. Combined with the already legendary ruthlessness of Juan Trippe at Pan American Airways, the development of postwar British aviation policy became one of protectionism- safeguard the economic livelihood of the British aircraft industry, maintain the British Empire and use British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) as the primary means of maintaining the aviation links of Britain's far flung empire. 

With the Americans and the British certain to dominate the upcoming 1944 Chicago Conference, a third party emerged that would have great influence as well, and that was the Canadians. During the Second World War, Canada was of strategic importance in that it sat astride not just the North Atlantic sea lanes to support the war effort in Europe, but it also had key landing fields that formed the western terminus of the North Atlantic air routes to Europe. As long as aircraft were unable to cross the Atlantic non-stop, Canada was a necessity in the any postwar discussion. Led by the chairman of Trans-Canada Airlines (TCA, which later became Air Canada), Herbert Symington, the Canadians not only presciently saw the North Atlantic air routes as lucrative in the postwar period, but they also saw themselves as conciliators between the American and British viewpoints. Lacking Britain's extensive aviation industry and far flung empire, in general the Canadians tended to lean towards the United States' position of open skies. In the run up to the 1944 Chicago Conference, Canadian diplomats were already playing the part of honest broker between the Americans and the British. 

Given the time, it's obvious the Axis powers weren't invited. The Soviets were invited but early on they made it clear they were dead set against any internationalization of commercial aviation. As far as Josef Stalin was concerned, any air traffic within their vast nation would be their sole domain only and would only connect with other airlines at specific points. 

With the formation of the United Nations in October 1945, the Americans formally invited all the signatories to the UN charter to the Chicago Conference in November to discuss postwar aviation policy. Initially the Soviet Union agreed to send a delegation but backed out of the conference the day before it opened. The only nation not present in Chicago besides the Soviet Union was Saudi Arabia. 

Lord Swinton, head of the UK delegation

Adolf Berle led the American delegation at Chicago and Herbert Symington led the Canadian delegation. Curiously, Lord Beaverbrook didn't attend and instead sent one of his deputies, Philip Cunlife-Lister, the First Lord of Swinton, as head of the British delegation. He had just been appointed as the new Minister of Aviation though his prior experience in aviation paled in comparison to his superior, Lord Beaverbrook. Unfortunately for the British, they didn't place the priority on the Chicago Conference that the Americans and Canadians did. Even some of the British delegation present failed to attend any of the sessions where more specific discussions took place. 

At the opening of the conference, Berle outlined the five freedoms of the air: 

1. Freedom to fly over a nation (today we'd call this overflight rights).

2. Freedom to land in a nation but without picking up passengers or freight (today we'd call this a technical stop).

3. Freedom to fly passengers and freight from the home nation to another nation.

4. Freedom to fly passengers and freight from another nation back to the home nation. 

5. Freedom to fly passengers or freight of a another nation between any two intermediate points (today we refer this as Fifth Freedom rights or cabotage, a contentious issue in commercial aviation).

The first two freedoms weren't too contentious and for obvious reasons- there was no economic benefit or harm to the involved parties. But invoking its protectionist stand, Swinton pushed for a system of quotas in relation to the third and fourth freedoms to prevent what he thought would be postwar flood of American airlines starting services to British cities. France, Australia, and New Zealand supported Swinton's quota system where service frequencies and the number of passengers would be tightly controlled to prevent domination by the Americans. Key to the quota system was "escalation" which was supported by the British aircraft industry- as they were able to recover from wartime production and shift to production of airliners to rival American designs, the quotas would be gradually relaxed as the British (and any of their supporters) got onto a more competitive footing. 

The American delegation led by Adolf Berle wouldn't have any of it. It was clearly apparent to the attendees that Adolf Berle and Lord Swinton had a genuine dislike of each other and it was up to Herbert Symington and the Canadians to try to bridge the divide. The Canadians proposed a less stringent system that tried to take into account both American and British positions. It was at this point with both the Americans and British unwilling to give ground that a series of errors in communication would harm British interests. Lord Swinton contacted Lord Beaverbrook for further instructions but he was unavailable. When Beaverbrook called back, Swinton blew him off due to the hour with the classic quote "Max, go to hell, it's three o'clock in the morning here!" Beaverbrook then sent a telegram stating "You may abandon escalation." To the relief of the attendees, the British announced their concession to go with the Canadian proposal on regulating the third and fourth freedoms. After their announcement, a second telegram from Beaverbrook arrived "Before 'abandon', insert 'not'", but it was too late as Swinton told Beaverbrook "A British delegation does not go back on its word."

With agreement now on the third and fourth freedoms (which today we know as bilateral air agreements), the conference moved on to the hot button topic, that of Fifth Freedom rights. Again, the British refused to budge from their protectionist position and Prime Minister Churchill himself made it known that Fifth Freedom rights were unacceptable. President Roosevelt himself tried to convince Churchill to yield, saying "It has been a cardinal point in American policy throughout that the ultimate judge should be the passenger and shipper."Churchill pushed for an adjournment of the Chicago Conference to a later date, but Roosevelt insisted that it would continue until an agreement was reached. Herbert Symington, leading the Canadian delegation, supported the Americans and they also insisted that the conference would continue until an agreement was reached. Soon the Latin American nations joined the American resolution. The crucial swing came when the Dutch, keenly aware the British restrictions threatened KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, joined the Americans along with other European nations. Only New Zealand, France, and Australia supported the British. Churchill still refused to budge and Roosevelt continued his own intervention with Churchill, even to the point of assuring him that American airliner designs would be as readily available to British airlines as they would be with American operators. One of the American delegates, Ralph Damon, who was president of American Airlines (and later would be a long time head of TWA) even went as far to offer the British fifty Douglas DC-4s if they would at least compromise. 

The ICAO flag

The Dutch delegation with the support of the Canadians put forth a compromise in which the first two freedoms were explicitly recognized (something that was already the case anyway), the third and fourth freedoms would be subject to individual review between the involved nations, and the fifth freedom was essentially tabled for later discussion. While Adolf Berle was bitter at the failure of his dream of open skies, he did get his legal framework. At the conclusion of the conference, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was set up under the aegis of the United Nations as a means for nations to exchange and maintain aviation regulations. The headquarters would be in Montreal-this was a compromise from the Canadians once again, with Britain and France wanting ICAO based in Europe and the Americans wanting ICAO based in the United States. The first president of ICAO was an respected American aeronautical engineer, Edward Warner, who would serve at the head of ICAO until his retirement in 1957. Today the ICAO has the Edward Warner Award given to for meritorious accomplishment in civil aviation. 

ICAO is the true legacy of the 1944 Chicago Conference. It created a mechanism for not just the exchange of regulations and safety advances in aviation but also a means for the standardization of the protocols and procedures in civil aviation worldwide. The Freedoms of the Air continue to be a contentious issue with open skies agreements coming only after considerable struggle amongst the signatory nations. Most remarkable has been the transformation of the United States from being an advocate for open skies to being protectionist of the domestic airline market with not just restrictions on cabotage but also foreign investment in US airlines. 

Source: Empires of the Sky: The Politics, Contests, and Cartels of the World Airlines by Anthony Sampson. Random House, 1984, pp 62-71. Photos: Wikipedia.

The Complexities of Aiding the Free French Air Force in World War II

Free French Air Force pilot wings with the Cross of Lorraine

With war clouds in Europe looming on the horizon, the British were first to send a mission to the United States in 1938 to determine if their aircraft needs could be met by the Americans since British industry was still barely getting spooled up on a war footing. Encouraged by the British, the French also sent a mission in the same year that resulted in the order of 100 Curtiss Hawk 75 fighters (P-36 being the US Army Air Corps equivalent). In the following year further contracts were finalized for more aircraft which also included the first orders by any nation, including the United States, for the Douglas DB-7 light bomber which would later enter US service as the A-20 Havoc. With the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939, deliveries temporarily ceased according to the terms of the US Neutrality Acts, but an amendment was quickly put in place that allowed British as well as the French to "carry" their own war materiel on their own ships. Following the fall of France and the signing of the French-German armistice in June 1940, the outstanding contracts with the United States were transferred to the British. The unoccupied portion of France became Vichy France with Marshall Petain as its leader. As part of the armistice agreement with the Axis, a German-Italian commission was put in charge of the activities of the Vichy Air Force that were full of restrictions and disbandment of French units as the Axis powers feared continued defections of French pilots to the Allies. French units in North Africa, however, were not under the jurisdiction of the German-Italian commission and continued to operate their US-built aircraft and it was these forces loyal to the Vichy regime that briefly resisted the Allied landings during Operation Torch. 

British Blenheims were some of the first aircraft given to the Free French.

A nucleus of French forces under General Charles De Gaulle (made up mostly of those evacuated from Dunkirk and other defections from the Vichy regime) tried to get Allied support as the "Free French", but this proved to be complex given that the legal French government at the time was Marshall Petain's Vichy regime which signed the armistice following the fall of France. And if that wasn't hard enough determining how to support a group fighting what was recognized as the legal government of France, the Roosevelt Administration even had recognized the Vichy regime as the legitimate French government! De Gaulle's efforts weren't helped any when despite a promise to Roosevelt to not seize the Vichy-controlled islands of St-Pierre and Miquelon off the Canadian coast, he did anyway. But on a perhaps moral level, aid would have to be provided to the Free French forces. Initially aircraft for the new Free French Air Force were diverted from British deliveries with the approval of the Roosevelt administration. In 1941 the Free French formed the French National Committee with General De Gaulle as its head to represent French interests independent of the Vichy regime. 

The Cross of Lorraine was used in addition to the French roundel.

With the coming of the landings in North Africa during Operation Torch, the Roosevelt Administration tried to develop an alternative to De Gaulle as he was seen as too difficult to work with for the war in Europe. Secret contacts had been made with dissidents within the Vichy government and General Henri Giraud was seen as an altnerative to De Gaulle- General Giraud had been captured by the Germans during the fall of France and sent to a prison camp, from which he had escaped back to Vichy France. This dissident element in the Vichy regime were promised large infusions of American aid if they could get the Vichy forces in North Africa to not contest the Torch landings, the idea that this group would then be put under Giraud's command as an alternative to De Gaulle. It would have worked as there were many French personnel who were loyal to Giraud and considered De Gaulle a traitor for having escaped to Britain before the fall of France. On the day of the landings on 7/8 November 1942 the Allies found themselves juggling three French factions- De Gaulle's Free French forces, Giraud and the dissidents in Vichy France, and Marshall Petain's defense minister, Admiral Francois Darlan, who was in North Africa at the time of the invasion and lobbied to halt Vichy resistance to the Allied landings. In exchange, Darlan would be made head of the new French government. This ended up enraging De Gaulle. Vichy resistance did end and Darlan ordered the French fleet at Toulon scuttled to prevent their takeover by the Germans. Darlan would later by assassinated in December 1942 and replaced by General Giraud, but by this point De Gaulle managed to emerge as the uncontested leader of the Free French following a 1943 agreement between Giraud and De Gaulle to unify their forces with Giraud as commander in chief and De Gaulle as the political head of the Free French. 

French B-26 units had their Cross of Lorraine on the nose in blue.

On 3 July 1943 De Gaulle's Free French Air Force was formally merged with Giraud's forces in North Africa with the set up of a joint commission with both US and British representatives in addition to the Free French to determine the aircraft needs of the Free French Air Force. By this point most aircraft used by the Free French could be identified with the use of the Cross of Lorraine in addition to the French roundels. Perhaps symbolically, the Escadrille Lafayette would be the first Free French unit to be re-equipped with American aircraft, Curtiss P-40 Warhawks diverted from USAAF stocks that were North Africa already. Over the next several months more aircraft arrived direct from US factories, from Bell P-39 Airacobras, Lockheed F-4/F-5 Lightnings for reconnaissance duties, to Douglas A-24 Dauntless dive bombers and C-47 transports. French trainees were sent to to the United States for flight training and completed their operational training with French units in North Africa prior to the liberation of France. The French Navy also received American aircraft to include Consolidated PBY Catalinas, Lockheed PV-1 Venturas and Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, but rather than operated under De Gaulle's command like the Free French Air Force, the French naval air arm units were placed under US Navy command. 

French Lend-Lease deliveries would continue for most of the war but were cut off prematurely in April 1945 by order of President Harry Truman before war's end due to a diplomatic dispute started when French units chose to obey orders from General De Gaulle instead of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower. De Gaulle had agreed earlier to Eisenhower's overall command and those deliveries outstanding were never released due to the German surrender on 7 May 1945. These issues would continue to simmer between De Gaulle and the United States in the post-war period that would complicate matters in French Indochina and ultimately result in France's withdrawal from NATO in 1967. 

Source: Air Arsenal North America- Aircraft for the Allies 1938-1945 Purchases and Lend-Lease by Phil Butler and Dan Hagedorn. Midland Publishing, 2004, p17, 105-114.